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AIMS AND POLICY

I. *Aim:* The aim of this quarterly shall be to provide a forum (1) for the discussion of Christian faith and life on the basis of the Lutheran confession, (2) for the application of the principles of the Lutheran Church to the changing problems of religion and society, (3) for the fostering of world Lutheranism, and (4) for the promotion of understanding between Lutherans and other Christians.

II. *Policy:* The editors will welcome contributions that are likely to be helpful in the furtherance of the aims set forth above. It will be required of such contributions that they be frank and fair in their discussion of moot questions; that they be free from controversial animus; and that their contents be of real scholarly and practical value to the readers. Difference of opinion between contributors, or between a contributor and the editors, does not of itself exclude articles from publication since the editors do not hold themselves responsible for the opinions of contributors.

THE LUTHERAN QUARTERLY

Volume VI AUGUST, 1954 Number 3

CONTENTS

BODY AND SPIRIT IN CHRISTIAN THOUGHT ..... *Conrad Bergendoff* 187

KARL HEIM AND SACRIFICE OF INTELLECT ..... *Paul L. Holmer* 207

THE WARFARE BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY
Niels C. Nielsen, Jr. 220

THE LOGOS DOCTRINE IN THE EAST-WEST CONTROVERSY
John Joseph Stoudt 227

NOTES AND STUDIES

Some Theses of Philip Melanchthon ..... *Charles L. Hill* 245
The Lutheran Church During the French and Indian War ..... *Glenn Weaver* 248

LIFE AND THOUGHT IN WORLD LUTHERANISM

Finland: Debate on the Sacred and the Secular ..... *Jacob W. Heikkinen* 257
Germany: Luther Society Reorganized; A Roman Catholic Historian on the Indulgence Controversy ..... *Theodore G. Tappert* 260

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES

King, *Introduction to Religion* (Harold L. Ditmanson) 263
Anderson, ed., *The World's Religions* (Stanley L. Olsen) 264
Tillich, *Love, Power and Justice* (Harvey D. Hoover) 265
Ruff, *The Dilemma of Church and State* (George W. Forell) 266
Butterfield, *Christianity, Diplomacy and War* (Wm. H. K. Narum) 267
Samuel, *A Foundation of Ontology* (Wm. H. K. Narum) 269
Schilpp, ed., *The Philosophy of Radhakrishnan* (Charles W. Kegley) 269
Berkouwer, *Modern Uncertainty and Christian Faith* (G. F Schott) 272
Wenger, *Introduction to Theology* (G. F. Schott) 272
Runestam, *Svensk kyrka och teologi i dag* (C. G. Carlfelt) 273
Ferm, ed., *The Protestant Credo* (T. T. Jensen) 274
Jørgensen, *Martin Luther* (Walter G. Tillmanns) 274
Vajta, *Die Theologie des Gottesdienstes bei Luther* (U. S. Leupold) 275
Hubatsch, ed., *Europäische Briefe im Reformationszeitalter* (E. C. Nelson) 276
Thulstrup, *Breve ok Akstykker Vedrørende Søren Kierkegaard* (P. L. Holmer) 277
Milton, *Preaching from Isaiah* (C. C. Madsen) 279
The Student's New Testament (Harvey D. Hoover) 280
Eby, *The God in You* (Harvey D. Hoover) 280

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Body and Spirit in Christian Thought

By Conrad Bergendoff

A FEW YEARS ago I read a paper by a noted teacher of religion which revealed a way of thinking fundamentally different from a central teaching of Christianity. In it the Spirit of God was repeatedly referred to as over against the Holy Spirit. Creation was considered the realm in which the Spirit of God operated. The Holy Spirit was confined to the realm of redemption. The author nowhere justified the distinction. Rather he seemed to take for granted that such usage of these terms was valid.

In itself the incident may be unimportant. But it may also be illustrative of a kind of attitude which unconsciously underlies much of modern thinking. The Holy Spirit is not directly related to the created world in which we live and whose contours are the framework of our existence. Rather he belongs to some more restricted area where saints live, move, and have their being. Creation is the universe as known by our minds and senses. Many have banished the idea of God altogether from this material world, but many others still allow to God some direction of or responsibility for what he has made. Yet it is a God who rules by might or wisdom. Holiness is reserved for some other form of divine action, less powerful and less universal.

We may recognize herein a new variation of an ancient heresy. For Gnosticism still lives on and is perpetuated by those of every generation who cannot reconcile the world they experience with the God they believe in. They can believe in a God of love, who does good to all creatures. But the world is a place of strife and ugliness, of hate and defeat, of unpunished wickedness and unrequited goodness. Since the idea of God is so alien to the observation of the senses, what more natural than the conclusion, if there be a God this is not his domain. He must be elsewhere, if he is, and earth and heaven are as widely separated as man's misery is from his blessedness.

To this type of thought we must reply in the words of Luther, *"Es gibt kein andrer Gott!"* There is only one God, only one Spirit of God, which is Holy Spirit. Our demarcation of continents of creation

and redemption are wholly artificial. Redemption is not to be referred to some state of existence apart from the world we daily inhabit. Redemption is the redemption of creation, as Paul was among the first to discern. "For the *creation* waits with eager longing for the revealing of the sons of God; for the *creation* was subjected to futility—because the *creation* itself will be set free from its bondage to decay and obtain the glorious liberty of the children of God. We know that the *whole creation* has been groaning in travail together until now" (Romans 8:19-22). The *ktisis* of this passage is the created world of which the first book of Genesis speaks, the world which the Creator formed and which is the scene of human history. Man has dishonored the Creator (Rom. 1:25), but man is still the work of God's hands and God the proper object of man's adoration. Neither redemption nor holiness are after-thoughts. The Creator is eternally holy, and redemption is the return of creation to its original purpose.

The separation of the realm of creation from that of redemption has often paralleled a division between body and spirit. Somehow the body of man has been considered a natural consequence of creation which requires nothing miraculous to account for its continuing through reproduction and heredity. The redemption of man has been associated primarily with his spirit, and the adjective spiritual has not always modified man as existing in the present body. It is an ancient habit to associate the weakness and sin of man with his material body, so that it is from a bodily existence that he is to be freed when his salvation is considered. Christianity has never fully shaken off the influence of Greek mysticism which early fastened itself on the New Testament idea of redemption. We are far from the earthy region of the Gospels when we enter the rarefied atmosphere of Plotinus who, as his disciple put it, was ashamed of his body. To liberate the soul from a prison house of the body is not the liberation which Jesus proclaimed as the aim of his ministry. Though he applied to himself the Isaiah passage which speaks of "the Spirit of the Lord" as being upon him, it was to the poor of flesh and blood that he came to preach good news, and the "captives," the "blind," the "oppressed" were men and women like unto ourselves.

The Gospels give no basis for a theory of redemption which saves souls apart from the bodies to which they belong. What God has joined together, philosophers and theologians should not put apart. But they

have been guilty of divorcing the bodies and souls of men which God made one at creation, and their guilt is not diminished by their plea that thus salvation would be facilitated. Until we have a theory of redemption which meets the whole need of man we have failed to understand the purpose of him who became incarnate that he might be able to save humanity. "Consequently," the letter to the Hebrews asserted, "when Christ came into the world he said,

> Sacrifices and offerings thou hast not desired,
> but a body hast thou prepared for me;
> Then I said, "Lo, I have come to do Thy will, O God" (Heb. 10:5, 7).

The doing of the will of the Lord is in a body moved by a spirit, and a genuine Christianity will interpret the "spiritual" in terms of a body. Sin is often enough associated with the members of the body or the sensuous. If the forgiveness of sins is to be a reality it must be a forgiveness of the sins committed by the body. Thus redemption cannot be thought of apart from the nature of the person who is redeemed.

The body has never been given the place in Greek thought which it has in the biblical writings. Plato set a fashion which the church was never able to overcome. Accordingly the human body was subordinated to a series of essences which realized themselves in the created world, but even in the physical world the soul was superior to the body. This in itself threw the biblical conception out of focus, but even more unfortunate consequences followed when the "spirit" of man was somehow identified with the Greek "soul" and the body was made to mean the Pauline "flesh." Thus the antithesis of "spirit" and "flesh" became the counterpart of "soul" and "body" with the result that the body was considered "earthy," "flesh," and the seat of sin.[1] In Christian thought Platonic and Neoplatonic ideas have reigned almost supreme, but the apparent victory of this philosophy does not change the fact that the Bible has a very different picture of man.[2]

1 "In Christianity the radical Pauline opposition of 'flesh' and 'spirit' has made this dualistic theory of human nature one of the ruling conceptions in Western thought." A. O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Cambridge, 1948), p. 198.

2 The Greek notion of "soul" is described in E. Rohde, *Psyche*. In the teaching of Pythagoras, "the soul of man—regarded entirely as the 'double' of the visible body and its powers, is a daimonic immortal being that has been cast down from divine heights and for a punishment is confined within the 'custody' of the body. It has no real relationship with the body; it is not what may be called the personality of the individual visible man: any soul may dwell in any

There is in the biblical story of creation no suggestion that the bodily existence was due to sin. On the contrary, sin enters after man is aware of himself. Nor is sin associated with the body any more than with the spirit. Man sins through an act of will—and will, if anything, is incorporeal. However, the important fact is that the Bible does not separate will and body. It is man that sins, man considered in his totality, choosing and acting, but neither choice nor act is referred to some supposed "part" of man. Greek philosophy has done Christian theology little service in contributing its whole metaphysical apparatus toward an explanation of the "nature" of man and the "nature" of sin.

The Epistle to the Philippians tells us that the Incarnate One "was made in the likeness of men" (2:7), but Christian theology has refused to identify the incarnation with the taking on of something sinful. He "was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin" (Heb. 4:15). There is nothing in Scripture to indicate a distinction between his body and our bodies as such. There is much that refers to our bodies as temples of God (I Cor. 1:19). The incarnation is a guarantee that the body of man is itself a gift of God no less than the spirit that dwells therein.

"Your bodies are the members of Christ" is the teaching of the apostle, who knows full well that men do not always use them for that

body. When death separates it from the body the soul must first endure a period of purgation in Hades and then return again to the upper world. Souls invisibly swarm about the living. The whole air is full of souls. Upon earth, however, the soul must seek out another body, and this may be repeated many times. So it wanders a long way, passing through many bodies of men and beasts. . . . The conditions of the new incarnations and the character of the new life-time are governed by the performances of the past life" (p. 375). "The practical philosophy of the Pythagorean school is founded upon a conception of the soul as absolutely distinct from 'nature' and, in fact, opposed to it. It is thrust into the life of nature, but it is in a foreign world where it preserves its self-enclosed individuality intact and from which it escapes into independence to undergo ever-renewed incarnations" (p. 376).

Plato's conception is summarized thus: "The soul is a pure spiritual essence; it contains nothing within it that is material. . . . It stands nearer to the whole world of the everlasting Ideas than anything else that is not itself an Idea—it is 'most like' to the Idea" (p. 465). "The soul, to which sense—perception, feeling, emotion, and desire are only added from outside—is in its own imperishable nature nothing but pure capacity of thought and knowledge, with which indeed the power to will that which is conceived in thought seems to be directly associated. Though no organic connection exists between them, yet there is a certain 'symmetry' between the individual soul and the body that is lent to it" (p. 467). "Man's effort must be directed not so much to ritual purity as to the preservation of his knowledge of the eternal from eclipse through the deceptive illusions of the senses; toward the concentration and gathering together of the soul within itself; its withdrawal from contact with the ephemeral as the source of pollution and debasement" (p. 470).

purpose. They may make them "members of an harlot" instead of "being joined unto the Lord" (I Cor. 6:15-17). Men may "yield" their "members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin" instead of "as instruments of righteousness unto God" (Rom. 6:13). But the sin is not "in the members"; it is in the yielding to wrong service. The body becomes an instrument of unrighteousness—in itself it is only an instrument. The tendency of human beings to locate their sin in bodies is itself a delusion, springing from a mind—if we were justified in differentiating between mind and body, which we are not, on biblical grounds.

Just as little as sin can be considered as originating in the body, so redemption cannot be interpreted as an escape from the body. Again we are far removed from the Oriental view of body and spirit. For redemption takes place *in* the body and is a redemption *of* the body. In that classic passage (Romans 6) where St. Paul discusses the relationship of the Christ with the Christian, the tense is not a future one, referring to some celestial habitation of disembodied spirits, but a vividly present one, where man and the functioning of his body is the object of consideration. Sin is not to rule in "your *mortal* body," the body we now and here possess. "Yield not your members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin: but yield yourselves unto God, as those that are alive from the dead." And how did we come to be alive from the dead? "We are buried with him by baptism into death," "our old man is crucified with him, that the body of sin might be destroyed (i.e., the body giving itself to sin)," "reckon yourselves to be dead indeed unto sin"—all these passages describe one effect of Christ in our *mortal* bodies. But "reckon yourselves alive unto God through Jesus Christ our Lord," "like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life," and "in that he liveth, he liveth unto God." When men serve unrighteousness they are dead, and mind and spirit and body partake of this condition which is death as far as man's relationship with God is concerned. In Christ there is a resurrection from the dead—a raising of body, mind, and spirit from servility to a wrong Master and a turning of man in his totality toward the true Master whose gift is eternal life.

The Christian church has in too great a measure lifted this passage out of the context of earthly life and made the resurrection of the body an event altogether beyond the grave. Certainly it must be clearly taught

that there is such a resurrection. But between the moment when man enters into the newness of life and that entrance into a new order of existence, there is here on earth a "walking in newness of life" which has not received in Christian theology the full consideration it needs. For it is not a walking either in one's sleep or on clouds, but a walking in the midst of daily duties in society which involves all the powers of the body raised to serve Christ. Salvation is not alone of a spirit, but of man whose spirit lives in a body, and therefore the description of a spiritual life must be in terms of what the body does in its functioning within the body that is the church and the body which is human society.

The New Testament term "flesh" is not a designation of the body as opposed to the soul or spirit of man, but is a description of the life which is "enmity against God" (Rom. 8:7). While the human body is an instrument and as such not in itself "flesh," man as a whole can turn from God and live *kata sarka.* In general, the life of the flesh is the life which "is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be" (v. 7). It is the condition of those who have not experienced the resurrection power of Christ. Only they can escape the life of the flesh who have the spirit of Christ. "If the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your *mortal* bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you" (v. 11). The body of the sinner, as well as his soul, is dead in sin until the raising power turns the mind and body to the Lord's service. Living "after the flesh" (v. 13) results in death; living "through the Spirit" is to have the spirit of adoption so that "neither death nor life nor any other creature shall be able to separate us from the love of God" (8:38-39).

Rather than removal from the body or from the world in which the body lives, Christian redemption means a renewal of the body and a subjection of bodily life to the service of God in this sphere of "mortal" bodies. Much of the dualism which has filled the minds of Christian philosophers has been mistaken. For it has differentiated between a world of spirit and of sense which has no biblical foundation, and has emphasized an otherworldliness in time and space, whereas the otherworldliness of the Scriptures is primarily one of *kind* of life. The redemptive power is a power that creates. Inasmuch as Christ now lives—"death hath no more dominion over him" (Rom. 6:9)—and lives in the Christian, who

lives because of Christ, there must be a manifestation of that life in the social sphere where the Christian dwells.

The Christian theologian is under no obligation to preserve the ancient distinction between spiritual and material. The Platonic world of ideas, existing prior to and independent of the material forms in which they expressed themselves, has been the background of much of Western thought. But there is little in common between this conception of being and becoming and the biblical teaching of creation. Even the Supreme Being of philosophy is another than the God of the Testaments. To Plato "goodness" was the pre-eminent character of this Being from whom all the fullness of life proceeded, but it was a "goodness" which was synonymous with self-sufficiency. And between the First Cause and the hierarchies of essences which formed the heavenly world a relationship existed which man's reason might comprehend but God himself could not transcend. We are hardly aware of the hold of this mythology on the Western mind, leading even the interpreters of Scripture to fashion the contents of the Bible according to the forms and moulds of Plato and his followers.[3] Luther sensed the incongruity of a theology that was more intent on reconciling itself with philosophy than manifesting the far more realistic and radical truths of Scripture. He restored to the church the revelation of the character of God—a God whom none could know as he knows himself—a *Deus absconditus* even from the highest of human intelligences. But he was a God who had revealed himself in a measure that men could grasp by the help of his own Spirit—a God who in compassion and love gave of himself that man might attain to the purpose of his creation. He was a God who entered into human history, revealed himself through human events, and contended against hostile powers for the saving of his creation. The scene is not the dim light of contemplation but the world of living men and women in whose lives the great issues of victory or defeat were involved. The stage was human history itself, the rise and fall of empires, the fortunes of a peculiar people, the decisions of individuals,

3 Cf. Augustine, *The Magnitude of the Soul,* trans. by J. J. McMahon (New York, 1947), p. 121: "The brute soul is more closely bound to the body, and, of course, the senses belong to the body, the senses that the soul uses for food and for the pleasure that it derives from the body. But because reason and knowledge transcend the senses, the human soul, by means of reason and knowledge, withdraws itself as far as it can from the body and gladly enjoys the delights of the interior life. The more it stoops to the senses, the greater its similarity to the brutes."

affecting their own fates and the fate of their fellowmen. The locus of revelation was not a cave on whose walls shadows played before the eyes of seers turned from the sun, but in the open spaces under starlit heavens or in the noonday marketplace or wherever men determined their ways. The stuff of life was a kind of materialism that the biblical writer considered as God's own creation, which needed no apology. He did not need to divorce mind and body to think the thoughts of his mind. His thoughts were of the actions of God in material bodies. The Platonist never made clear what was the nature of the mind which reasoned about the essences above and beyond material forms. The biblical writers would have more in common with the modern psychologist who knows that the mind functions physiologically. And just as thought apart from brain would be impossible for us, so it is impossible for the human mind to think of anything which is not related somehow to the forms the body beholds.

These considerations are not altogether abstract. They touch on very pertinent realities in the life of mind and body, spirit and matter. They correspond to some far-reaching consequences in the attitudes of Christians in both the more restricted sphere of individual behavior and the far-reaching policies of organized churches.

In 1948 the Orthodox Church replied to an invitation to participate at Amsterdam in the formation of the World Council of Churches. The answer was in the negative and was explained in a document prepared by Archpriest G. Razoumovsky.[4] To a pronouncement of the Oxford Conference (1937) that "for a Christian the only supreme authority is God," the Russian spokesman made this significant reply: "Yes, but only in the realm of the life of the soul and the spirit and not in the material sphere, for there the state alone is sovereign and carries its own special responsibility to God—food and the world are the realm of the State, salt and light the realm of the Church."[5]

Here, characteristically, soul and spirit are set over against the material, food and the world over against salt and light. One might

4 *The Ecumenical Review*, Vol. I, No. 2 (Winter, 1949), pp. 188-197.

5 Sixth Novella of Justinian (A.D. 535), quoted by Frank Gavin, *Seven Centuries of the Problem of Church and State*, 29-30: "The greatest of those gifts of God among men given from God's great love for man are the priesthood and secular authority. For the former ministers to the things of God and the latter rules over and cares for the things of man." Also, quoted by Gavin, p. 30, a statement in the Manifesto of Archbishop Alexander III (1937): The priesthood "is superior to the worldly authority in the same measure that the spirit is superior to the flesh and the immortal to the mortal."

point out that salt and light are themselves material—as material as food and the world. What the Bible really means by the antithesis is a different kind of material in the salt from that in the thing to be salted. So the life of the soul cannot be opposed to the material sphere, for all the life of the soul which we know of is in a material form. But there is a spiritual existence which manifests itself in the acts of the body which can be worlds apart from another kind of spiritual force revealing itself in a different series of bodily acts. The opposition, fundamentally. is between a good life and a bad life, between good men and bad men, good forces and evil forces, good deeds and evil deeds. Spirit is as much implied in the evil as in the good. Material is neither evil nor good, but spirit is neither evil nor good except as it is manifested in material. To say that religion has to do with the spirit and the state with the material is to be blind to the fact that the spiritual makes the state a living power and the material makes the spirit a present reality. The church cannot be relegated to the realm of the spirit any more than the spirit can be distilled out of the material phenomena with which we deal. Church and state are differing bodies but each is dominated by spirit.

Modern materialism is a form of revolt against a development of the spiritual which was far from reality, even if it paraded under the banner of religion. It was a development of Greek Idealism which reached its zenith in Hegelian philosophy. The patient study of nature by a school of scientists who found life on the earth different from the categories of the schools led to a new conception of reality. It took revenge on the Idealistic extravagances by itself going to the other extreme, claiming that there is nothing of spirit.[6] Only the material is real. But there is no necessary antagonism between the Christian faith and a realism which expresses itself in material phenomena. Indeed, that faith has much closer affinity with a world of created things than with a realm of disembodied essences independent of time and space. It has been demonstrated that idealistic philosophy can be as atheistic as materialistic philosophy. Each can make itself a pantheon of gods with whom the God of creation and redemption has nothing in common. The God of Abraham and Isaac and Jacob, the God of Moses and Elijah, of David and Isaiah and Jeremiah, the Father of Jesus Christ and Lord of Paul and John and Peter is a God who deals with men of flesh and

6 Cf. Frederic Lilge, *The Abuse of Learning. The Failure of the German University* (Macmillan, 1948).

blood and enters into relationship with individuals and communities who people and build and destroy this earth. For all its otherworldliness, Christianity is a religion rooted in this world, revealing its truth in this life, and determining its destiny in this aeon.

Christian theology must face squarely the question whether the basic truth of the Gospel has been stated correctly or adequately in the categories of Greek philosophy which, especially in Neoplatonic forms, have been the pattern of its thinking. Dean Inge is doubtless right when he says, "In East and West alike the influence of Plotinus on Catholic dogma, and on the whole intellectual life of the Church, has been enormous and is still operative,"[7] but it is significant that in those formative years of the third century Plotinus was strangely silent about Christianity, standing aloof from it. "The controversy with Christianity he left to his disciple Porphyry,"[8] whose objections were exactly on the problem of creation, incarnation, and the resurrection of the body. Plotinus was more interested in Plato than in Christ. That he should be regarded as a great interpreter of the Greek philosopher is natural. What is harder to explain is the fact that Christian truth has had to be understood in the light of his philosophy rather than in line with its own teachings. The effect has been incalculable when we realize how central in those teachings are the subjects which Porphyry impatiently rejected.

A fairer statement of the content of Christian doctrine is found in a writer of the second century. In a fragment attributed to Justin Martyr[9] the question is asked, "If the Saviour proclaimed salvation to the soul alone, what new thing, beyond what we heard from Pythagoras and Plato and all their band, did he bring us?" The answer is that Christ "has come proclaiming the glad tidings of a new and strange hope to men." The new and strange hope is the renewal of the whole man, body and soul. "For what is man but the reasonable animal composed of body and soul? Is the soul by itself man? No; but the soul of man. Would the body be called man? No, but it is called the body of man. If, then, neither of these is by itself man, but that which is made up of the two together is called man, and God has called *man* to life and resurrection, he has called not a part, but the whole, which is the soul and the body."[10]

7 W. R. Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus* (Longmans, Green & Co., 1918), Vol. I, p. 70.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 65.

9 *The Ante-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. I, p. 299. But the Platonic stream of thought is evidenced very early in *The Epistle to Diognetus*: "The immortal soul dwells in a mortal tabernacle."

10 *Ibid.*, pp. 297, 298.

If our interpretation of the New Testament is correct, what is said concerning the resurrection holds equally in regard to man in this world. Man's redemption is of the whole man, body and soul, and body as well as soul have been raised from a present death to a present life. The fruits of resurrection are to be evidenced in the daily experiences of the Christian, who lives not of himself but in the power of Christ. This doctrine has immediate consequences in every area, but two are of special importance in our day—the field of education and the field of politics.

Education has often been described in terms of spirit apart from the body. Truth, beauty, goodness have been set up as goals. Surely we cannot dispense with these abstract qualities in our thinking, but something is lost when we fail to associate beauty, for instance, with forms which are manifested in material (as painting or sculpture) or sounds (as in music). And the production of beautiful form is certainly associated with bodily actions. So that education which has beauty as an end is inseparably connected with the training of finger and hand and eye and ear. While it is true that the beautiful is not evident to every eye that sees and ear that hears, it is not to be denied that beauty is inconceivable apart from the senses. ". . . nor soul helps flesh more, now, than flesh helps soul." These words of Browning apply to any education of the spirit. It is partly in the mastery of the material that the success of the artist lies. But apart from the material there would be no art—and no genius of the artist.

It is hardly different in the realm of the good. The good life manifests itself in a pattern of actions which involve the hands, feet, tongue —in short the behavior of the body. No ethical education stops with thinking, though too often good intentions are mistaken for good deeds. Only as the thought is translated into concrete deeds can we be sure that the intention is anything more than a phantasy. In the creation story there is no gap between thought and deed. God spoke and it was! Education ought to close this gap so that the good deed is not calculated (for its bearing on some other end) but is the instantaneous expression of the good thought. The Master's word about "Yea, yea, Nay, nay" seems to point toward this more direct and immediate relationship between what we say and what we are. "They say and do not," was the charge laid against the false teachers—and their pupils. When the heart claims to be where the eye is not, then the suggested remedy is drastic—tear out the eye (Matt. 5). And if a hand does not move as

the soul directs, it is prescribed that it should be cut off rather than endanger the whole body—and the casting of the body into hell must surely include the soul. In genuine Christian education there is an emphasis on the body which is strangely missing in idealistic systems where only the intellect seems to be worthy of attention. Probably the contrast is nowhere more startling than in eschatological terms. Opposed to the Nirvana-like repose of the soul which has become absorbed in the Unutterable One, those called blessed of the Father are they who visited the sick, gave a cup of water to the thirsty, and clothed the naked. These inherit the kingdom!

But is not truth entirely immaterial? Here we would seem to have got beyond earthly things and to be moving in a rarer atmosphere—the atmosphere of being and essences, the eternal forms of Pythagoras and Plato, the realities above all material things of space and time. But if so, we are not in the world of Scripture, certainly not of the New Testament. For in the New Testament the truth is Incarnate. Christ said, "I am the truth." And not as a shadow of reality, but as a gatekeeper, he could affirm that "no man cometh unto the Father, but by me" (John 14:6). Far from considering a human form in a degraded and transient existence, the Son of Man could say "the Father dwelleth in me" (v. 10). Paul later echoed this statement when he assured the Colossians that "in Christ dwelleth all the fulness of the godhead bodily" (Col. 2:9), an assertion he felt called on to make "lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men" (v. 8).

The central truth of Christianity is the Incarnation. But the God who dwells in Christ is not a God known apart from him, whose workings therefore can be in some measure predicted because we would expect this from the kind of God we had known him to be. The true God is known only through the life and death and resurrection of Jesus Christ! When we reject the revelation in Christ because it does not accord with other notions we have of an invisible, eternal, immaterial God, then we have made these notions a measuring rod by which to judge Christ. We have set up an idol and rejected Christ, who is otherwise than the idol. We have ideas of truth which we employ to deny the Truth. But the Incarnate One must be the criterion of our ideas, the judge of our philosophy. Human truth is embodied in the Son of

Man, and man may not claim to know divine ideas which justify him in looking for another kind of God than he reveals.

If we are sincere in our belief that Jesus Christ is God and man, then progress in religious knowledge consists in discovering ever more fully how his presence affects our bodily existence. There is no higher form of Christianity than doing his will in all our experiences, and this means training eye and ear and tongue and hand and foot to the end that "the life of Jesus might be made manifest in our body, that the life of Jesus might be made manifest in our mortal flesh" (II Cor. 4:10, 11). Christian truth has sometimes been sought in high, esoteric places, in an intellectual realm or even a dim mysterious sphere, whereas the example of Gospels and Epistles suggests that in the *doing* of the will of God we shall come to understand him (John 7:17). The ministry of Christ has hallowed the ordinary, everyday, obscure event and made it a vehicle for the glory of God. The miracles of God are wrought in humble, unknown folk, whose bodies are restored no less readily than their sins are forgiven. They are healed in order that they might walk, but they are to "walk worthy of the vocation wherewith" they "are called" (Eph. 4:1).

The new life is not a "spiritual" life in the sense that it is opposed to a "bodily" life. St. Paul makes the distinction between the "old" and the "new" man. Putting off the old man is not "to shuffle off this mortal coil," but giving place to a new nature, a new "spirit of mind." The distinction is less between spirit and flesh than between a body subject to a will of one's own and a body sensitive to the dictates of the Word of God. The distinction is not primarily one relating to time or eternity, this life or one to come, but between a mortal body which has become a slave of sin and a mortal body which can be an "instrument of righteousness," and "old man, corrupt according to deceitful lusts" and a "new man, created after God in righteousness and holiness of truth" (Eph. 4:22-24).

When we say that a realistic conception of the place of the body in Christian thought would have an immediate bearing on education, we mean that more honor would be done than has usually been the case to the training of the senses, the creative arts, the practical life of the individual. Education has become secular partly because the church has forfeited its claim to what the fingers can be made to do when redeemed and transformed into instruments of righteousness. They can be made

to glorify God when exercised to master the strings or keyboard, when taught to mix color and compose forms on the canvas, when occupied in making the tools of modern machinery or operating the controls of industry. "The earth, O Lord, is full of thy mercy: teach me thy statutes" (Ps. 119:64) is the praise and prayer of one who sees nature, not as a chaos, but as an order where man may perceive the laws of God and know that "thou hast established the earth" as certainly as "thy word is settled in heaven" (vv. 89-90).

The fact that time changes is no argument against the significance of the temporal and spatial. Christian hymnody has been too strongly influenced by the grass which flourisheth in the morning and withereth in the evening (Ps. 90) and forgotten that the other side of the picture is the Lord, who has been our dwelling place in all generations. We sing too thoughtlessly that "earth's vain shadows flee," in the spirit of "all is vanity," rather than acknowledging him who is not a part of universal vanity, but to whom the psalmist could appeal, "Let the beauty of the Lord our God be upon us: and establish thou the work of our *hands* upon us; yea the work of our *hands* establish thou it." Though the eternal kingdom is always a gift of God and not an achievement of man, the redeemed are citizens even now of that kingdom and their deeds here and now have a significance not inferior to that of a state beyond the grave.

That Christians despaired of the Roman Empire and waited for the immediate appearance of Christ to set up a new order of things is no justification for Christians in the twentieth century to close their eyes to their vocation. That even when we have done everything we yet are unprofitable servants who have not brought in the kingdom by our efforts is the admission of every good Christian. But they are not good Christians who for that reason refuse to work in the vineyard. Rather, they are those who by the talents given them to invest in the tasks of our generation. Those who were accounted blessed by the Lord were they who were doing the very things which the unworthy failed to recognize as the marks of the heirs of the kingdom. It is a paradox of the Christian faith that while expecting the coming of the kingdom we produce the fruits of the kingdom. And it may be that faith is more perfectly exercised by perceiving the presence of the Lord and his assignment here in this present shape of things than by peering out into the skies looking for his return.

From this point of view the distinction between church and state seems less a reality than from a political standpoint that divides society into sacred and secular, eternal and internal, material and spiritual. The political organization of any time or place is a given form in which the Christian finds himself, but so also is the ecclesiastical body of which he is a part. Facts would hardly warrant a theory that the evil of the world is organized in a political form and the righteousness of the world is in an ecclesiastical form. Church and state are not counterparts of right and wrong. The Christian church has always in the main considered political organization a necessary and a right condition for the attainment of certain results on which the very existence of social life depends. And since society includes every individual in it, the structure and functioning of the political organization must take cognizance of these individuals. The church believes that there is a justice and righteousness which God demands of every society. To that law of God the state is subject, whether it wills or not. If it does admit their higher sovereignty, it will shape its laws and actions accordingly, and testify to its subordination, even if not all citizens fulfill their duties in a willing obedience. If the state ignores or repudiates its subservience to a higher will of God, it will—so the church holds—sooner or later pay the penalty of transgression. The church must ever direct the state to its obedience and witness to the Law by which individuals and societies alike are ultimately judged.

The other task of the church concerns the witness to the Gospel, by which it is kept alive as a communion of believers. But this Gospel is never separated from the proclamation of the Law—to its own members as well as to society at large. In preaching the forgiveness of sins it offers what is nowhere else to be found. A new people is thus formed, a fellowship of forgiven sinners who live in communion with Christ and one another. This is the church which Luther calls the mother of all who believe and are born into the people of God. Word and sacrament are the means this church has to win men and women to faith. But the sins which are forgiven are sins of men and women in society, in relationship with one another. They are the same men and women who are citizens of the state. There can thus not be a clear demarcation between the membership of church and state. The same individual is in each. But he functions differently in one than in the other. In the church he is turned to God, in the state toward his neighbor. In either case both body

and soul are involved. Therefore, the distinction between spiritual and material is faulty. In his worship he must take along all that concerns body as well as soul. In his citizenship he must act spiritually as well as with his physical frame. In turning to God he brings his sin with him as well as his faith. In turning to man he needs faith in order to keep him from sin.

Some at least of our error derives from an unconscious identification (sometimes it may even be conscious) of righteous-minded men with the church and evil men with the state. But this is not justified, partly because the Christian is in state as well as church and partly because there is unrighteousness in the Christian's life throughout all his earthly career.[11] Another cause of error is our failure to discriminate between the functions of church and state. We cannot expect the state to perform the duty of the church, nor expect the church to do what is the constitutional purpose of the state. Even as the eye cannot substitute for the foot, so church and state must operate within their own sphere.

The really important distinction is between unrighteousness and righteousness, both of which exist in church and state. There is a righteousness of the law which is the constitutive principle of the state. There is a righteousness of the Gospel which brings men and women to the new life of the church. Against the unrighteousness of the law there are forces arrayed in constant conflict within the state. And in the church, no less, there is an unceasing struggle against the enemies of the Gospel. God, as Luther put it, has two hands, Law and Gospel. He works with both, and neither arm is shortened. The enemies which he contends with are flesh and blood as well as spirit. Here again the division—spirit, body—is without validity. The forces on either side are incarnate. The sins for which Christ gives forgiveness are in both church and state. The righteousness of God applies to both. The body and soul are in both. The Word is for all of man and for all men, and all of it is for mortal man.

Undoubtedly our difficulty in determining the role of the Christian in the state is due partly to the confusion caused by the age-old conflict of church and state and the presuppositions of that conflict. In view of the foregoing we can see how easily the notion developed that the church represented the spiritual and the state the temporal or

11 Cf. Gustav Aulen, *Church Law and Society* (New York, 1948), esp. Ch. 3.

material interests of man. This, indeed, was the fundamental principle of the division of power between the papacy and the empire since the days of Charlemagne. But no such equilibrium presented itself in practice, and the struggle turned more consistently on the issue, which of the two was the more important. Gregory VII fought the battle through and established the pontiff as supreme. We may consider Bernard of Clairvaux as thinking it through. "To St. Bernard there are not two truly correlative levels of life both sanctioned by God. There is actually but one, and it is that of the divine society, the Church. 'What is more servile and undignified on the part especially of the chief pontiff than to work constantly over worldly matters?' he asked Eugene III. In St. Bernard it is perfectly clear that his reservation of a dignified place for the spiritual office as over against temporal concerns dictates a demand for the supremacy of the spiritual over the temporal."[12] It would be interesting to know how much influence this distinction had on the following centuries which created a world of the spirit apart from the realm of "worldly matters." In assuming to itself the sovereignty over the "spirits" of men, the church cast a shadow of insignificance over their bodies which had dire results. The mystical realm that was designated the home of the spirit became far removed from the actual life of the men and women who made up humanity. It was to require an intellectual revolution to bring men back, later, to the understanding of man which would do justice to his physical nature.

The heritage of the past is seen, too, in an unrealistic view of the composition of church and state. Figgis has made clear to us that "in the Middle Ages, the Church is used to distinguish the spirituality from the laity, and in nine cases out of ten it means the ecclesiastical body—a churchman meant one who belonged to the Church in the narrower sense of its governing body. . . . Church and State in the sense of two competing societies did not exist; you have instead the two official hierarchies—the Court and the Curia, the King's officials and the Pope's. . . . It is a quarrel between two different sets of people."[13] The Roman Church claimed rule over the souls of men, but the church was essentially the hierarchy. Its officers, by derogating the function of statesmen, made themselves increasingly dominant over the concerns

12 Frank Gavin, *Seven Centuries of the Problem of Church and State* (Princeton, 1938), pp. 76-78.

13 J. N. Figgis, *The Political Aspects of St. Augustine's "City of God"* (Longmans, Green, 1921), pp. 189-191. Quoted by Gavin, *op. cit.*, p. 62, Note 3.

of men, for all material interests were subordinated to the spiritual. The laity were excluded from the seats of government—except as they were tolerated.[14] The effect of this removal of power from the laity has been little noticed in medieval studies. Certainly in some countries it meant a radical change. In Sweden, for instance, the synods were at first connected with the law moot, and the laity were included, for in the early missionary period there was no distinction. But soon the sessions were moved to the cathedral and became exclusively clerical.[15] The interest of the peasants thus became absorbed in the church, not as a society primarily, but as an organization of officials. To the diminishing rights of the citizen the term "temporal" was applied, while the more honorable "spiritual" was reserved for that which belonged to the clergy. In the long run human nature revolted against this false dichotomy, and the results of the explosion are such that to this day the layman has been unable to adjust himself to what is "church" and what is "state." And the most disastrous vengeance is that which has denied any sphere to the church and both philosophically and politically arrogated all of life to the sphere of the material.

We cannot claim that Luther has solved the predicament of modern man. But we can rightfully assert that he has restored to the term "spiritual" a more biblically correct significance. In 1527 he wrote, "Alles das jenige, so unser Leib äusserlich und leiblich tut: wenn Gottes Wort dazu kommt und durch den Glauben geschieht, so ist's und heisst geistlich geschehen, dass nichts so leiblich, fleischlich oder äusserlich sein kann, es wird geistlich, wo es im Wort und Glauben gehet, dass geistlich nicht anders ist, denn was durch den geist und glauben in und durch uns geschieht, Gott gebe, das Ding damit wir umgehen, sei leiblich oder geistlich. Scilicet in usu, non in objectu, spiritus est. Es sei Sehen, Hören, Reden, Greifen, Gebären, Tragen, Essen, Trinken oder was es wolle. Denn wer seinen Nächsten dient, und tuts leiblich, so ists ihm kein Nütze, Denn Fleisch ist kein Nütze. Tut ers aber geistlich. das ist, so es sein Herz tut aus dem glauben in Gottes Wort, so ists Leben und Seligkeit."[16]

14 J. N. Figgis, "Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century," in *Cambridge Modern History,* Vol. III, p. 742: "the medieval view—the priest—a divinely appointed—the Prince—a divinely tolerated power."

15 Sigurd Kroon, *Det svenska präasmötet under medeltiden* (Stockholm, 1948).

16 *W.A.* 23:189. Quoted by A. Runestam, "Ordningsteologi," in *Svensk Teologisk Kvartalskrift,* 1937, 2, p. 142. Compare also *W.A.* XXXVI, 666 (Predigt zu I Kor. 15, 1533): "Es soll ein geistlicher Leib sein, und eben derselbige Leib, der zuvor natürlich gewesen ist und das

A Swedish author, commenting on "The Gospel and the Secular Authority in Luther," makes this comparison between the medieval and the evangelical attitudes toward government: "In contrast to the obedience which the Roman Church demanded of the secular authorities, what Luther urged is of an entirely different character. In the latter there is no thought of subordination to the spiritual regime, but rather he demands that the secular authority shall recognize the Gospel or the divine Word as its own authority—the secular authority must profess that God and Christ is Creator." "It is in law that this secular authority has both its religious foundation and its norm."[17]

As the Christian himself is a creation of the Holy Spirit, he is called to exercise creative powers in the world of which he is part. The heart which the Spirit has created in man is active in a body, no less a gift of God than the heart. This body and soul of man is not in a vacuum but surrounded by all the material of the universe and by a host of human relationships. Each word, each deed, is a creating of something new and unique which in turn sets in motion an infinite series of consequences. Man resembles his Creator in possessing this perilous power of creating. But always human creativeness deals with the given situation—in home, among fellows, in the laboratory, in the marketplace, in the legislative hall. Man shapes his own mind and body, he influences the mind and bodies of his contemporaries. This is no shadow play, no mystic intercourse of disembodied wraiths. The modes of intercourse may be difficult to explain, may even be hidden from human discernment, but the results are always in terms of bodily reactions —whether the body be that of the individual or the body politic, ecclesiastic, or the half-glimpsed structures we call the institutions of society.

In the remarkable passage in Romans 8 Paul inextricably interweaves body and spirit in his rhapsody of redemption. Through the Spirit that raised Jesus from the dead our *mortal* bodies shall be quickened. We are but the first fruits of a deliverance which is not complete until creation itself shall be delivered from the bondage of

viehisch Wesen geführt hat, ebenderselbige soll geistlich werden. Sonst wären wir feine Gesellen und könnten sagen, wo wir gesündigt haben: 'Der leib hat gesündigt.' Aber du wirst nicht allein an der Seelen getauft und gepredigt und durch Evangelion gesegnet, sondern am Leibe. Er soll nicht dahinten bleiben. Und soll werden ein geistlicher Leib gleichwie Christi Leib am Tage der Auferstehung."

17 G. Törnwall in *Svensk Teologisk Kvartalskrift*, 1937, 1, pp. 67, 68.

corruption. Both we and creation await "the redemption of the body" (v. 23). Then the sons of God will be manifest (v. 19), for the body of man will no longer be carnally minded or subject to infirmities, and creation will be freed from those powers which pervert it from the obedience of the Creator. Ultimate redemption is not a flight from the body but the gift of glorious liberty of the soul and the body of the children of God.

Karl Heim and Sacrifice of Intellect

By Paul L. Holmer

IN A WORK of huge compass called *Der evangelische Glaube und das Denken der Gegenwart* Karl Heim, of Tübingen, is again essaying the relation between the province of Christian faith and the provinces of human learning. In a spirit alien, perhaps, to much of contemporary European Protestant theology, and even to much of current Roman Catholic thought, the German theologian specifically discusses the results of contemporary learning and not the categories of knowledge. Thus his problem is not precisely that of relating reason to faith as this problem has usually been considered but, instead, of relating faith and its theological categories to the cognitive details, and generalizations from them, which concern the nature of man and the physical world. Karl Heim's efforts bespeak wide erudition and a skillful command of detail, both, of course, essential to becoming aware of the issue at hand as well as the attempt to resolve it. The nature of the question as he conceives it should not lead the reader to expect the kind of analysis which is typical of post-Kantian philosophy and theology. What analysis there is, is expended upon the content and the theory within various fields of learning and not upon the forms of intelligibility nor upon the possible forms of religiosity.

Though each of Professor Heim's five volumes (and a sixth is forthcoming, all parts of the same work) has its own significance, I choose here to comment only upon Volumes IV and V, both of which clearly exhibit the argument of the entire work and, besides, so state the case as to overlap in appeal with the kind of issue with which much of Anglo-American literature is concerned. The two works are *Christian Faith and Natural Science* and *The Transformation of the Scientific World View*.[1] Readers of Heim's earlier writings are perhaps amply cognizant of his somewhat idio-syncratic approach. He seems to avoid addressing the communities of either the faithful or the learned in their

1 Both are published in English translations by the SCM Press, London, 1953. The first is Volume IV in the series and was published in German in 1949; the second, Volume V, was first published in 1951.

own terms. But in these two volumes the problem he shares with both communities gives him egress immediately; and whatever the ultimate judgment about his solution, there can be little doubt about the pertinence of his inquiry. For, though both theological and philosophical currents are running against Heim by denying the possibility of the dependence of ethical commitment or religious faith upon cognitive propositions, yet philosophers and theologians must continue to speak to the issue in order to make their negations relevant. And it is to this issue that Karl Heim speaks with great learning and at surprising length. In what follows I shall address myself to three considerations by which his work may be evaluated and described. These are, first, his problem; second, the presuppositions of the problem thus stated; and, third, a criticism or two.

I

There is a certain sense in which Karl Heim is akin to Rudolf Bultmann. Both German theologians are troubled by the breakdown of the argument with which the Christian church addresses the world. They are concerned to diagnose the failure of communication and propose a remedy. For both men an argument must be dialectical and dialogical. An argument presupposes two points of view and two arguers. But the irony is that the church's dialogue is actually an instance of the church talking to itself, a monologue as it were. And there is no one to convince because no one is really listening. Bultmann finds that the Christian church has few listeners and few dialectical opponents because the *kerygma* is overlaid with certain components which, while seeming to be biblical, are yet mythological. Without the myth faith can be related to the believer more primitively and more nakedly than it can with the myth. Bultmann believes the negative task of stripping the myth from the Gospel message to be of positive theological and religious benefit; for it means that the accretion within which its relevance was once made evident for others is removed, and thus it once again leaves the faith-elements negotiable and accessible to contemporaries.[2] At this point Heim finds the difficulties to be more complex. Although a Lutheran-oriented believer who appears to be

2 Ian Henderson, *Myth in the New Testament* (London, 1952). Cf. also *Kerygma und Mythos*, which contains Bultmann's original demythologizing essay and numerous critiques of it, and Paul Leo, "Kerygma and Mythos," in *The Lutheran Quarterly*, Nov. 1953.

cognizant of Luther's vitality and pertinence, he does not find it sufficient to re-conjugate the Law-Gospel theme, nor does he believe that the *eros* and *agape* themes are sufficiently comprehensive to state an entire theology. And contrary to most of recent Protestant theology, he does not disparage (except with a considerable remainder) the theological and philosophical traditions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

What, then, is his analysis? He finds the current intellectual situation to be disheartening indeed. He believes that modern science and technology (even admitting war, and mass unemployment, and urbanization, and everything else that is "evil") have created attitudes and actions which make religious language and attitudes almost an irrelevancy. It is not that religion offends; it simply does not interest anyone, least of all the learned man. Heim's understanding of secularism allows him to say that the religious issue disappears when the contemporary picture of the physical universe is sketched by scientists and is understood and acted upon by others. Thus he says: "The church is like a ship on whose deck festivities are still kept up and glorious music is heard, while deep below the water-line a leak has been sprung and masses of water are pouring in, so that the vessel is settling hourly lower, though the pumps are manned day and night."[3] And this situation demands a very strenuous and systematic effort if the ship is to be saved. Instead of proposing a negative task for the theologian and biblical interpreter, Heim is intent upon the theologian's again assuming a constructive task of synthesis.

Unlike others who believe theology to be confessional, Karl Heim wants to make theology polemical. He wants theology to plug the leak in the ship of faith! His intent in his entire work has been, and is, to strengthen the tactical arm of the church. He wishes to restore the vigor and enthusiasm and manliness of the theological enterprise. Apparently, therefore, he has no patience with those who, either in ignorance or with intelligence, do either of the following: (a) defend the totality of the church's teaching by isolating a part of it—a single doctrine, for example—and extending its persuasiveness to the totality, or (b) separate theology from learning by stressing its independence. To do the first is to disregard the thoroughness of the scientific world outlook and to imagine that it is weak because another point of view, albeit the Christian, is strong in at least one area. Piecemeal attacks

3 *Christian Faith and Natural Science*, p. 24.

he finds vain, for secularism is rooted, both cognitively and attitudinally, in the "contemporary conception of the physical universe," and whether permission is granted by scientists or denied by theologians, contemporary men become secular in outlook. Even those intimate with theology and the activities of the church admit that this same secularism "traverses our own hearts."[4] In other words, the pervasiveness of the attack of secularism forbids the ordinary kind of critique and demands, instead, a wholesale and complete reconstruction.

In contradistinction to Bultmann, who believes that demythologizing the message is itself religiously important, Heim believes that worldliness and secularism have entered the thought structures of the learned and the ignorant, the believing and the unbelieving, and constitute the world insofar as we respond to it as an order. Worldliness is therefore not a negation, not an absence, not a void; it is something positive and with content, and it can be combatted only by something equally contentful and positive. To negate the secularist world view without providing another would be for Heim a travesty of intellectual and religious justice.

But the situation in Protestantism is even more refined than this, for since Schleiermacher, theology has abstracted some themes from the Scriptures and from history which seem to be always the same—for example, responsibility, salvation, sin, regeneration, etc.—and by developing these ". . . in every direction . . . has thought it could quite confidently leave all the rest to the profane sciences."[5] Heim's point about all of this is that this tactic, which once appeared to be sound, learned, and even evangelical, failed because these same profane sciences have taken over the theological themes and left the churches without an audience.

This is, of course, a very serious charge, for it indites not only the church and its theologians but, as we shall see, science too. For by giving up wrestling with cognitive principalities and powers, theologians have literally let the devil take over—and with the help, of all people, of the scientists! The German theologian is at pains to show that the lack of theological perspicuity and criticism, and the lack of an intellectual and religious dialectic by which opposition is made clear, caused

4 *Ibid.*, p. 25. See also pp. 11-34 and the first few pages of *The Transformation of the Scientific World View.*

5 *Christian Faith,* p. 26.

men of learning who fed on the sciences to fill the vacuum with religious surrogates. Theological independence, besides its inimical effect upon the clergy and the pew, besides its failure to keep Christianity credible, was also an intellectual error. And insofar as theologians and scientists believed in the independence of the cognitive contents of theology from other disciplines, both shared the conviction that the whole was constituted by the part which they cognized. Though Heim does not say so, it would seem that this could be put in terms like the following: that an attempt to make oneself a whole man, a living synthesis, would fail if any part of knowledge (for example, either sciences about the world, or theology without the sciences and philosophy) would constitute the whole man.

The immanent and intrinsic requirements of the intelligence are therefore the other significant aspect of the problem occasioning Heim's writing. Because neither science (at least as it has been understood) nor theology has construed the part in the context of the whole, it is essential to effect a reconstruction in both the theological order and the scientific, or perhaps it would be better to say in the meta-scientific order. Theology, from Schleiermacher to Barth, Lutheran or Calvinistic, is in need of a correction which the author finds possible only as one reassesses the scientific world view. This world view is scientific—that is, it grows out of the cognitive content of the physical sciences—and within its meanings is the nexus by which the content of Christian faith can be communicated to contemporary men. The changes necessary to make theology polemical again, and of tactical use, are not of the nature which would mean a modification of theological content, but they would be of an incremental and an additive sort; the changes necessary to restore intellectual and intrinsic merit to cognitive awareness are to be effected primarily by concessions on the part of scientists as to the merits and extra-scientific bearing of recent physical theory.

II

The resolution of any intellectual difficulty is a function of the concepts or language or both in which the difficulty is construed. It would be a mistake to suppose that Karl Heim's many-volume work could be categorically delineated without a much more detailed analysis of ideas and terms than is offered in these few pages. Therefore, only

a modest endeavor is here proposed, that of analyzing a very few of the attitudes which seem to be involved in the very mode of stating the problem.

First, and perhaps of most importance, is the flat assertion which, because it is asserted and is not argued, functions as an attitude and not as a conclusion, namely, that "all responsible speech and action rest upon an overall picture of reality."[6] This is a very straightforward assertion, and like all obvious "truths" which, Heim says, "everybody today knows from experience," does not have to be repeated. But often such assertions are either empty banalities which tell you nothing at all, or they are simplifications of an otherwise complex matter which can be understood to any degree of intellectual satisfaction only when the complexity is described in many sentences rather than one. For the moment, let us assume that we know what an "overall picture of reality" is. Suppose that it is a kind of sentence or group of sentences found in Genesis 1, or in the assertion that "everything is made of atoms," or "all events are predetermined." Professor Heim takes to be established (and believes that everyone knows the same by experience) what the Sophists of the ancient world sought to establish against Plato and Socrates and numerous other critics. This is the view that the subjective life of speech and action depends upon a view, comprehensive and full, of the way things really are. This has a name in the history of reflection—Sophism. The point is that it gives ethical, and in Heim's instance, religious significance to knowledge of facts. Sophism in religion means that theology, if it is knowledge of God, is conceived to be the cognitive ground from which the Christian way of life is a deduction. Any attempt to deduce a way of life from facts is sophistry, whatever the facts might be. After Socrates' day the willingness of teachers to accept money for teaching the facts which would in turn produce virtue was used to give to sophistry another connotation than the more epistemological meaning. Though there is nothing obvious about Heim's sophistry—it is disguised here, as it always must be—it seems to me that his theological work, together with all theological works conceived in the same mode, are instances of it.

If the contemplation of facts, of views, of even the world itself can somehow produce a kind and quality of human existence, it would seem to be the responsibility of anyone who insists on this to tell us

6 *Ibid.*, p. 37.

"which" facts and "how." At this point Karl Heim does not really carry the argument any further than it was centuries ago. He provides the facts that he believes are important, but he says nothing about the "how," and here is where the difficulty lies. Of course, it is true that some facts startle the observer and others do not. But assent to the truth of a view about anything you please—God, the stars, astronomical distances, the life of Jesus, the occurrence of miracles, the piety of Mary —none of these by itself produces a view of life. Nor does any of them produce the same response in various beholders. What we mean by the truth about events is the endeavor to find that which we can state and agree upon, irrespective of the many qualities of response that are possible. Responses are various, not only to things and events, but also to the truths about things and events. And not all of these responses are a sole function of the things or the events. Some of them depend in large part upon the capacities of the observer. Aristotle discerned that the capacity to wonder was not evenly distributed among men, and other capacities for subjective response are equally differentiated.

The question which is raised by Karl Heim's work is whether or not truth-claims (or even the physical order thus described) translate into "responsible speech and action" directly. If so, are the quantity and the "overall-ness" so important? Or, is the translation indirect? Then, what are the elements essential to the indirect translation? Now, of course, if it is wonder that makes some people interested and amazed and attracted and attentive, then we enter an arena not commanded at all by true propositions or views. A picture of reality, whatever its proportions, is not then constitutive. Surely "wonder" is not an area to be commanded by any writer or his books. Oddly enough, Heim seems to admit this difficulty when he cites Fichte, who told his students to "stop looking at all that surrounds us and concentrate solely on ourselves. . . ."[7] Heim even avers that this is the only way to find God, who cannot be encountered by "objective contemplation of the great law-abiding complex of natural processes."[8] Rather than make the distinction sharp for the intellectual order, Heim chooses to address himself throughout his work to the notion that concerns about God and the self and concerns about physical research somehow overlap or intersect.[9]

7 *Transformation*, p. 247.
8 *Ibid.*, passim. Cf. *Christian Faith*, pp. 202 ff.
9 *Transformation*, p. 112.

Hence, however sharp the distinction is drawn on the one hand, it is blurred and rendered useless for purposes of discriminating analysis by the supposition that knowledge of events somewhere and somehow makes a direct translation into a view of life and a quality of inwardness.

Related to this first presupposition is a second one, which is more difficult to state. Let us examine his argument and see if we can determine its intent. He looks at the physical sciences and finds three major changes produced by recent advances. The notion of an "absolute object" (a kind of thing or substance or existent which has qualities which we know and for which our words or thoughts or knowledge—the subjective response—are but an approximation) is no longer tenable, and for numerous subtle reasons which he is at pains to trace.[10] Belief in the fixed references of time and space for everything knowable is made impossible by the relativity theory, and the absolute determinism of natural events is negated by the a-causal concept used in modern physics.[11] Certainly Professor Heim is right in saying that the picture of a world of things, all related to one another causally and in a space and duration. which are their common measure, was (and perhaps still is) the view accompanying most scientific endeavor.[12] But granting this, Heim proceeds to erect another kind of extra-scientific world view which is compatible with recent science. In so doing he seems to disregard the salutary humility of many scientists who, on the ground of their awareness of the cognitive limits of empirical facts, refuse to generalize or hypostatize views or things which would mean a new metaphysics or a new world view. Even Newton was perhaps not empirical, despite his scientific proclivity, when he gave such enormous scope to space and time. And the criticisms of Newton's reflections were engendered by mathematicians on the one side, who found that the relationship between Euclidean geometry and existence was not itself mathematical, and physicists on the other, who found that the relationship was not observable. The destruction of the old world view was not so much the direct result of the growth of empiricism or empirical knowledge as it was an indirect consequence of the growth of knowledge and a correlative reflection upon the limits of knowledge. World views do not grow without a considerable extra-empirical factor being added.

10 *Ibid.*, pp. 27-64.

11 *Ibid.*, pp. 65-168.

12 Whitehead's *Science and the Modern World* makes this point most clearly, and tellingly too. Cassirer has also explored this issue in a number of his writings.

Karl Heim writes as if the old science produced the old world view, and that the new science produces, in his own instance at least, a new world view. This is much too simple. Belief in an object, absolute if you will, is not a scientific matter. It is extra-scientific and becomes a part of science only when incorporated into the texture of scientific language, and then only by a kind of secular grace! The attempt to construct a metaphysical world view on the results of a science presupposes a kind of correspondence between levels of cognition that simply does not exist. It is possible to construe (even at this date) the empirical results of science with various extra-scientific world views, including, I suspect, those which Heim says most scientists have rejected. Where the correspondence between empirical facts and over-views is so loose, and where, on the other hand, metaphysical views are so loose and so commodious that they will fit the facts of one generation and again the vastly incremented facts of another, another ground than the facts ought to be suspected as fundamental for all metaphysics. This does not, of course, mean that any given metaphysical view is false, but it does mean that verification for a metaphysical assertion does not lie in the facts in the same way as verification of a scientific hypothesis. Or one might say this in another way: because the facts are so ambiguous in respect to their metaphysical bearing (that is, they permit so many, or at least several, without requiring any single one), therefore one ought to suspect a non-intellective and non-factual ground for the metaphysical view. Though Professor Heim hints at this possibility, he never develops the suggestion; instead, in virtue of his argument, he creates in his reader the belief that a metaphysical view, or at least some of them, stand related to bodies of facts or whole sciences almost as hypotheses stand related to individual facts.

Again, lest I be unfair, it is incumbent upon me to point out that Heim does explore selfhood as Fichte had commanded and that he does come up with a kind of Christian world view. In fact, this is the burden of his volume, *Christian Faith and Natural Science*. He finds that the ego lives in a non-polar, non-objective space.[13] This contention, buttressed with countless details and reminiscent of much of the best in existentialist philosophy, Heim finds to be incompatible with secularism but compatible with the transformed world view which recent scientific theory

13 *Christian Faith,* pp. 159 ff. The argument is restated in somewhat different categories in *Transformation,* pp. 200-207 and 240-256.

permits and which Heim himself writes out. The crucifixion of the intelligence, which is thought to be an act of self-denial for Christian intellectuals, is a consequence of misunderstanding. It is only with the now out-moded scientific world view that the *sacrificium intellectus* must take place.[14] With the new and transformed view such a negation of intelligence need not occur. In fact, the continuity which is necessary to bridge the gap between the Christian and the secular is the same as that continuity which can restore integrity to the intelligence of the single knower.

The bridge is built from both sides. The Fichtean and existentialist emphasis upon inwardness and selfhood yields a religious content for Heim which is complemented by the metaphysics arising from the contemplation of scientific knowledge. The latter point must be remembered. It is not the non-sophisticated wonder of the innocent person at the immediacies of nature which yields the metaphysical harvest; rather is it the sophisticated man's understanding of the scientifically mediated facts which are the instrumentalities of the overall picture of reality. And the stress upon inwardness is also a stress upon introspective cognitive awareness or, more properly, upon awareness which seems in Heim's writings to be conceptual but is achieved introspectively. So, here again, the Christian and ethical source claimed by the author is another source of knowledge. Ethicality and Christianity do not have their locus within subjectivity, nor do they stand related to the individual in any kind of immediacy. Both, or together, they are cognitively encountered, and the "enigma of personal existence" becomes of maximal religious significance only when recast by the individual into cognitive forms. This is why it becomes so appropriate to insist that Heim finds the objectification of the intelligence religiously efficacious. Despite his overtures to other modes of stating the Christian faith, and to much of recent neo-Kantian philosophy, he still illustrates the presupposition that knowledge issues in a metaphysics and that metaphysics constitutes the content of theological discourse.

III

There can be no doubt that Heim has been stung by the flexibility and toughness of secularism. His effort to understand it must necessarily

14 *Ibid.*, p. 172.

be substantial and equally strenuous. And the fact that he finds it so distressing is an indication of evangelical zeal that bespeaks a high degree of passion and enthusiasm. Certainly, too, he is right to look with anxiety upon the Christian's reluctance to understand the other man's best thoughts. Without his saying so, it is perhaps accurate to say that he finds that Christians can evade the evangelical task with the best of theological reasons. And here he fights the theological dragons of the time as well as those who seek to devour the queen. But admitting all of this, is there not a reservation that must be made?

Suppose we reflect for a moment upon the fact that space and time were once considered to be meaningful because they were believed to be actualities to which they corresponded. This certainly was once a very common conviction. Suppose, too, that such words (because they were believed to refer to actualities) were useful. Suppose, for example, that they were used in persuasive contexts, in world views, and that "responsible speech and action" (as Karl Heim says) rested upon them. After a century or two, men find that actualities are not related to these words as their usage had implied. In fact, as Heim himself tells us, the use of these very words can be documented, and today we are no longer sure that there are corresponding actualities or that the words play any significant role. Is not this a good reason for practicing more austerity with respect to words—or shall we say metaphysics?—so that we do not attach our responsibilities wantonly? Or is it the other way? If responsibilities emanate from knowledge of actualities, and the actualities do not exist, then will we have no responsibilities? A good part of the history of science—and according to some historians, also a good part of historical writing—reflects the slow and very painful acquisition of an awareness that the multiplication of entities by metaphysical views is a gratuitous business. If this be so in intellectual endeavors, might it not be even more important to learn the dangers for the ethical and religious life? But all of this admitted, metaphysical words may still be important. They may reflect the user's attitudes and needs with respect to whatever actualities there are. Certainly it is not only the existence of an object which is important; the attitude one has toward the object is even more important. And an attitude toward an object where there is no object is somewhat ridiculous. The manufacture of objects by the use of words is equally ridiculous. The latter seems to have been the case with much of classical metaphysics.

Professor Heim is at great pains to give us meaningful examples of this from the history of science. But at the same time he seems to carry on the project he condemns. For he seems to argue that words which have a function must also have an actual object. Thus he tells us that Christianity ". . . is intelligible only if an omnipresent space exists, which encompasses us all, no matter whether we be children or adults, average people or heroes, and by virtue of which there is a third possible way of existence, one that raises us infinitely far above the two possibilities, relativism and positivism, which lie open to us within the polar space."[16] It is not at all clear how this non-objective, non-polar space is known to be actual. That the words have a use in Heim's writings cannot be denied. But the point is that he does not admit that he is expressing an attitude or re-aligning the known facts about nature and people to cohere more satisfactorily to his intention. Rather, he insists that he is constructing a scientific world view of nothing less than reality itself. The words about non-polar space are used as if they were descriptive. And, of course, this is why Heim believes the view to be religiously and ethically productive.

But nothing that Professor Heim says brings conviction to the reader whose doubt has been aroused on the point of whether or not there is an objective reference to metaphysical language. And it is doubt that metaphysical language has objective reference that sustains secularism and indifference to the claims for God's existence. To fight another man on his terms is very sporting. But to fight within the circle of doubt created by reflection by using the very tools of reflection which initially produced the doubt, is to fight without a chance of winning. No, it would have been far better had the author's magnificent talents and even dialectical skills been spent upon a much simpler issue, namely, the reason for the rejection of what he calls the scientific world view of the past. He rightfully accepts that rejection, but instead of tracing the epistemological course of the argument, he speeds to the task (if one can speed in several volumes!) of building another metaphysical structure which is already vulnerable even without waiting for future scientific discoveries.

There is a further question which is relevant too. Has a Christian the right to persuade men of the truth of Christianity for wrong, albeit

15 *Ibid.*, pp. 35-48.

16 *Christian Faith*, p. 194. See also *Transformation*, "Introduction," and Chapter VI, Sect. 25.

persuasive, reasons? Does a Christian who wills to reflect have the right to bring others into the reflective arena and share only the certitudes and plausible conjectures to which reflection gives access? If the doubts are equally sustained by reflection and would mitigate the religious believing, are not the plausible conjectures wrong reasons for believing? And does not reflection presuppose doubt? Is not reflection itself thwarted without doubt? To admit a doubt is to admit that the metaphysics is also doubtful. And to say this is to make the movement of faith dependent not upon the certainty of the metaphysics, for this does not actually obtain, but upon factors within the personality which are not described within the objective picture of reality. If a man becomes a Christian or finds it easier to become a Christian because the scientific world view is true, he is then only scientifically superstitious. If a man becomes a Christian and makes the movement of faith because he finds no one world view necessary, then factors within his own subjectivity permit him to choose. The doubt which the objective world views permit, simultaneously permits the movement of faith without commanding it. Karl Heim's efforts, encompassing as they are, and learned and detailed as they also are, still do not credit personality with the capacity for Christian faith without the application of metaphysical certainties. With the state of metaphysics being what it is, might it not be a matter of wisdom to conjecture that it is the argument that is wanting rather than metaphysics which is wanting?

The Warfare Between Philosophy and Theology

By Niels C. Nielsen, Jr.

ROGER MEHL has made a new and significant appraisal of the problems of philosophy from the perspective of Reformation faith.[1] There is no Christian reason, he argues, but there is indeed a Christian use of reason. Mehl does not accept the confessionalism of Karl Barth or Paul Tillich's doctrine of correlation. Rather, he interprets the relation between philosophy and theology (to use the words of Paul Ricoeur, Mehl's colleague at the University of Strasbourg) as a "loving warfare." Mehl's study makes clear that the problem of the Christian in philosophy cannot be dismissed as summarily as is commonly supposed in positivism.

Mehl argues that the Reformation doctrine of the freedom of the Christian man recognizes the autonomy of philosophy and theology while none the less allowing for an authentic relationship between the two. Protestantism need not limit itself to a single system of philosophy as in so much of Roman Catholic Thomism. Philosophy and theology must each develop according to its own best insight. Assuredly, there is a critique of each by the other, but not in the spirit of mutual reproach. If philosophy determines itself entirely from impersonal, scientific models, theology must emphasize the personal, existential aspects of experience. However, philosophy may rescue theology from needless concern with outmoded cosmology. Neither inquiry can expect to be the queen of the sciences as in the medieval period.

Renewed interest in Reformation ideas in contemporary theology has led to a reaffirmation of the authentic Protestant claim that revelation is not open to examination as a phenomenon among other phenomena. Ultimately, God's Word determines all other phenomena. The electing God who chooses to reveal himself in Jesus Christ can only be known in a living relationship of grace and not from any conceptualization. A

1 Roger Mehl, *La Condition du Philosophe Chrétien* (Neuchâtel: Delachaux & Niestlé, 1947).

philosophy which proposes to apprehend God empirically from experience in general, or which treats Christian truth as a timeless intuition, cannot relate itself to the Christian *kerygma*. Moreover, Christian revelation cannot be disposed of in a philosophical interpretation of mysticism, for mystical experience takes many forms, only some of which are Christian. The problem of the normative still remains, even if we acknowledge that there is a place for the mystic in the church. The Christian doctrine of sin and forgiveness emphasizes the distinction between creature and Creator and does not allow for any mystical approach to the deity apart from repentance and faith.

However, if there is an absolute separation between earthly and heavenly truth, as both philosophers and theologians have sometimes claimed, revelation can have no significance for philosophical inquiry. If faith and reason are of an entirely different order, there can be no word of reproach against the idolatries of modern man apart from an affirmation of faith. No rational argument can be relevant to the sinner. Such a radical dichotomy between philosophy and theology not only forbids the Christian use of reason; it denies the relevance of the Gospel to the world. It allows only an arbitrary choice between two contradictory points of reference.

Mehl does not believe that either philosophy or theology is a self-complete system of thought. He emphasizes the essentially eschatological character of the knowledge of God in revelation. Unless we recognize that we live "between the times," there is an immanent danger of a *theologia gloriae* which misconstrues Christian truth in terms of timeless, atemporal existence. Apart from God's action in history, our theology has no reference to actuality and becomes lost in abstract and irrelevant speculation. Christian theology is not an exposition of eternal truths which can be known from the order of nature. Rather, it presupposes God's special initiative and activity in Jesus Christ.

Revelation is its own orderer and is not dependent on a particular hierarchy of values or speculative ontology. Mehl criticizes Roman Catholic rationalism on the ground that it binds revelation to a predetermined order of being in creation. The truth of the Gospel can never be possessed in a philosophical synthesis. The meaning and structure of revelation are given with God's self-manifestation. They do not have an autonomous character which can be analyzed independently in the psychology or philosophy of religion. Revelation is more than a

series of propositions or deductions. Its essential character cannot be determined a priori in advance of the events of God's self-disclosure.

The universal claims of the Gospel cannot be known from any general philosophical deduction or intuition. If this were the case, the "loving struggle" between philosophy and theology would be impossible as well as unnecessary. If Hegelian metaphysics or Kantian moral principles could encompass Christian truth, there would be no need for faith. However, in actuality we can appraise the relationship between faith and reason only by considering the fundamental elements of experience at its deepest levels. We must go behind formalized expressions to the primary bases of our understanding.

Philosophical perspectives change drastically from one era to another. The ideas of one time are drastically modified, indeed rejected, in another. For example, Kant in his *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* set stringent limits on philosophical knowledge and rejected ontology. In the next century Hegel propounded one of the most inclusive speculative ontologies in the history of Western thought. Hegel's idealistic system is, in a way, the philosophical counterpart to a *theologia gloriae*. Kierkegaard protested that such an idealistic interpretation cannot deal with the existential dimensions of experience; it has no place for the self or real freedom.

Hegel's philosophy represents the most comprehensive attempt to assimilate Christian faith to a philosophy of immanence. Hegel attempted to translate the essential truth of Christian theology into philosophical ideas. Kierkegaard insisted that there is an absolute either-or between Hegel's idealistic synthesis and Christian faith. Christian revelation is not allowed its own authentic meaning in Hegel's frame of reference. If a philosopher attempts to resolve the struggle between philosophy and theology at the level of immanence, he must leave out significant dimensions of experience. The Christian use of reason must challenge the first presuppositions of any philosophy which interprets revelation only in terms of immanence.

Kierkegaard insisted that the tensions of man's life in history cannot be resolved by reflection alone. No rational deduction can serve as the final proof of God's reality. Kirkegaard's claim in part parallels Pascal's view that a philosophically demonstrable truth is not necessarily compulsive to the will. Both philosophy and theology must direct their attention to experience in its most inclusive character. The divergence of

will and intellect makes doubly clear that revelation is not simply an a priori referent for philosophy. However, we need not disavow all concern for understanding. The existential tensions of man's being give meaning to the life of faith.

Hegel recognized that some claim to objectivity must be made in order to avoid psychologism and even solipsism. Rational judgments treat of relations which are not simply physical. The final compulsiveness of a truth judgment lies in the order of ideas. In short, truth is not simply empirical but implies mind; the fullness of truth is spiritual. Recognition of the spiritual character of truth may indeed lead us to an idealistic metaphysics. Nevertheless, the question still remains whether such a truth claim is not hopelessly anthropocentric even when it is purified from the cruder anthropomorphisms. God is not simply moral law or an absolute philosophical principle, but presence and person.

Christian revelation has been interpreted in idealistic metaphysics in terms of the growing insights of a particular philosophy. In the end such rationalism blunts the Christian understanding of sin and grace as well as its claims for the eventful character of revelation. It fails to recognize that the resolution of the problems of man's life in history is not possible simply from an epistemological or ontological reference, but is indeed dependent upon historical efficacy in a particular situation. The kerygmatic character of revelation precludes that it can ever be made fully intelligible to philosophy. If this were possible, Christianity would be a gnosticism. The Gospel is not a principle of intelligibility which can be substituted for free speculative inquiry. In short, it is not the role of revelation to seduce the philosophical reason or to displace metaphysics. Historical revelation always has its expression in actuality and particularity. The authority of idea or indeed of faith itself cannot be substituted for the judgment and mercy of God.

The works of Anselm represent the classic attempt to make revelation rationally intelligible for philosophy. Anselm's ideas have had a profound influence on the theology of Karl Barth. After his study of the thought of this theologian, Barth modified the negative dialectic of his earlier works and does not emphasize as much as before the difference between man and God.[2] Particularly in his interpretation of creation, Barth develops a more positive doctrine of the relationship

2 Cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Karl Barth. Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie* (Cologne: Jakob Hegner, 1951).

between man and God, the *analogia fidei*. Mehl regards Anselm's attempt to make the universe intelligible in terms of Christian revelation as a high point of faith seeking knowledge. However, he believes that its essential limitation is that Anselm's distinctions are often verbal rather than existential. For example, Anselm's description of the attributes of God requires that he reconcile apparent contradictories. When probed in full philosophical rigor, his interpretation does not escape paradox in reconciling God's omniscience, power, and love. Moreover, Anselm's position has at best a minimum of the eschatological tension which distinguishes Christian faith from speculative philosophy.

The philosopher who insists on a "loving warfare" between theology and his own inquiry does a service to Christian faith. Revelation is not a first principle of knowledge in general. There is no Christian chemistry or biology, and any attempt to limit investigation in these fields can only bring reproach on the Gospel. The Bible is not an encyclopedia of astronomy or physics, but a record of God's revelation to man. It is significant for its spiritual insights which are known from God's living Word. Mehl accepts Barth's claim that there is no way from man to God but only a way from God to man. However, he does not believe that this rejection of the "point of contact" allows us to dismiss the problem of the Christian use of reason.

If revelation is not an exhaustive knowledge which enables us to see reality fully, but rather the unique and particular action of God in history, can it speak to philosophy at all? Mehl argues that this question is illumined significantly if we consider the temporal character of our experience. Our knowledge in both philosophy and theology is characterized by incompleteness and ambiguity. Truth is known under the guise of temporality. Bergson and Heidegger, in very different ways, have both emphasized that there is an elusiveness about reality in time. Truth is apprehended by persons only in the "becomingness" of their historical life. An appraisal of the contingent character of all reflection may lead the philosopher to a recognition of the finitude of his knowledge. Time itself will warn him not to absolutize his conclusions lest they become for him a bar to further inquiry. Neither philosophy nor theology may substantialize act into timeless truth. The theologian must not transform *kerygma* into an exhaustive definition of pure doctrine. This is the end of life and creativity.

It has been held traditionally that God is the ground of being as

well as the moving force in the actualization of values. The theistic argument is premised on the principle of sufficient reason. However, it is not the explanation of being, but the frustration of values that raises the most acute problems of philosophy and theology. Consideration of our life in history makes it clear that we do not appraise values wholly in a detached, disinterested way. We know them as they make demands upon us. However, even as they become values for us, their unfulfilled possibilities become apparent. We cannot control their actualization in its fullness, much less accomplish the realization of all the goods we seek.

The philosopher cannot ignore the confessional claim that man can know himself only from the intention of God in creation. Mehl describes the relation of God and the world as "theandric." By this term he does not mean to imply any natural theology. However, he wishes to make clear that God has an existential relation to the world from his action in creation, albeit one of grace. Revelation renews the rational understanding and is at the same time an imperative for self-criticism. As the existential confrontation of the law of God, it establishes its own unique context of meaning even as it brings new motivation and dynamic of life. Although faith and grace cannot be conceptualized exhaustively, they none the less make possible creativity and spontaneity. The free response to the gracious will of the deity which the Reformation doctrine described as the freedom of the Christian man, comes to its fullness in an increasing apprehension of reality in faith seeking understanding.

Mehl accepts Gabriel Marcel's distinction between "problem" and "mystery." A "problem" allows of solution by our own resources. "Mystery" in Marcel's usage does not signify a reality which is wholly unknown to us, but rather one which we cannot encompass fully or master in knowledge. It confronts us, even as we cannot dismiss it from us. Our knowledge of other persons as well as of the deity is a knowledge of "mystery"; it is never self-complete but has an existential reference. The distinction between "problem" and "mystery" is particularly relevant in describing revelation; God's presence is necessarily concrete and personal, indeed existential, but none the less objective and real.

Thus philosophy and theology have a common meeting point in the description of the life of persons. The language employed at this level

cannot be simply mechanistic or behavioristic. Neither philosophy nor theology can treat the comprehensive relationships of meaning without recourse to myth and symbol, or, to use Barth's term, saga. None of these references signify illusion or unreality, but rather point to a reality which is historical and personal. In short, there is a limited rapprochement between philosophy and theology in ethical decision and the life of persons. Mehl points out that the mystery which attends both is radically different from the "unknown" of Spencer. It is essentially positive, purged from skepticism and open to reality.

The history of philosophy and theology in the West makes clear that the dialogue between the two has contributed to the development of each. The consequences have been destructive only when one type of inquiry has been mistaken for the other. It is important that the full significance of experience and reality shall not be compromised at any level. In this dialogue Christians have come to recognize a new and profound dimension of meaning as well as problems which they formerly apprehended only in part. In the end there can be no exhaustive a priori determination of the relationship between philosophy and theology. Mehl rejects both fideism and any simply positive correlation between the two. He speaks of the tension which characterizes the Christian use of reason: the eschatological character of Christian revelation reinforces the claim for the incompleteness of all understanding. Mehl has marked out the large historical lines on which we must appraise the problem: philosophical inquiry makes clear the precariousness of knowledge and being in history. Christian faith sustains critical reflection, as it gives assurance of an ultimate meaningfulness and reality. The "loving warfare" must continue. Most of all, the Christian use of reason must hold fast to the revelation of God in Jesus Christ.

The Logos Doctrine in the East-West Controversy

By John Joseph Stoudt

THE IRON curtain which for a millenium has parted east from west is that which, running from the Balkans to the Arctic, has separated the Romanized west's cross-topped cathedrals from the east's domed basilicas.

This cleavage is more than architectural. The cathedral's length and breadth, built on an earthly foundation, soars heavenward, culminating in the Roman cross, symbol of passion, death, suffering, and sacrifice. The basilica's comprehending corners colonnade toward a keynote centered in the arching dome, showing, as is written in Ephesians (1:10), "how it was the purpose of his design so to order it in the fulness of the ages that all things in heaven and earth should be gathered up in Christ." The cathedral's cross mediates transcendent divinity to man; the basilica's keystone, once rejected, now crowns the highest arch.

The theological cleft which has separated east from west almost from the days of Pentecost not only originally divided the Christian fellowship but also produced two differing cultures, the American and the Russian, which now confront each other across the bridge of history. Both cultures are heirs of differing traditions, and the present crisis seems to be rooted in this break.

As the west, true to its passion for rational precision, concentrated on the baptismal confession as a reasoned statement of faith in intellectual terms, the east focused on Bible teachings and on development of theological speculation.[1] Only protagonists of a Jewish Gospel hold that western theology has no classical roots. St. Augustine in *De civitate Dei* knew better when in Book Six he demonstrated that the Christian idea of God accorded with the deepest Greek philosophical insights. The amazing Greeks first substituted rational for mythological world views and put reason in the center. Western man's autonomous rationality sharply distinguishes him from intuitive, collective eastern man.

Western culture is, however, rooted in the ancient world. In Werner Jaeger's words, "The spiritual foundations of this growing

1 Reinhold Seeberg, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte,* I, third edition (1920), pp. 378 ff.

humanistic world unity were (1) the *Imperium Romanum,* so far as it was sustained by the idea of a world-wide rule of law and justice; (2) the Greek *paideia,* so far as it was conceived as the start of a universal human culture; and (3) a 'universal' (*katholike*) theology as the religious framework of such a civilization."[2]

But even from the beginning of western culture in Greece a principle has been evident which has marked it off from eastern cultures. The basis of technical civilization, the aim of which has been the rational control of nature, became possible when the Greeks asked those questions which were at once the beginning of western philosophy and the break of the western mind with its past.

When Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes probed for nature's rational basis, technical civilization appeared as something different from older mythological cultures in Babylonia, Sumeria, Persia, Egypt, and the Far East. The Greeks found a component within reality which was foreign to the oriental mind and which established a new theology of knowledge. This was the Logos doctrine.

In the east reality had been held beyond the reach of immediate rational apprehension, and the founding of Greek science formulated the western premise that, deductively formulated, experimentally verified ideas have validity. Reason became man's tool in managing his world, a universe with meaning in it. When St. John wrote in the prologue to his Gospel,

> The Logos existed from the very beginning,
> The Logos was with God,
> The Logos was divine.
> He was with God in the very beginning:
> through him all existence came into being,
> no existence came into being apart from him.
> In him life lay,
> and this life was the light of men:
> amid the darkness the light shone,
> but the darkness could not master it (Moffatt),

a new religious and philosophical view was expressed which more sharply separated west from east by proclaiming that reason had become personal flesh and blood. St. Paul's identification of the Logos with an immanent entity became the cornerstone of western religious thought. Jewish ideas of the Torah as revelation of God's will had

2 Werner Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford, 1948), p. 9.

maintained God's separation from the world. Roman practicality continued the Greek interest in nature, and the Stoic Logos later was in direct descent.

All this is contrary to the spirit of the Orient. The oriental mind has ever held that reality is a vital dynamism, chaotic in irrational freedom, incomprehensible to finite minds. By many names this "conception" of the formless abyss of life has impressed itself upon the east, and the east has lost itself in boundlessness while the west, ever realistic, has searched for the unique "in terms of egos, individuals, lives, not Life," as Heinrich Zimmer put it.[3] The east has known a deep, primitive reality from which formed, created, individualized entities have come. Because it has been convinced that only this ground is real, the east denied reality to precise, individualized objects of rational thought. Furthermore, the east has shown a stubbornness to ignore all other freedoms than the freedom from determination within this ground.

Hinduism has the *brahman,* a self-sufficient world-principle which, though formless, individualizes itself within each aspect of life, which makes, sustains, contains, and finally reabsorbs all individualities. It alone is real. Finitude passes. This formless energy is *atman,* too, the innermost center of all finite existences, what remains when all externalities have been sloughed off created things.[4]

Brahman cannot be named, nor can it become the object of finite knowledge, because it is beyond differentiation as a blend of opposites in a "great Nothingness, the vast desert of a shoreless sea."[5] The aim of Hindu teaching is to have the devotee transcend finite individuality by removing restricting externalities through which absorption with *brahman* is prevented. *Brahman,* while embracing phenomena and concealed within them, is beyond definition or conceiving.[6]

> That which remains inaudible, intangible, invisible,
> Which can neither be tasted, nor smelt, imperishable,
> That abides eternal; without beginning or end, greater than the greatest
> He who knows this has escaped the jaws of death.

So the *Katha Upanishad.*

3 Heinrich Zimmer, *Myths and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilization* (New York, 1947), p. 21.

4 H. Schmidt, *Philosophisches Wörterbuch* (Leipzig, 1931), p. 256.

5 Zimmer, *op. cit.,* p. 46.

6 A. C. Bouquet, *Comparative Religion* (Penguin Books, 1950), p. 129.

Buddhism even rejected the formless *brahman's* relative stability by asserting that the world is merely a continuum of transitoriness, producing nothing permanent.[7] Things are relative. The Buddha's three negations deny the validity of concretion:

1. All elements have no self (sarvadharma anātmatā).
2. All component things are impermanent (sarvasmaskā amityatā).
3. All is suffering (sarvam dukkham).[8]

Finite reality is evil *per se,* thus denying even *atman,* the divinity of individuation.

Zen Buddhism, pushing this to its end, sought amorphous knowledge of amorphous unity, life within Life beyond all differentiation and personal or finite determination.[9] Although beginning with a kind of rationalism, it shrank from conditioning ideas.

Taoism, a philosophical exaltation of non-being, nihilistically denied that *Tao* could be expressed. The famous prologue to the *Tao Teh Ching,* as symbolical for the east as St. John's prologue is for the west, says in Ch'u Ta-Kao's translation,

The *Tao* that can be expressed is not the eternal *Tao;*
The Name that can be defined is not the unchanging Name;
Non-existence is called the antecedent of Heaven and Earth;
Existence is the mother of all things;
From eternal non-existence, therefore, we serenely observe the mysterious beginning of the universe;
From eternal existence we clearly see the apparent distinction;
These two are the same in source and become different when manifested.
The sameness is called profundity. Infinite profundity is the gate whence comes the beginning of all parts of the universe.[10]

Like *brahman, Tao* is emptiness, absence of rational determination, a "way" where roads converge and then diverge, a formless, unknowable energy which unites finite existence in an obliteration of the lines of finite differentiation.

7 Junjiro Takakusu, "Buddhism as a Philosophy of Thusness," in C. A. Moore, *Philosophy —East and West* (Princeton, 1941), p. 69.

8 *Ibid.,* p. 70.

9 D. T. Suzuki, "Interpretation of Zen Experience," in Moore, *op. cit.,* p. 124 *et passim.*

10 Quoted by F. C. Northrop in "The Complementary Emphases of Eastern Intuitive and Western Scientific Philosophy," in Moore, *op. cit.,* p. 204. The fact that the "two become different when manifested" denies that the Logos is one substance with the ground.

Ancient Jews likewise were afraid to speak the Most High's name. Hidden in anonymity he spoke his will on Sinai, which then was veiled in the Holy of Holies. Only after the prophets had identified Yahweh with the righteous servant did he begin to lose his formlessness.

With their genius for clear ideas the Greeks discovered the Logos.

Logos is a stumbling-block for beginning students of Greek and also for mature historians of philosophy. It can mean many things: word, thought, speech, discussion, argument, debate, reason, definition, statement, account, the opposite of myth, rationality, language, intellectuation, and idea in the Platonic sense. It is usually Latinized as *oratio* and *ratio,* and Germanized as *Wort, Darlegung, Rede, Vernunft, menschliche Vernunft, Berechnung, Gesetz, Verhältniss.* But its metaphorical sense as that which has been spoken forth, the articulated and the expressed, is still close to the core meaning.

Heracleitus of Ephesus, who flourished around 500 B. C., revolted against the vague formulations of the Greek mysteries, against popularized knowledge, against the crude, unformulated opinions then prevalent. He wanted things sharp, clear, precise. In the flux of opinions he sought clear order, and he found it in his Logos, the belief that reality can be expressed and that man's mind can grasp truth. After postulating changing external reality—you cannot go into the same river twice (an instability the Milesian naturalists did not see)—he found a principle of measure, order, and reason stabilizing the flux. In a surviving fragment he said: "If we speak with intelligence, we must base our strength on that which is common to all, as the city on the Law. . . . For all human laws are nourished by one, which is divine. For it governs as far as it will, and is sufficient for all, and more than enough."[11] Here appeared the idea that the law which the human mind discovers in natural reality is divine.

This sharply separates Heracleitus from the east. In addition to the reality of the boundless, undifferentiated ground of being, here is a single knowable law "which is divine" and which unites all human laws. Heracleitus even enjoins us to look for the singularities of things.[12] How wide a break this is, indeed!

11 Kathleen Freeman, *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers. A Complete Translation of the Fragments in Diels Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Oxford, 1948), 22B, 114. (The numbering in this edition follows the fifth edition of Diels.)

12 88B, 35. Freeman, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers. A Companion to Diels Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Oxford, 1949), p. 118.

Man's insight into this divine law can be distorted by the senses. The philosopher seeks the "purpose which steers all things through all things."[13] The wise soul, instead of yielding to self-abandonment, learns to know itself and so to learn the wisdom which ends in moderation.[14] "You could not in your going find the ends of the soul, though you traveled the whole way; so deep is the Logos."[15] Hindu *atman* becomes one with the indeterminate *brahman,* but the Heracleitian Logos is rational orderliness. He separates the Logos from the One and from man's mind, for man imperfectly apprehends the Logos "which loves to hide."[16] It is hidden harmony beyond the strife of visible things,[17] a strife which was the preoccupation of poets and mythologists. Heracleitus' tirade against teachers, preachers, popularizers was fulminated scorn at those who could not see orderliness behind the flux.

Parmenides of Elea, who flourished around 475 B. C., separated the way of opinion from the way of truth. He rejected sense opinions, asserting that truth came from a logical process for which reason was a criterion, for what "it thinks exists."[18] "For it is the same thing to think and to be."[19] Man is enjoined to judge all things by the Logos.[20]

Empedocles of Acragas, who flourished about 420 B. C., also distrusted sense knowledge and urged man to accept the more trustworthy Logos.[21]

Democritus of Abdera, who flourished about 420 B. C., was a realist both in metaphysics and in theory of knowledge. He atomized reality, individualizing it in repeatable objects, creating a deterministic world where cause, effect, and design were knowable. The scientist could approach reasoned truth by proper use of sensual knowledge and Logos.

Socrates sought knowledge of a particular kind, of virtue. He had started life with an eagerness to investigate nature,[22] but he soon under-

13 Freeman, *Ancilla*, 22B, 41.
14 *Ibid.*, 22B, 115.
15 *Ibid.*, 22B, 45.
16 *Ibid.*, 22B, 123.
17 *Ibid.*, 22B, 56.
18 Freeman, *Companion*, p. 147.
19 Freeman, *Ancilla*, 22B, 3.
20 *Ibid.*, 22B, 7, 8.
21 *Ibid.*, 31B, 4.
22 *Phaedo*, 96A.

stood that this knowledge was not true wisdom and he changed his interest to man.

Plato's theme was the rational order discoverable by man's mind and the advisability of using intellect to advance man's situation. Philosophy is therefore rational search. He adopted the dialogue which in his hands became a nearly perfect literary genre to show the development of reasoning. He had few doctrinal axes to grind, little formal dogma to offer; and sometimes the seemingly negative result of a Platonic dialogue exasperates. Its final value lies in search for precision of thought over against loosely reasoned prejudices and popular superstition. It tried to show how man becomes free of error and self-conscious stubbornness[23] and the process of thought by which man's ignorance is overcome with clear intellectual forms.

With his doctrine of ideas Plato refuted the Sophist's relativism by showing that knowledge is more than one man's opinion. His significant separation of reason from the perceived and his linking of reason with being and of perception with becoming gave reason a transcendent character which his doctrine of knowledge by reminiscence served to point up. Love of ideas, not love of the perceived reality, was the philosopher's goal, and search for higher categories, for a reasoned hierarchy, ended in mystical contemplation of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. This is expressed in a celebrated passage from the *Symposium*:

> Beginning from obvious beauties he must for the sake of the highest beauty be ever climbing aloft, as on the rungs of a ladder, from one to two, and from two to all beautiful bodies; from personal beauty he proceeds to beautiful observances, from observances to beautiful learning, and from learning at last to that particular study which is concerned with the beautiful itself and that alone; so that in the end he comes to know the very essence of beauty.[24]

In addition to soaring transcendence Plato moved to an immanent Logos. After the *Sophist* his thought became oriented to a theory of measure and he made the Logos an ontological genre. The *Timaeus*, a difficult but significant work, distinguished between divine and human Logos.[25] The Demiourgos speaks out the laws of rational order upon

23 Alexandre Koyré, *Discovering Plato* (New York, 1946), pp. 1 ff.

24 *Symposium* 211C, in the translation of W. R. M. Lamb, Loeb Classical Library.

25 *Timaeus* 37-A-C. See A. E. Taylor, *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* (Oxford, 1928), p. 177. Also F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* and *Plato's Cosmology*.

the soul-mass which already can become rationally ordered because it partakes of the measurable substance of the sun and five stars.[26] Plato put reason above the world and in it, a significant step in western man's growth from mythological thinking to reason's precise delineations.

Plato's disciple, Aristotle, showed a genius for making abstract conceptions and for ordering thought in an organization of the sciences. He founded deductive reasoning and established the relation between the general and the particular. In addition to inference, deduction, proof, and explanation, he studied the process by which irreducible terms or notions appeared—the categories. The spirit of Aristotle's logic was search for individual substantiality, for as Ross says "the primacy of individual substance is one of the most fixed points of Aristotle's thought."[27]

Stoicism continued emphasis on rational precision and helped to solidify the differences between eastern intuitive thought and western rationalism. The Greeks had known in Dionysius a god whose deaths and rebirths gave his devotees' lives rhythm as they associated themselves with this divine pattern.[28] The Stoic god was neither Dionysian nor Olympian but a god who came into rapport with man through reason, and man, rational participant in the rational Logos, could come to know a god who unfolded himself through rational forms. The deity makes himself formed forces, spermatic ideas, by which he governs.

This development of ancient thought shows that western culture's drive toward rational precision separated it from older mythological cultures. The Godhead was rational and the world was rationally understandable. One step yet remained, St. John's personal Logos.

Philo Judaeus, who lived just before Jesus, combined this philosophical tradition of a rational creator's rational universe with religious thought. His coherent system reveals Platonic, Stoic, Neo-Pythagorean influences. God was utterly transcendent and indefinable, fully irrational. Mediating between the Godhead and matter was the world of ideas heading up in the idea of all ideas, the Logos, divine wisdom and God's first-born. As the means of God's self-knowledge and the instrument of his revelation, this first-born has an origin and is therefore a second God.[29] Through him the world was fashioned and

26 *Timaeus* 38C, 42 A-D. See Brice Parain, *Essai sur la Logos Platonicien* (Paris, 1942).
27 W. D. Ross, *Aristotle* (London, 1923), p. 24.
28 E. Brehier, *Histoire de la Philosophie*, I, 2, p. 297.
29 Windelband, *A History of Philosophy* (New York, 1938), p. 242.

as high priest he now maintains the world's relations with the Godhead. Philo's significance was his insistence on God's unknowability, in his transcendent freedom from all determination, and on his mysteriousness to man.

Jesus of Nazareth asked Peter, "But whom do ye say that I am?" St. John answered, "Thou art the Logos." So he made Jesus, not merely Messiah, Lord, Saviour, Son of Man, Light, Good Shepherd, Suffering Servant, or any other New Testament name for the God in self-revelation, but he said that the Judaean carpenter's son was also the Godhead's uttered and personal reason. He was the forth-spoken Word of the as-yet-unspoken God. St. John made Jesus an epistemological category.

Almost at once the controversy broke out in which the east took the side of emphasizing God's oneness and the west the side of giving the Logos personality and divinity. The six following centuries saw this controversy rage in which east and west tended toward their characteristic views and the Logos became the theological issue in a cold war which finally divided the Christian church. Can a carpenter's son be God? Can a nameless One become two? Can the transcendent Father beget a Son? Can God be a person? Can the Godhead be similar essence with its emanation? These are not dry theological points but efforts to validate personality. If God could become personal without being distorted, then individuality, as the east holds, is not in itself evil. Surely, at the heart of Christian theology, in the speculation about the Trinity itself, lies the question of the validation of individuality and of reason.

These issues led to the break between Roman and Byzantine traditions. In the continuing debate the eastern church found it hard to agree with the west's contention that the forth-spoken personal Word was equal to the Godhead. Gradually, as one issue after another was settled, the controversy was pushed farther into peripheral issues.

The first conflict was Gnosticism. Gnostics were followers of eastern syncretistic religions, combining Platonism, Neo-Pythagoreanism, and insights from the mystery religions. Some Gnostic features were Persian and Babylonian. We have little accurate information, and most of what we know comes from Christian opponents.

Gnosticism conceived God as wholly transcendent, unconditioned, and incomprehensible—an unchanging good, much in oriental style. He was separated from matter by grades of being, one of which was the

strictly subordinated Logos. Irenaeus says that Menander, an early Gnostic, affirmed that the first power was unknown to all.[30] Cerinthus, "who taught in Asia," held that the Godhead did not create the world but made a second power to govern it who was not virgin-born, not full-blown deity equal to the Godhead.[31] Basilides, a Persian, taught a "nature without root and place" which supervenes on things.[32] Irenaeus wrote that Basilides declared "that in the beginning the Nous [Reason] was born of the unborn father, that from him in turn was born the Logos, then from the Logos the Phronesis, from the Phronesis Sophia and Dynamis, and from Dynamis . . . the powers and principalities and angels."[33] The Father was "unbegotten and nameless."[34]

A significant Gnostic was Valentinus, a well-educated and fine-spirited man, who after working in Egypt came to Rome, later returning to the east. His followers were close to Christian groups. He quoted the Bible to insist that no one shall see God's face and live. His God was invisible, and Irenaeus reported that his disciples said that "in the invisible and ineffable heights above there exists a certain perfect, pre-existent Eon, . . . that he is invisible, eternal, and unbegotten, he was in silence and profound quiescence in the boundless ages. . . . Bythos . . . received his seed and . . . generated Nous, who was both similar and equal to him who had not sent him forth and alone comprehended the Father's greatness."[35] With victory over Gnosticism the church preserved the idea that Logos was equal essence with the Godhead.

Irenaeus, from whom much knowledge of Gnosticism comes, was the representative of Asia Minor Christianity which, because of geography, was on the traditional frontier between east and west.

Roman Christianity was meanwhile being supplied with sharply delineated conceptions which further alienated Roman theology from eastern. The Carthaginian centurion's son, Tertullian, by fashioning a Roman lawyer's hard, clear formulations, forged the west's theological vocabulary: words like religion, substance, merit, sacrifice, sacrament, ecclesiastical law, grace, inspiration, etc. These ideas, basic to the west, were not shared by eastern theologians, and formulation of man's rela-

30 *Adv. Haer.* I, 23.
31 *Ibid.*, I, 26.
32 *Acta Archelai*, 36, as quoted in J. C. Ayer, *A Source Book for Ancient Church History* (New York, 1913), p. 83.
33 *Adv. Haer.* I, 24, 3 ff.
34 *Ibid.*, I, 24, 4.
35 *Ibid.*, I, I, 1.

tionship to God in legal terms—payment, merit, satisfaction—remained foreign to the eastern church.

Tertullian created the Trinitarian formula—*tres personae, una substantia,* three persons, one substance. Substance gave him no trouble, for it was the equivalent of the Greek *ousia,* essence. But where was he to get a word expressing the individuality of the hypostasization? A lawyer, he found one in the legal distinction between *res* and *persona.* While *persona* did not then mean what "person" now does,[36] oriental theologians hardly would have used it to describe *prosopon.*[37] Tertullian's legalizing brought him logical paradoxes which were resolved only by believing the impossible on faith, so opposing theology and philosophy and hence rationalizing faith.

In contrast to Tertullian's legalizing of theology was the east's impulse which used the idea of *prosopon* to deepen the analysis of substance and to study the relation of essence to quality. These theological problems became philosophical.[38] Christology also raised in the east questions of the soul's relation to the body, of the divine to the human.[39]

Tertullian conformed theology to Roman law; the east rejuvenated its philosophy.

With the third century distinctively eastern and western ideas of Christianity, illustrated by Irenaeus and Tertullian, appeared. The former saw Christ ennobling and spiritualizing man; the latter saw him as teacher, illuminator, sacrifice, merit.[40]

During this period several attempts were made to solve the problem of God's unity and Christ's divinity. The Easter controversy is a case in point. Asian churches, more interested in the risen Christ than in the sacrificed Lamb, cherished Christ's relationship to humanity more than historical anniversaries. Eusebius said that "the parishes of all Asia" would continue to celebrate Eastern in the customary way. Polycrates, leader of the Asian bishops, wrote: "We observe the exact day, neither adding nor taking away anything. For in Asia also great lights have fallen asleep, which shall rise again on the day of the Lord's coming."[41] Divided fellowship was appearing.

36 See Hessel E. Yntema, "Roman Law and its Influence on Western Civilization," in *Cornell Law Quarterly,* xxxv, 1949-50, pp. 77, 88.

37 Seeberg, *Dogmengeschichte,* I (Leipzig, 1920), pp. 424-425.

38 Tatakis, *La Philosophie Byzantine* (Paris, 1949), p. 23.

39 *Ibid.,* pp. 23-24.

40 Seeberg, *op. cit.,* p. 426.

41 *Hist. Ec.* V, 24, as quoted in Ayer, *op. cit.,* p. 162.

Although Logos theology began to possess old Catholic theology, it was not unopposed. Monarchianism, a term for those positions which explained Christ's divinity without violating God's unity, appeared. It took two forms. Dynamistic Monarchianism, taught by Theodotus of Byzantium, where the divine element became impersonal power sent by God to Jesus, and Modalistic Monarchianism, taught by Noetus of Smyrna, which, allowing for the divine Jesus to be a person, made no separation between Father and Son.[42] Other Monarchian teachers were easterners, as Paul of Samosata, bishop of Antioch, and Praxeas, who came to Rome from Asia Minor. Sabellius, leader of the Roman Modalists after 215, was a Lybian who asserted God's unity with three functions which, like a great actor, he could adopt at will. Of him Basil the Great, bishop of Caesarea, wrote: "Sabellianism is Judaism imported . . . under guise of Christianity. For if a man calls Father, Son, and Holy Spirit one, but manifold to person, and makes a hypostasis of the three, what else does he than deny the everlasting pre-existence of the Only Begotten?"[43] Modalistic monarchianism remained in the orient until post-Nicene times, especially in Egypt and Lybia.

An illuminating footnote to this theological divergence between east and west is found in the two contrasting types of primitive Christian art. Western representations of Christ were always in human form (as the good shepherd) or in one of his historical incidents. Eastern representations of Christ were in symbolic form: as the day-star, the key of David, the rose of Sharon. Western artists pictured a human Jesus; eastern artists the symbolic Christ.

While theologians were struggling to hold the revelation that Jesus was full Logos equal to the Father, the last significant ancient philosophical movement arose to strengthen the eastern position. Much Neoplatonism came from the east, and its ascetic impulses linked it with the orient. Iamblicus, a Syrian, carried the transcendentalism of God to the extreme. Plotinus of Alexandria, who had traveled in India, worked out a scheme seeking to explain how everything comes from the One's radiation, or emanation, to lower life-forms. Paul Shorey's description of this follows:

> In this process or procession the higher remains unchanged while the lower turns back and reflects that which brings it forth, somewhat as . . . the mind turns

42 Ayer, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-172.
43 Epistula, 210:3, quoted in Ayer, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

back and reflects upon itself. The highest and ineffable One. . . . The second principle emanating from this is the Nous, or intellect, answering to the Demiourgos, or creator, in Plato's *Timaeus*. The ideas are the prototypes of all created things and constitute the intelligible world. . . . Soul is the emanation of intellect and the third and last member of the triad. . . . Extended first matter is the final and faintest irradiation of Being, and as such . . . the ultimate principle of evil.[44]

Nous or intellect is not divine, as the Christian Logos, but assumes a subordinate position in being's hierarchy. Neoplatonism was both a bridge to and a rival of Christian theology. Its insistence upon God's unity and ineffability later was mediated to Byzantine Christianity by Pseudo-Dionysius.

The most significant controversy between east and west was the Arian, which lasted during most of the fourth century. Indeed, the Arian dispute was mainly fought out in the eastern part of the empire around the question of whether Christ, before his incarnation in Jesus, was of equal or similar essence with the Father. By this time most theologians accepted Jesus' divinity, but the oriental mind, true to its desire to maintain God's unity, could not accept the implied paradox. Most eastern theologians followed Origen and taught the subordination of the Logos. One group, adherents of Antioch's presbyter, Lucian, was outspoken. The group's leader was Arius, a stern ascetic, who held the Logos to be different in essence from the Father, that Christ was a creature, made from nothing, changeable, and achieving divinity only by power of moral will. The western position, later imposed on the church by governmental dictation, was stated by Alexander of Alexandria in his letter to Bishop Alexander in Constantinople:

We [the non-Arians] believe, as the Apostolic Church teaches, in one unbegotten Father, who of His being has no cause, immutable, and invariable, and who subsists always in one state of being, admitting neither progression nor diminution; who gave the law and the prophets and the Gospel. . . . And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God, begotten not out of that which is not, but of the Father, who is; yet not after the manner of material bodies, by severance or emanation, as Sabellius and Valentinus taught, but in inexpressible and inexplicable manner. . . . We have learned that the Son is immutable and unchangeable, all-sufficient and perfect, like the Father, lacking only His "unbegottenness." . . . And in accordance with this we believe that the Son always existed of the Father. . . . Therefore his own individual dignity must be reserved to the Father. . . . To the Son, likewise, must be given the honor which befits him.[45]

44 Paul Shorey, *Platonism Ancient and Modern* (Berkeley, 1938), pp. 48-49.
45 Quoted in Ayer, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-172.

The eastern position is put by the leading opponent, Athanasius, as he quoted from Arius' *Thalia*:

> God was not always Father; but there was when God was alone and was not yet Father. . . . So also the Logos of God himself came into existence from nothing, and there was a time when he was not. . . . He willed to create us, and He made a certain one and named Him Logos and Wisdom and Son.[46]

The issue was whether the Logos was one substance with the Father or merely a similar substance—but surely this was more than a controversy over an iota; this was the validation of a personal Logos, the validation of a personal God, which had divided east and west for many years.

When Christianity became the empire's official religion, schismatic groups arose to threaten the institution's unity. Novatians, Melitians, Montanists, and Marcionites, while not wholly Asian, found their chief successes there. Furthermore, pressed by the Huns, the Germanic tribes moved west from the Balkans to Britain, Gaul, the Rhineland, central Europe, bearing Arian ideas.

During the fourth and fifth centuries the eastern fellowship developed its own character. A series of internal struggles helped to isolate the bishop of Constantinople from western prelates. One issue was the significance of Origen's theology, a dispute which began in Egypt but which was soon transferred to Constantinople. Another was the conflict between Alexandria and Antioch over the relation of the divine to the human in Christ—the same issue in new guise! The Alexandrian school, leaning toward Rome, insisted upon Christ's full unity. Antioch held union and no mixing of divine and human: God still was God and man man. His unity remained unbroken.

Several other controversies arose before the break was final.

The Nestorian controversy between Alexandrian patriarch Cyril and the patriarch Nestorius of Constantinople came about in A. D. 428. The issue was the *theotokos* for Mary. Nestorius believed that the Emmanuel was not God, that the holy virgin was not *theotokos,* that the Father was not united to Jesus' flesh in one *hypostasis,* and that the two natures were connected, not merely united.[47] It is significant that the one Christian position which had success in the orient was the Nestorian.

46 *Ibid.,* p. 303.
47 *Ibid.,* p. 305.

The Eutychian controversy, twenty years later, was more a naked power struggle between the patriarch of Constantinople and the western bishops. The issue was the same, but now, perhaps, a tool of power-politics. The focus was Mary's deification. The final episode which has produced our divided churches was tragic. In the seventh sitting of the Council of Constantinople, November 22, 448, Archbishop Flavian was examining Eutyches, patriarch of Constantinople. In a passage which reminds us of Dostoievsky's legend of the grand inquisitor, he said:

> Do you confess that the one and same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, is consubstantial with His Father as to His divinity, and consubstantial with his mother as to His humanity?
>
> Eutyches said: When I intrusted myself to your holiness I said that you should not ask further what I thought concerning the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.
>
> The archbishop said: Do you confess Christ to be of two natures?
>
> Eutyches said: I have never yet presumed to speculate concerning the nature of my God, the Lord of heaven and earth. I confess that I have never said that He is consubstantial with us. Up to the present day I have not said that the body of our Lord and God was consubstantial with us. I confess that the Holy Virgin is consubstantial with us, and that of her our God was incarnate.
>
> Florentius, the patrician, said: Since the mother is consubstantial with us, doubtless the Son is consubstantial with us.
>
> Eutyches said: I have not said, you will notice, that the body of a man became the body of God, but the body was human, and the Lord was incarnate of the Virgin. If you wish that I should add to this that His body is consubstantial with us, I will do this; but I do not understand the term consubstantial in such a way that I do not deny that He is the Son of God.
>
> Florentius said: Do you or do you not confess that our Lord, who is of the Virgin, is consubstantial and of two natures after the Incarnation?
>
> Eutyches said: I confess that our Lord was of two natures before the union, but after the union one nature. . . . I follow the teaching of the blessed Cyril and the holy fathers and the holy Athanasius, because they speak of two natures before the union, but after the union and incarnation they speak not of two natures but of one nature.[48]

The east here remains firm to its traditional view that God is one and unknowable. Throughout the controversies, however the focus may have changed, the continuing issue was the divinity of the Logos. The east retreated, but it never surrendered its principle that the Godhead remained unbroken.

48 *Ibid.*, pp. 513-513.

Eastern Christianity, at one with the oriental emphasis on the "one substance" aspect of the trinitarian formula, could not accept the west's emphasis on Christ's full divinity. Eastern Christians continued to see the incarnation as the supreme event of religious history.

Tragedy followed. Eutyches of Constantinople was condemned by the Roman church with these bitter words:

> Eutyches, formerly presbyter and archimandrite, has been shown by what has taken place, and by his own confession, to be infected with the heresy of Valentinus and Apollinaris, and to follow stubbornly their blasphemies, and rejecting our arguments and teaching, is unwilling to consent to true doctrines. Therefore, weeping and mourning his complete perversity, we have decreed through our Lord Jesus Christ, who has been blasphemed by him, that he be deprived of every sacerdotal office, that he shall be put out of our communion and deprived of his position over a monastery. All who hereafter speak with him or associate with him are to know that they are fallen into the same penalty of excommunication.[49]

Love was forgotten by the Roman Church, and the fellowship was destroyed.

They tried to patch it up at Chalcedon, but with the subsequent fall of the oriental empire nationalism asserted itself in the southern provinces. Unrest developed, and by the sixth century the break was complete. In connection with these disputes the Persian church separated from Rome and the Nestorians spread eastward as far as Peking and Java, becoming in India the Thomas Christians. Armenians and Georgians also separated at this time.

It is therefore understandable that within several centuries Islam triumphed in the east, for the Koran's doctrine of God's oneness had sure eastern affinities. Mohammed was another eastern advocate of transcendence. He wrote that they who say that God is the Messiah believe wrongly, for Mary's son is only another prophet. Prophets before him have passed away:

> The Messiah, Jesus, son of Mary, is but the apostle of God and His Word, which He cast into Mary and a spirit from Him; believe then in God and His apostles, and say not "Three." Have done; it were better for you. God is only one God, celebrated be His praise. (Surach IV, 152.)

The east was lost.

Why did Christianity fail in its eastward push? Because it met

49 *Ibid.*

head-on the oriental stubbornness about God's unity. What was the issue at stake? The validation of personality and of individual reason within the Trinitarian formula. The orient has never believed that individual existences are real.

Now east and west went their ways. Byzantine Christianity became eastern orthodoxy, culminating in the Russian church, and with the Justinian tradition of the emperor as head of church and state.

In the west, however, rationalization of personality became the foundation of a new cultural stabilization. That the validation of personality was the issue is clear from Boethius' *A Treatise Against Eutyches and Nestorius,* a work written just after these controversies, about A. D. 512. Boethius, last of the Romans and first of the Scholastics, discussed the problem raised in these discussions. He himself was aware of the meaning, for he wrote, "the proper definition of person is a matter of very great perplexity" (II, 1).

> For if every nature has person, the difference between nature and person is a hard knot to unravel; or if person is not taken as the equivalent of nature but as a term of less scope and range, it is difficult to say to what natures it may be extended, that is, to what natures the term person may be applied and what natures are dissociate from it (II, 5 ff).

His definition of personality, coming as it did at the beginning of western culture, is significant:

> It is clear that Person cannot be affirmed of bodies which have no life (for no one ever said that a stone had a person), nor yet of living things which lack sense (for neither is there any person of a tree), nor finally of that which is bereft of mind and reason (for there is no person of a horse or ox or any other of the animals which dumb and unreasoning live a life of sense alone), but we say there is a person of man, of God, or an angel (II, 29 ff).

His final definition of personality, so significant for the course of western culture, is that a person is "the individual substance of a rational nature" (III, 4). Here western culture is grounded.

The east remained firm in its undifferentiated ground. The distinction between church and state, which marked western medieval tradition, never assumed the same significance in the east, where a process of collectivization appeared. Byzantine Christianity became fused with governmental ambitions and continued to express popular

but irrational, longings. Justinian had imposed his theological views, particularly the Christological position known as aphthartodocetism, which glorified Christ's body both before and after the resurrection. He also had absorbed Athenian philosophical schools and had centered education in Byzantium. His legislation in church affairs had been detailed and exact.

Finally, Neoplatonism in the form of Pseudo-Dionysius added the idea of hierarchies. His theological views of God's oneness were combined with an institutional structure which expressed a holy order "which in a holy manner works the mysteries of illumination which is appropriate to each one. The order of this hierarchy consists in this, that some purify and others are purified; some are illuminated and others illuminate; others are completed and others complete."[50] Salvation was directed by and through this hierarchy and was comprehended beneath the all-embracing dome of heaven, held together by the archhierarch Christ, the keystone. Three stages lift man: baptism, eucharist, and unction. Baptism becomes purification; eucharist becomes insight into mysterious divine unity; unction becomes deification.

But the ultimate difference which separated east from west was the freedom of the self, for the east could not see how a sinful, individual man, be he flesh or spirit, could be free except within God's all-embracing bosom.[51]

However viewed, these Christological views point up the issue which has separated east from west. The Logos has been central. Clinging to unity, the east could not comprehend personal divinity. The issue first appeared in theology but, with the passing of time, it became secular too. It was the issue of personality: does individual man have value?

What seems to have become lost is the basic Christian insight that love requires both a personal lover and a personal beloved.

So the broken Christian fellowship, divided for about 1,300 years, is not only the symbol of the cold war which now grips our world, but, inasmuch as this schism has helped to produce the two monolithic cultures which now oppose each other, the institutional churches from whom this division has emerged should bear their share of the guilt. Repentance is in order.

50 *Ibid.*, pp. 561 ff.
51 Seeberg, *op. cit.*, II, 338.

Notes and Studies

SOME THESES OF PHILIP MELANCHTHON

Translated by Charles L. Hill

I. Circular Themes (1520)

WHILE Luther was engaged in his powerful literary activity in 1520, Melanchthon had already taken up his position in the university in Wittenberg and was beginning to bring Luther's position out into academic circles, as can be seen from the theses which he debated in 1520. In these Melanchthon drew a sharp distinction between theology and philosophy, and especially did he oppose the Catholic interpretation of the mass as a sacrifice. Luther was very much impressed with these writings and said as much in a letter which he wrote to John Voigt: "I send you also the theses of Melanchthon which are to be debated today; although remarkable, they are true" (*WA, Br.,* 2, 162). The so-called "Circular Themes" of 1520 read in translation as follows:

1. The beginning of justification is through faith.
2. Charity is a work of faith.
3. The distinction between "faith formed" and "faith informed" is a false one.
4. For informed faith, as they call it, is not faith, but false opinion.
5. Charity necessarily follows faith.
6. Faith and charity are the works of God, not those of human nature.
7. Christianity, to be sure, is a process of sabbatizing and absolute freedom.
8. It follows that satisfaction is not a part of repentance.
9. It likewise follows that in Christianity there is no outward sacrifice.
10. Therefore, the mass is not a sacrifice.
11. Nor is the mass a work of such a nature that its fruits can be transferred to another.
12. Indeed, in like manner, there is no efficacy in baptism to anyone except to him who is washed, nor is there any efficacy in the mass to anyone but to him who partakes of it.
13. For just as is the case with baptism, so also with the mass, it is but a sacramental sign by which God witnesses that the remission of sins has been granted.
14. Since the whole of our justification is faith, no work can be called meritorious.
15. Therefore, all of our works are truly sins.
16. Seeing, indeed, that the keys have been given to all Christians alike, the primacy of Peter by divine right cannot be asserted.

17. The form of happiness fashioned by Aristotle not only does not agree with Christian doctrine, but does not even agree with the common judgment of mankind.

18. Therefore, it were better and more adequate to seek the plan of happiness and similar loci in the Scriptures, and therefore in the very sources, rather than in the ignorant nonsense of an empty-headed sophist.

II. Themes for Discussion on the Sixth Day (1522)

The disputations contained in this list of theses were held on July 25, 1522. The person who responded to Melanchthon was Philip Eberbach, later a schoolmaster in Joachimstal and in Coburg. At this time it was popular to discuss spiritual and worldly government. Since Luther's return from the Wartburg comparative peace had been restored, but the discussion of types of government was still the vogue. We get a glimpse of Melanchthon as a social and political philosopher in these thirty-four theses, which read in translation as follows:

1. Government is twofold: spiritual and corporal.

2. Corporal government regulates the external use of affairs.

3. And there is also civil administration which coerces the body, makes divisions of property, and prohibits violence.

4. God entrusted corporal government to Adam when he subjected Eve to him and ordered homicides to be killed.

5. This law was subsequently confirmed, both by the law of retaliation and by precept: Honor thy father and thy mother.

6. In like manner it was enjoined upon parents by divine law to rule their family corporally.

7. That law which makes it a duty to kill a stiff-necked son testifies of that very thing.

8. For since the law of God does not justify, ordinances have been handed down in the law.

9. Now, this external administration is the righteousness of the flesh.

10. There are persons who stand in the place of parents and to whom the latter entrust their duty, such as teachers, magistrates in the cities, and princes, to whom by consent of the people the rule is committed.

11. That is what Paul means in Romans 13 by the word government when he calls it the power of God.

12. For government is from God, of whatever kind it may be, whether of those who seize or of those who carry the sword.

13. When I mention magistrates or princes, I include all servants of the laws: judges, advocates, all defenders of litigants.

14. The servants of laws can use this government without sin since it is a good creature of God.

15. They sin who take up the sword against this government, and they are of the same nature as those who seize the possessions of others.

16. Even Peter was sinning when he took up the sword against duly constituted authority.

17. And Christ confirms the right of the sword when he says: he who takes the sword ought to perish by the sword.

18. Jehu did not sin when he took arms against the king, for he was compelled by an evident divine call to do what he did.

19. He has sinned who has invaded the kingdom without regard to an evident call.

20. Legal government, since it is of God, cannot be violated except by the will of God.

21. It is directed spiritually, by the Word of God alone and not by human power.

22. Ecclesiastical traditions are civil laws, and enforcement of them pertains in no way to spiritual government.

23. However, I am speaking of those traditions in which nothing has been decreed contrary to Scripture.

24. The Word of God gives life to some and slays others, for it judges the world. Thus Peter rightly slew Ananias.

25. The ministry of the Gospel is plainly a spiritual government.

26. Because the spirit proclaims nothing but righteousness, it lays down nothing by way of the external use of affairs.

27. The righteousness of the spirit is life eternal, for the Word is life. John I.

28. But what is the concern of life eternal with the righteousness of the flesh of those who perish?

29. They are miserably deceived who judge that the righteousness of the spirit is nothing other than that carnal righteousness of the world.

30. When ignorance and contempt for God can stand beside righteousness, that righteousness is not life.

31. But there are certain external matters which even the saints use, such as food and drink.

32. Those who are justified by the spirit cannot abuse external matters.

33. And so corporal government has been instituted for the coercion of the bodies of those who are without the spirit of God.

34. In brief, the righteousness of the world is not life, but the death and penalty of sin.

III. Baccalaureate Theses (1519)

Luther took special notice of these theses and praised them highly in a letter addressed to Staupitz in 1519. Both Melanchthon and Luther had developed a great interest in the dogma of transubstantiation and had criticized it on the basis of the norm of Scripture. Theses 16-18 were especially noteworthy. These provoked serious comments from John Eck, who wrote down his impressions and sent them to the princes. In translation Melanchthon's theses read as follows:

Peter Fontanus, dean of Theology, will discuss the propositions submitted while Philip Melanchthon will reply.

1. Human nature loves itself chiefly for its own sake.

2. It cannot love God for his own sake.

3. First divine and then natural law have decreed that God must be loved for his own sake.

4. Since, then, we cannot do this, the law is the reason why we fear God in a servile manner.

5. One must hate what is feared.

6. The law, therefore, causes us to hate God.

7. Just as hate is not the beginning of love, so servile fear is not the beginning of filial love.

8. It follows that servile fear is not the beginning of repentance.

9. Therefore, the benefit of Christ is righteousness.

10. All of our righteousness is a gratuitous imputation of God.

11. And therefore it is indeed true that even good works are sins.

12. The intellect can give assent to no given proposition without reason or experience.

13. Nor can the will by itself force the intellect to give assent.

14. The will drawn away by love to an object of faith orders the intellect to give assent.

15. This assent is faith or wisdom.

16. It is not necessary for a Catholic to believe any other articles of faith than those to which Scripture is a witness.

17. The authority of councils is below the authority of Scripture.

18. Therefore, it is a heresy without any crime not to believe in the sign, transubstantiation, and the like.

19. Faith acquired is mere opinion.

20. He who fails in one is guilty of all.

21. Precepts are to love an enemy, not to take revenge, not to swear an oath, and having things in common.

22. Natural laws are habits concreated in the soul.

23. Human nature loves to be well more than it loves simply to exist.

24. There is one God in the divine categories, and he is the sum of all things.

THE LUTHERAN CHURCH DURING THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR

By Glenn Weaver

IN TIME of war the position of a minority group is usually a difficult one, especially if the members of the group are suspected of having sympathies with the enemy. At the outbreak of the French and Indian War in 1754 the sit-

uation of the German element in British North America was indeed an unenviable one. Ironically, the German colonists were, of all the peoples residing there, least interested in public affairs,[1] and yet they found themselves accused by prominent colonials of open disloyalty and even of being in league with the French. Thus, because of this widespread distrust of the Germans, burden of proof that they had no traitorous intentions was placed squarely upon their shoulders. As the war progressed, however, the German minority succeeded in convincing the British authorities of their loyalties so that, to a large degree, the German settlers from Nova Scotia to Georgia came to be accepted as part of the social fabric of the colonies. It would not, therefore, be incorrect to say that the period between 1754 and 1763 marked the first step in the "Americanization" of the German-speaking people of the British New World. Likewise, the course of the conflict marked certain noticeable changes in the religious life of the Germans, and, in certain of their denominations and sects, denominational maturity was achieved during this period.

Of the German-speaking religious groups, the German Lutheran Church was by all odds the largest. From humble beginnings in the small Swedish colony on the Delaware and in the Dutch colony of New Amsterdam, the Lutheran Church had made slow and uneventful progress. In 1682 several hundred German Lutherans had arrived at the recently founded city of Philadelphia, and two years later the first Lutheran service was celebrated there. As the flow of German immigrants to the colonies continued into the eighteenth century, congregations were organized by lay-readers or by self-sacrificing missionary clergymen so that by the outbreak of hostilities in 1754 the denomination had been able to extend its influence throughout a considerable area of the eastern seaboard and, in certain regions, even beyond the mountains.[2]

When hostilities first began, the Lutherans were no less suspect than the smaller or lesser-known bodies. They had, however, a distinct advantage in having no doctrinal objection to bearing arms, a factor which embarrassed the so-called "plain sects" to no end. When the first calls for volunteers went out from the provincial capitals, members of this communion were quick to offer their services. Indeed, most of the Germans who served in the colonial militia and the Royal American Regiment were of either the Lutheran or Reformed faith. Although it is difficult to ascertain denominational affiliation beyond this point, it has been well established that Lutherans from Maine,[3] New Jersey,[4] Pennsyl-

1 See the present writer's "German Settlements in British North America before the French and Indian War," in *The Social Studies,* XLIV (December, 1953), pp. 283-290.

2 Abdel Ross Wentz, *The Lutheran Church in American History,* 2nd ed. (Philadelphia, 1953), pp. 31-55.

3 M. R. Ludwig, *Ludwig Genealogy: Sketch of Joseph Ludwig* (Augusta, 1866), pp. 24, 29-30, 39.

4 *The Journals of Henry Melchior Muhlenberg,* edited and translated by Theodore G. Tappert and John W. Doberstein (3 vols., Philadelphia, 1942 ff.), I, 397-399. Hereafter cited as *Muhlenberg Journals.*

vania,[5] Virginia,[6] and Georgia[7] were to be found among the regulars and the militia.

This participation by the Lutheran soldier was altogether unostentatious, and the frontier soldier—whether German Lutheran, Scottish Presbyterian, or Anglican—fought merely to put an end to the Indian raids which were making life almost unbearable. Among some of the Lutheran clergy, however, the war took on something of the nature of a religious crusade. Henry Melchior Muhlenberg, for example, found his interests in the success of the British cause prompted not so much by loyalty to the civil powers as by the fact that he saw the Protestant nations of Europe arrayed in what he felt was a mortal conflict with Roman Catholic powers.[8] Whatever may have been his motive, however, Muhlenberg's labors in the interest of his colony continued without interruption throughout the war years.[9]

With the outbreak of the conflict, the German Lutheran Church found itself with certain geographical advantages and disadvantages. Most of the older and larger congregations were located in the more densely populated area, while the many smaller and younger groups were scattered along the frontier from Nova Scotia to Georgia. The northernmost were to be found in Nova Scotia at Halifax, where a church had been organized in 1752,[10] and at Lunenburg, a town which had been purposely placed and peopled with Protestants for the express purpose of forming a buffer between the newly-founded capital, Halifax, to the east and the Roman Catholic French Acadians to the west.[11] Neither of these churches had been able to secure the services of a pastor except for the short time that the latter had been served by a clerical impostor, the "Rev." Daniel Shoemaker.[12] After much struggling to maintain their mere existence, the two Nova Scotia congregations combined their efforts to secure the services of an ordained clergyman. During the war years, through Michael Schlatter, the German Reformed chaplain to the Royal American Regiment who acted as intermediary, a pastoral call was extended to Henry Melchior Muhlenberg. He was offered the annual salary of £70 with an additional £20 if he would devote a part of his time to the instruction of the young. Muhlenberg gave serious thought to the call, but after deciding that his services were equally useful to the Pennsylvania Lutherans and perhaps also wishing to remain near the geographical center of the denomination over which he exercised a considerable control, he declined the call.[13]

5 C. Z. Weiser, *The Life of [John] Conrad Weiser* (Reading, 1876), *passim.*

6 John Walter Wayland, *A History of Rockingham County, Virginia* (Dayton, Va., 1912), p. 37.

7 Amos Aschbach Ettinger, *James Edward Oglethorp, Imperial Idealist* (Oxford, 1936), p. 219.

8 William J. Mann, *Life and Times of Henry Melchior Muhlenberg* (Philadelphia: G. W. Fredrick, 1888), p. 320.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 314.

10 D. Luther Roth, *Acadie and the Acadians* (Philadelphia, 1890), pp. 106-107.

11 David L. Roth, "Across Boundary Lines," in *The Lutheran*, XV, April 6, 1933, p. 10.

12 Mann, *op. cit.*, p. 325.

13 Mann, *op. cit.*, p. 325.

The "union" church at Waldoboro, Maine, prospered to a degree in spite of the ravages of war.[14] During the latter phases of the conflict (in 1760) a substantial log church was erected,[15] and two years later the group received its first pastor, "Dr." John M. Schaeffer,[16] a man of questionable learning and moral character who, along with his pastoral duties (which he performed carelessly) acted as town physician and grew wealthy through the exploitation of his patients and parishioners.[17] The German inhabitants of "Frankfort-on-the-Kennebec" also professed adherence to Lutheran doctrines but made no progress toward the organization of a congregation.[18]

New York boasted many Lutheran congregations: New York City, Rheinbeck-on-the-Hudson, East Camp, West Camp, Tar Busch, Ancrum,[19] Albany,[20] Newburgh,[21] Athens,[22] Schoharie, Stone Arabia, Little Falls, Heidelberg, Beaver Dam, and Cobelskill.[23] The savage destruction of the "German Flats" in New York, of course, meant suffering to the large Lutheran population there. However, there were many New York congregations which actually suffered little from Indian raids, for the southern part of the colony was far from the scene of actual fighting, and life for these people proceeded at a normal pace.

New Jersey also had a considerable Lutheran population, and there were churches or "preaching points" at Raritan, Fosseberg, Rockaway, Hackensack, Remersbach,[24] and New Germantown.[25] In New Jersey, congregational life seems to have been little disturbed. At Hackensack in 1759 lotteries were held for the purpose of raising funds to make repairs to the church building,[26] and in Bedminister Township, Somerset County, a similar lottery was held in 1758,[27] evidently for the purpose of raising money to complete the church at Pluckemin

14 Lucy Forney Bittinger, *The Germans in Colonial Times* (Philadelphia, 1901), pp. 131-132. A "union" church was one in which both Lutheran and Reformed congregations used the same building. See *The Lutheran Quarterly,* V (Feb., 1953), pp. 56-69.

15 Bittinger, *op. cit.,* p. 139.

16 The Rev. Mr. ——— Starman, "Some Account of the German Settlement in Waldoborough," *Collections of the Maine Historical Society,* V, 1857, p. 405.

17 Bittinger, *op. cit.,* pp. 139-140.

18 *Ibid.,* p. 139.

19 *Muhlenberg Journals,* I, 248-254; E. B. O'Callaghan, *Documentary History of the State of New York,* 4 vols. (Albany), III, 294-295.

20 *Ecclesiastical Records of the State of New York,* 7 vols. (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1901-1916), I, 483, 602.

21 Bittinger, *op. cit.,* pp. 58-60; O'Callaghan, *op. cit.,* III, 351.

22 Delber Wallace Clark, "Zion Lutheran Church at Athens, New York: European Events and American Results," *New York History,* XX (Oct. 1939), 436.

23 Jeptha R. Simms, *History of Schoharie County, and the Border Wars of New York* (Albany, 1845), pp. 37, 610, 611.

24 *Muhlenberg Journals,* I, 199-200, 285, 289.

25 George S. Mott, *The First Century of Hunterdon County, State of New Jersey* (n.p., *circa.* 1878), p. 71.

26 *Archives of the State of New Jersey,* first series (Newark, New Jersey, 1880-1924), XX, 394.

27 *Ibid.,* XX, 283.

which had been begun about 1755,[28] but as wartime inflation had so greatly increased building costs, an insufficient amount of money was on hand.[29] Perhaps to the Lutherans of New Jersey the wartime inflation was a more serious problem than Indian raids.

While the New Jersey Lutherans were not immediately affected by the hostilities, they took an active interest in the progress of the war. In one of the congregations shepherded by Muhlenberg, on October 30, 1759, a service of thanksgiving was held "for the glorious acts of God . . .: (1) The victory of . . . Prince Ferdinand. . . .[30] (2) Admiral Boscawen's victory . . . at Algawe. (3) The glorious victory of His Royal Majesty of Prussia[31] over the Russians at Kunersdorf.[32] (4) The marvelous victory of General Wolf . . . at . . . Quebec."[33] Similar services were held at this time in most of the West-Jersey Lutheran communities.[34]

In Pennsylvania, where there were perhaps as many as 35,000 Lutheran adherents,[35] there were in 1754 congregations of vaying size and importance in the following places: in present Philadelphia County: Philadelphia and Germantown; in Bucks County: Neshaminy and Friedens Church in Tohickon Township; in Northampton County: Forks of the Delaware [Easton] and Petersburgh; in Montgomery County: New Providence, Franconia, Falckner's Swamp, Old Goshenhoppen, New Goshenhoppen, Trappe, and Pennsburg; in Lehigh County: Upper Milford, Old Blue Church in Saucon Township, Jordan, Heidelberg, Trexlertown, Jerusalem (in Salisbury Township), Macungie, Maxatawny, and Weissenberg; in Chester County: Zion Church; in Berks County: Reading, French Creek, Molatton, Oley, Moselem, Tulpehocken, Christ Church (in Rockland Township), Bernville, Allemangel, Alsace, and Schwartzwald; in Lebanon County: Swatara, Quitepahilla, Bindnagel, and Schaefferstown; in Lancaster County: Lancaster, Earltown [New Holland], Muddy Creek, and Brickersville: in York County: Conewago [Hanover], Codorus [York], and Paradise; and in Adams County: Bermudian.[36] In Pennsylvania, a colony with a long and greatly exposed frontier, the Lutherans could not enjoy the safety of their brethren in New Jersey. Those even in the more exposed regions continued, however, to worship in their churches, but carried their guns with them to the services.[37]

28 *Ibid.*, XX, 285, n. 2.

29 *Ibid.*, XX, 311.

30 Victory at the Battle of Minden, August 1, 1759.

31 Frederick the Great.

32 A false report had reached New Jersey, for this was not a victory for Frederick, but a serious defeat.

33 *Muhlenberg's Journals*, I, 419.

34 *Ibid.*, I, 420-421.

35 Theodore Emanuel Schmauck, *The Lutheran Church in Pennsylvania* (Lancaster, Pa.), I, p. 227.

36 Schmauck, *op. cit.*, pp. 239-243, 251, 256, 258; Daniel Miller, "Early History of the Reformed Church in Reading," *The Pennsylvania German*, VII (December, 1906), p. 391; "Bernville: "A Historical Sketch," *The Pennsylvania German*, VIII (Oct., 1907), p. 482.

37 Weiser, *op. cit.*, p. 404.

At Tulpehocken, one of the Lutheran communities to feel most severely the blows of Indian attacks, the congregation displayed much fortitude. There, late in 1755, John Nicholas Kurtz conducted funeral services for seven victims of an Indian raid, and the congregation in its hour of sorrow opened the service with the singing of Luther's hymn *"Ein feste Burg ist unser Gott."*[38] It was here at Tulpehocken that Pastor Kurtz acted as chaplain, in an unofficial capacity,[39] to the troops which passed through the community by offering prayer for those who would gather at the church before departing for the frontier.[40] The church at nearby Swatara also served as a fortress during raids, and many of the victims were buried in the adjoining graveyard.[41]

In the spring of 1765 Muhlenberg accompanied "a number of inhabitants of the townships of Providence and Limbrick" on a journey to the Lehigh Valley to make inquiry as to the welfare of the refugees who had moved into the settlements of this area from the more remote frontier regions,[42] and in the summer of 1758 he made a tour of the entire Pennsylvania frontier, giving what comfort he could to the distressed Lutherans.[43] Muhlenberg, having a direct interest in the successes of the English cause, was critical of the pacifist attitudes of the "plain sects," and of Christopher Sauer in particular. In 1754 he wrote to Benjamin Franklin deploring the influence which the Dunker printer of Germantown was wielding over the Reformed and Lutheran people by means of his newspaper.[44]

Regarding Maryland, Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia, stories similar to those of Pennsylvania's hardships and fortitude could doubtless be told. Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulties, parish life in Maryland (as in Pennsylvania) continued to flourish and in that colony denominational holdings were even extended. At Frederick, Maryland, a church building had been started in 1753, but as the work was soon halted by the war, the project was not completed until 1762,[45] possibly because it was left without a pastor in 1759.[46] At nearby

38 C. Hale Sipe, *The Indian Wars of Pennsylvania* (Harrisburg, Pa., 1929), p. 237.

39 It would seem that no Lutheran clergymen served as chaplains either to the militia regiments or in the Royal American Regiment.

40 Weiser to Gov. Morris, Oct. 30, 1755, in Weiser, *The Life of* [*John*] *Conrad Weiser*, p. 208; N. Willison, "Centennials in Canada," in *The Lutheran*, XVI (Jan. 25, 1934), p. 9, says that a Lutheran chaplain ministered to the British soldiers at Louisbourg in 1758. Probably he refers to Schlatter, who was not Lutheran, but Reformed.

41 H. M. M. Richards, *The Pennsylvania German in the French and Indian War* (Lancaster, Pa., 1905), p. 309.

42 *Muhlenberg Journals*, I, 386. The editors of the edition consulted raise the question as to whether Muhlenberg actually went on this journey. As parts of Muhlenberg's account of the journey are recorded in the first person, it may be said that he was probably a member of the party.

43 Mann, *op. cit.*, 315.

44 James Owen Knaus, *Social Conditions Among the Pennsylvania Germans in the Eighteenth Century as Revealed in the German Newspapers Published in America* (Lancaster, Pa., 1922), pp. 5, 6.

45 J. Thomas Scharf, *History of Western Maryland*, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1882), I, 511.

46 Roth, *Acadie and the Acadians*, p. 138.

Middletown, however, the congregation succeeded in erecting a church building in 1755, the year of the most severe Indian raids in that region.[47] The Lutherans at Hagerstown also carried on their parish affairs with little disturbance.[48]

Virginia had a considerable Lutheran population, and there were a number of congregations in the Shenandoah Valley which were maintained largely through visits of ordained pastors from Pennsylvania.[49] At Massanutten, on the Shenandoah River, in what is now Page County, there was a small Lutheran community.[50] George Samuel Klug served as pastor of the Hebron Church (in present Madison County) from 1739 until 1764. During the war years he had also extended his pastoral labors to the Shenandoah Valley, particularly to present Rockingham County.[51] In this same county, Peace Church, near Mount Crawford, was organized about 1748,[52] and the congregations at Shepherdstown and Winchester date from about the same time.[53] At least one new parish was organized in Virginia during the war years: Roeder's Church near Timberville (1762).[54] It was in this German Lutheran region of the colony that suffering from Indian raids was most acute. It was also from this region that a large number of Germans volunteered in the Virginia militia.

The "mother churches" of Lutheranism in North Carolina were small bodies in the Piedmont region which were developed by Germans who migrated southward from Pennsylvania to settle at Salisbury, Zion Church (in Rowan County), and St. John's Church (in Cabarrus County).[55] Happily for these congregations, this particular region of North Carolina was spared large-scale Indian raids.

In South Carolina the Lutheran Church was late in coming of age. While Charleston served as a port of entry for the Lutheran migrations to the colony, no congregational life prevailed among the members of this faith until the middle of the century. However, upon the arrival of a visiting clergyman of their own faith, followers gathered for religious services,[56] and by 1754 there was a considerable Lutheran element in the city, and a new church was built there in 1759.[57]

47 Scharf, *op. cit.*, I, 575.

48 *Muhlenberg Journals*, I, 158.

49 John Walter Wayland, *The German Element of the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia* (Charlottesville, 1907), p. 111.

50 Wayland, "Early Reformed Churches in Virginia," *Bulletin of the Theological Seminary of the Evangelical and Reformed Church*, XVII (October, 1946), p. 211.

51 Wayland, *A History of Rockingham County, Virginia*, p. 46.

52 *Ibid.*, p. 259.

53 Wayland, "The Germans in the Valley," *Virginia Magazine*, X, 121-122.

54 Wayland, *A History of Rockingham County, Virginia*, p. 258.

55 Carl Hammer, Jr., *Rhinelanders on the Yadkin* (Salisbury, 1943), pp. 35-36; this question, as well as the matter of German settlement in general, is skillfully treated by William H. Gehrke in "The Beginnings of the Pennsylvania-German Element in Rowan and Cabarrus Counties, North Carolina," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, LVIII (1934), pp. 342-370.

56 G. D. Bernheim, *History of the German Settlements and of the Lutheran Church in North and South Carolina* (Philadelphia, 1872), pp. 81-88.

57 *Ibid.*, p. 207.

The Lutherans at the Purysburg settlement probably never enjoyed the services of a pastor of their own faith, and the few Lutheran families located there were obliged to cross the border to worship with the Ebenezer community in Georgia.[58] At Saxe-Gotha, South Carolina, a contemporary numbered the Lutheran membership at about 280 souls.[59] A small group had also survived at Orangeburg (now Lexington) since 1735.[60] These frontier congregations were less fortunate than those in North Carolina, for the members joined in a general exodus to the British forts in Georgia.

In Georgia a very strong, and probably the most important, congregation in the colony was the one at Ebenezer. This parish, however, suffered the loss of a number of its members, for when the community was more or less disintegrated because of dangers of Indian raids, many failed to return to Ebenezer and formed the nucleus of several later Lutheran congregations in the south.[61] At the fort of Frederica in Georgia an unusual group, consisting of soldiers stationed there and a few of the Salzburgers living in that vicinity, was formed.[62] Though it seemed that all congregations in Georgia struggled to survive, there were of course "preaching points" in various German localities from Savannah (which boasted that it was one of the oldest Lutheran centers)[63] to the north and to the west,[64] so that by the outbreak of the war there were upwards of 1,200 Lutherans in the colony.[65] From the beginning the Lutherans were held in high regard by the trustees of this colony. When the Salzburgers built their church at Ebenezer they furnished some of the materials needed in construction, as well as an altar cloth, vestments, a chalice, and other articles necessary to the conduct of liturgical worship. In addition to these evidences of generosity, the trustees contributed liberally toward the erection of a parsonage at Ebenezer. The kindnesses of the trustees were well repaid, for the Lutherans, unlike the Moravians, who had deserted the colony in 1740 because of their unwillingness to assist in the defense of Georgia against the Spanish, became staunch supporters of the government and were vitally concerned about the welfare of their colony as well as the well-being of their church.[66] Here, where the Lutherans had always been among the most valiant defenders of the colony,[67] Pastor John Martin Bolzius in 1757 took his stand against a proposal to establish the Church of England in the colony. Bolzius wrote a lengthy protest to Commons reminding them that Georgia had been greatly strengthened by the Lutheran element, and that to discriminate

58 *Ibid.*, p. 98.
59 *Ibid.*, p. 142.
60 Edmund Jacob Wolf, *The Lutherans in America* (New York, 1889), p. 203.
61 Wentz, *op. cit.*, p. 81.
62 Bittinger, *op. cit.*, p. 147.
63 Reba Carolyn Strickland, *Religion and the State in Georgia in the Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1939), p. 37.
64 Bittinger, *op. cit.*, p. 149.
65 Wolf, *op. cit.*, p. 196.
66 Strickland, *op. cit.*, p. 76.
67 Ettinger, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

against the communion would preclude further immigrations of members of this faith, with a consequent weakening of colonial defenses. An act of this sort was, nevertheless, finally passed by the Georgia Assembly, but only after numerous amendments had rendered it unworkable and only after specific mention of the Church of England had been eliminated.[68]

During the time of the Indian troubles, the Lutheran communities—in particular the ones at Frederica and Ebenezer—were the centers to which the German refugees from the Carolinas fled.

Just as individual congregations were adversely affected by the war, so the Lutheran Church in its denominational organizations suffered setbacks. During this period the Lutheran Synod was unable to carry on, for from 1755 until 1759 no sessions of that body were held. This was not entirely caused by the dangers of the war, however, for this was also a time of internal controversy between factions within the communion.[69]

The effect of the conflict upon the German Lutheran Church has already been dealt with in regard to the individual congregations as well as the Synod, but in conclusion a few general observations must be made. So far as the membership of the denomination is concerned, there seems to have been no decline, and even during the latter years of the war Lutheran outposts had been extended westward at several points along the frontier. While the Synod did not convene during the early years of the war, when sessions were resumed in 1759 the denomination entered into a new spirit of cooperation and much material progress was soon to be noted. Needless to say, the new progress was made *in spite* of the war rather than because of it. On the negative side, several of what would have been major plans for denominational advancement had to be discarded because of the uncertainties of the times. Chief of these plans was one made as early as 1749 for establishing in Philadelphia a theological seminary and a home for the aged.[70] A second plan, which probably had not progressed as far as the first, was to transform the Bethesda Orphans' House in Georgia into a college which was to operate primarily for the benefit of the Lutherans of Georgia. Pastor Bolzius of the Ebenezer congregation and George Whitefield last discussed the matter in 1755, but here again the difficulties of the times prevented a realization of the plan.[71]

68 Strickland, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-104.

69 Wentz, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

70 Wentz, *op. cit.*, p. 84; Fredrich G. Gotwald, "Lutheran Secondary Schools and Colleges," *The Pennsylvania German*, VIII, p. 404.

71 Strickland, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

Life and Thought in World Lutheranism

Debate on the Sacred and the Secular in Finland

Since the end of World War II a theological debate of unusual intensity has been in the making in Finland. Now it has reached a literary stage (beyond occasional articles in journals and religious newspapers) in the form of a book, "The Secular and the Sacred," and a new theological periodical carrying the title, "The Church and Theology."

Because this debate is a discussion among the Finns themselves, and because the atmosphere of heat accompanying the controversy is intelligible only within the tradition of Finnish Lutheranism — although the objective frame of reference is the "theology of Lund"—it is not possible to create an adequately objective picture to the American reader. However, some of the salient features, of interest beyond Finland, can be presented.

In the early 1940's several younger pastors went to Sweden to study at Lund. Their interest was stirred by the question of theological methodology. Some of them felt that standing in the line of the Beckian biblicistic and pietistic traditions (not to be too closely identified with the German and Swedish pietistic movements, the Finns having their own unique chapter in the powerful movements of spiritual awakening) they were wanting in a method which made sense and which could articulate in objective terms what they believed. Something of a revolt stirred in their minds, and soon long distance artillery began to fire from Lund to Helsinki that shook the silence of generations.

Pastor Erkki Niinivaara, of Porvoo, is the author of the book referred to in the beginning, a book which raised a storm of discussion, even exciting the secular press. The occasion for the writing of the book was this: The diocese of Tampere had commissioned Niinivaara to write on any subject of pertinent interest to pastors as an "introduction to a discussion" at the synodical assembly of clergymen which meets a year prior to the church convention. This is a long established custom in all the dioceses, and Niinivaara took the occasion to write about a subject that was on his heart.

"One of the most significant features of contemporary life," he wrote, "is the fact that between the world of God and the human world of men there exists a chasm. . . . Have we inherited from past generations certain habits of thought, assumptions accepted as self-evident, which now turn out to be only habits and assumptions? What is sacred, spiritual? What is secular, worldly? Has theology (and under its influence, preaching) presupposed uncritically that certain areas in human life are, as if by their very nature, profane and removed from God while other areas are holy and by their own nature belonging to God? . . .

"The themes of the first article of

the Apostles' Creed are now beginning to engage the center of our attention. The viewpoint set forth in the doctrine of creation has served as a powerful stimulant to many theological minds. . . . Of particular significance is the impact of the new Luther-research in calling for a new formulation of the problem. . . . While interest in creation has gained new momentum, we should remember that the question is not that of placing faith-in-creation over against faith-in-salvation, but of the total perspective of the Christian faith. The God of creation and of salvation is the same. . . .

"Quite generally today we preach as follows: first we describe how riches, fame, power, health, and the pleasures of life are deceptive and last but a short time. Then we go on to exhort the hearer to seek for worthier things as the content of life, things which bring a deeper satisfaction for his innermost yearnings. . . . Here we are dealing with a certain kind of a metaphysics of value. There are secular things, profitable and good in themselves, but finally they prove to be inadequate. Therefore, we must turn our search to the real, durable objectives, namely, to the highest good, God.

"This view is static and hellenistic. Something is secular, something else is sacred. . . . Luther's world view represents an entirely different atmosphere. . . . Man stands continually in the presence of God, before his face, *coram Deo,* and at no time does he occupy a position outside, evaluating the situation as a neutral observer. His existence rests in God every moment. But he exists either in a state of faith or of unbelief. A person does not arrive at a right relationship with God by exchanging secular interests for spiritual ones or by choosing God as his highest good, but by receiving the Word in faith. In this way he is made righteous through faith. The kingdom of God is the 'kingdom of hearing' and not a terrain which you may step on with your foot. . . .

"Behind all this lies the proud thinking of man regarding his autonomy. From this arises the concept of free will and of its alleged power of decision to build the spiritual world, which, although false, casts a spell over men who 'desire to be like God.' . . . The righteousness of faith and the righteousness of free will are as fire and water. The one or the other must perish. . . ."

Soon after Niinivaara's book appeared, Professor Osmo Tiilila, dean of the theological faculty in the University of Helsinki, wrote a severely critical review in the leading religious bi-weekly, *Kotimaa.* He felt that a strange doctrine had been set forth and that for the sake of novelty an interpretation was proposed which went directly counter to the sound and secure foundations of evangelical faith which had been tried and tested in the rich experiences of Finnish Lutheranism. Other writings appeared, both for and against, in anticipation of the pastors' synodical assembly at which the book was to be discussed formally. This assembly, meeting in October, 1952, heard eighteen formal speeches, each ten minutes in length, and found it necessary to postpone further discussion to a period following the conclusion of official business. In one form or another the debate has con-

tinued, culminating in the creation of a new theological journal dedicated to the cause of theology and the church as found in the faith of the fathers.

Professor Tiilila spoke twice. In substance he emphasized these points: "Since I have already presented my opinion of the book in the newspaper *Kotimaa,* I shall not repeat my thoughts. But I should like to speak to you for the following reason. I fear that the discussion provoked by this book will be a divisive one. That we cannot afford to have. It would be tragic to engage in battle against one another when we ought to form a common front against sin and the world. . . . Furthermore, I wish to address my appeal to that group among us which has brought this restlessness into our church after the wars. Do not continue. Do not draw the bow too tight. . . . It is difficult for you to realize how stiff an opposition you have awakened because you draw your ideas from sources alien to Finnish Christianity and you have learned to think otherwise than the Christian people of Finland, who have boundless gratitude for the heritage of the great movements of spiritual awakening in the last century. . . . I should like to call your attention to the basic error in this book, namely, the ignoring of the second and third articles of the Apostles' Creed. This is the primary mistake of all liberal theology as we have come to know it since the days of rationalistic deism. Another characteristic of liberal theology can be seen in the fact that when men begin to feel that the works of God and of his revelation as we now know them are insufficient, they seek novelty and admire things which seem new. They always expect something new, regardless of its mistiness and contradiction to the Bible. . . ."

It is not possible at this time to report that the differences between the contending parties in Finland have been reconciled. Professor Lennart Pinomaa commented: "The new Luther-research has disclosed to us a more genuine conception of Luther. Can it be true that the Church of Finland cannot accept an encounter with the real Luther? . . . Niinivaara's sources are not to be found solely among Lund scholars. He is also acquainted with German Luther-research. . . ."

Two questions come to the mind of an American observer: (1) Have we ourselves learned to perceive the decisive significance of the question of "theological method?" Sooner or later we shall have to meet the challenge. (2) Americans are now in the midst of a "religious renascence." What does the theologian say? How does he interpret the current phenomenon?

Jacob W. Heikkinen

Luther Society Reorganized

The *Luther-Gesellschaft,* whose activities were interrupted by the emergence of National Socialism, was reorganized on May 28, 1953, under the leadership of Professors Paul Althaus (Erlangen), Theodor Knolle (Hamburg), Kurt-Dietrich Schmidt (Hamburg), and others. The first number of the society's occasional publication, *Luther: Mitteilungen der Luther-Gesellschaft,* appeared in a new series in June, 1953, in the Lutherisches Ver-

lagshaus, Berlin. The former annual, *Jahrbuch,* is also to be published. Membership, including a subscription to both publications, is tentatively fixed at DM 12.

A Roman Catholic Historian on the Indulgence Controversy

There is a great gulf fixed between the scientific interpretation of Luther by Roman Catholic scholars and the popular treatment of the Reformer which reaches Roman Catholic people in pamphlets and periodicals. This is not surprising. Rather more surprising at first sight is the difference in treatment accorded Luther at the hands of American and continental European Roman Catholic historians. The following is an extract from the work of a German Roman Catholic historian who has made an honest effort to understand Luther and his times without in any way sacrificing his own faith. It is translated from Joseph Lortz, *Die Reformation in Deutschland,* 3rd ed., 2 vols. (Freiburg: Herder & Co., 1949), I, 194-200.

"A just judgment of the whole indulgence controversy of 1519 and a reasonable interpretation of the difficulties which then existed require a careful distinction, based on the pertinent facts, between theory and practice. Or better said: a distinction between pure theology on the one hand and ecclesiastical and popular practice on the other. To this ecclesiastical practice belongs that cruder kind of theology which was at home in the formula—indeed, in the whole attitude —of the curia, of the bishops, and to a large extent of the pulpits.

"The juxtaposition and the antithesis of these two factors were characteristic of the entire theological situation at the close of the Middle Ages and on the eve of the Reformation. Whether theological theory correctly defined and established the distinction between mortal and venial sins is less important than the fact that, by the casuistical and legalistic treatment of the subject, the notion of calculating and bargaining with God was overemphasized, and with this went the assumption that one could know exactly what one could do in any given instance without sinning, what one had to do to get rid of sin, what one could do to help poor souls in purgatory, and how many of the purgatorial penalties one could escape. . . .

"An indulgence—even less the remission of sins—was not simply offered for sale by the church and given in return for a payment.

"The payment of a material work for a spiritual grace was in itself correct [according to medieval theology]. To be sure, this represented a departure from primitive Christian customs and ideas. But it was not an invention of Rome. It represented a specifically Celtic-Germanic conception, as the development of medieval penitential discipline in the West shows. It was an externalization of something Christian, but not a denial of it. The danger of such denial appeared when indulgences introduced an abatement of Christian moral earnestness.

"And this occurred. Two causes, especially, contributed to it. First, the relaxation, by means of indulgences, of the strict penitential discipline of the ancient church resulted (as relax-

ation always does) in a desire for more and more favors. The curia yielded to this desire. It did so—and this is the second cause—by making of indulgences more than a proper arrangement for financial contributions and by involving them in the unhappy development of curial fiscality, that is, in an un-Christian secularization. Both of these causes were intimately related to the piety which was characteristic of the late Middle Ages, as this piety expressed itself in pilgrimages and relics. Immoderate multiplication of indulgences and their fiscal function, together with the dangerous externalization of late medieval piety, deprived indulgences of their profound religious meaning and often transformed them into something that was, for all practical purposes, un-Christian.

"Let one example suffice here. As a consequence of the mass distribution of indulgences the notion that penalties for sin could be remitted dominated the consciousness of Christians in that age. Although this notion is theoretically capable of defense, it has the effect of shifting emphasis to what is peripheral. The perfect repentance with love which was taught—as a correct expression of theology—in medieval devotional literature receded far into the background. Theory and practice parted company.

"The danger became a reality when the cautious and correct theology was practically crowded out by the crass theories of chanceleries and indulgence preachers. . . .

"The church itself never promised remission of penalites for sin without repentance. But at the time of the Reformation there were shameless deceivers who did promise this. They did this by falsifying papal bulls and selling indulgences for money. They were deceivers. They did what they did in flagrant opposition to the teaching of the church. Obviously this could occur only in an environment dominated by the unscrupulous fiscality of a Boniface IX and men of his stripe. . . .

"But this is not the conclusion of the matter. Only when all this has been said are we ready to draw conclusions. The question is not whether, abstractly considered, it was still possible to interpret words correctly. The question is what practical meaning the words had, in what direction they tended with dialectical necessity. Even the theories of Tetzel can be demonstrated to have been correct. Yet the practice which he represented and which was approved by the church became, to a large extent, sub-Christian.

"One cannot prove that Tetzel's extreme view—that an indulgence can be applied to a particular soul with complete assurance—was utterly opposed to Christian doctrine and therefore essentially wrong. But what if this indulgence was secured by a sinner without repentance? If a man who is in a condition of enmity to God is able by a mere payment of money to alter the secret judgment of the divine majesty in the world to come, the danger in such theories is at once evident to anyone's Christian consciousness. The bagatellization of repentance which emerges clearly in this one case (the purchase of indulgences for the dead) stamped the rest of the practice of the professional pardon sellers, correct as their practice may have been in theory. The goal of those who commis-

sioned indulgence preachers was business. To achieve this, the people were enticed—not with dishonest intentions—by a gloriously easy way to secure salvation. . . .

"The Dominican Tetzel, general sub-commissioner of the archbishop of Mayence, adhered strictly to the spirit of his instructions. There can be no doubt whatsoever that he taught according to the sense of the doggerel, 'As soon as the coin in the coffer rings, the soul from purgatory springs.' It is equally certain that he did not claim that indulgences remit the penalties of sins which were yet to be committed. This slander was not picked up by Luther until 1541, in his pamphlet *Wider Hans Worst.*

"Tetzel was very well paid. But one cannot prove that he was guilty of gross moral misconduct. He did not belong to the sort of indulgence preachers of whom John Eck said that they paid for their carousing with indulgence certificates. Rather, he belonged among those whom Jerome Emser pilloried as men who were more interested in money than in repentance and sorrow for sin. It is a fact that, for the sake of raising money, he lowered, in a very dangerous fashion, the requirements of salvation."

THEODORE G. TAPPERT

Book Reviews and Notices[1]

Introduction to Religion. By Winston L. King. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954. 563 pages. $6.

This is a book about which one can speak very enthusiastically indeed. Our libraries are filled with volumes dealing with the history, sociology, and psychology of religions and with the relations between religion, morality, art, philosophy and science. The literature of comparative religions is enormous. But here is the first book by an American scholar to deal comprehensively and systematically with the whole of religion. It is so complete and well-written that it is sure to achieve a position as one of the most important American contributions to the perennial discussion of the question: What is religion in its *totality?*

The author received the major part of his training in the history and philosophy of religion at Harvard. He has been a Congregational minister for many years and is at the present time Dean of the Chapel and Associate Professor of Philosophy and Religion at Grinnell College.

This book is not a detailed description of a number of religions, nor is it a collection of religious curiosities such as anthropologists sometimes present. Nor is it a philosophy of religion which seeks to evaluate doctrinal structures. The author tries to combine the historical, comparative, and evaluative types of study so as "to give insight into the religious approach to life, whatever its forms and level, and to some extent discuss the total development and meaning of religions in the life of mankind." Mr. King states his aim in these words: "Most of our attention will be centered on the typical ways in which the great living faiths of the present day have dealt with the basic religious concerns of mankind in their patterns of thought, their moral codes, and their institutions."

A brief glance at the table of contents will show that the author makes good his claim to comprehensive coverage. Part I is devoted to a discussion of the meaning of the term "religion" and how it shall be distinguished, both in its diversity and unity, from other kinds of human activity. This section contains as authoritative and judicious a statement on the problems of the origin and history, the distinguishing marks and interrelationships between religion and other disciplines as one could hope to find.

At the outset the author acknowledges the difficulty of treating religion objectively. He announces that his own presuppositions are Christian and that his evaluations will be colored by that faith. But he insists that even the committed religious man can and must seek to be fair and sympathetic in his approach to other faiths than his own.

In Part II King describes the social expression of religion in terms of its group life. His style of organization is one which gives cross-sections of many religions under topical headings. In Part III, "Religion as Salvation," the author discusses three classic patterns of salvation: the way of works (law, sacrament, morality), the way of devotion (faith and love), and the way of knowledge (mystical insight). In Part IV he discusses "Religion as Question and Answer." He examines the intellectual efforts of various religions as they have sought to deal with the ultimate moral and intellectual problems with which man has wrestled since the dawn of history: the nature of the universe, the nature of God, the nature and destiny of man, and the problem of evil.

King's analysis of many religions and sects under these headings creates the strong impression that structurally all religions are similar. That is, religions are similar in that they seek to reach the same general goals, fulfill identical functions, satisfy like desires and needs, and answer the same questions.

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1 Books reviewed or noticed in these pages may be purchased through your church's publication house.

But in the methods by which they seek to do these things they are different. With respect to the "continuity-discontinuity" controversy recorded in Volume I of the Tambaram Series, King pretty clearly falls on the "continuity" side. In affirming that "no religion is absolutely unique" he would be out of sympathy with the view of Hendrik Kraemer. But on the other hand, he would not be at home in the *Rethinking Missions* school of thought. He does not actually give a specific decision on this matter, although his book presents adequate materials for such a decision on the reader's part. One of the finest features of the book is the author's realistic awareness of complexity and his unusually stubborn attempt to be objective in analysis and presentation. He describes the actual phenomena of each religion as fairly as possible, estimates the merits and defects of each tradition, and then indicates what his reasons are for believing that the Christian religion is the superior religion.

Yet the book is not an argument for or against any religious tradition and it is only incidentally related to the question as to whether God's providential operations are confined to one line of revelation. This book is more nearly like an encyclopedia. It consists almost entirely of information with a minimum of interpretation. He includes just enough theory to account for the sequence of topics. His judgments are fair and based on wide and thorough knowledge.

Upon a first reading this book strikes one as a splendid achievement and it is the sort of book to which one would often turn for reference. Yet there are, of course, points in it to which the Protestant theologian would take exception. King seems to miss many of the distinctive theological insights of the Old Testament. His statement on the origin of Christianity is inadequate as are also his comments on the significance of the Nicene Council. His definition of revelation is such that he attributes to Christianity a static rather than a dynamic view and is overgenerous in granting that every religion operates with a similar category of revelation.

Side by side with a small number of defects, one will find many brilliant passages, such as King's description of the element of passionate devotion in Puritanism, his exposition of Roman Catholicism as a blend of legalism and sacramentalism, and his acute criticisms of Humanism both in its "soft" (Confucianism and modern humanitarianism) and "hard" (Communism) forms.

Unlike other books of this same general type, this volume does not collapse in the last chapter. King recommends a "prospective mutual enrichment of religions" which can be achieved by the double movement within each high religion of purgation and reconstruction. His list of the areas in which Christianity must show deeper concern and creative advance sounds almost exactly like the agenda one might find proposed for a conference of the Lutheran World Federation or the World Council of Churches.

A thirty-page annotated bibliography adds greatly to the value of this superb book.

HAROLD H. DITMANSON

The World's Religions. Edited by J. N. D. Anderson. Grand Rapids: Wm. Eerdman's Publishing House, 1953. 208 pages. $3.

This "practical handbook" on seven of the leading religions of the world does a fine job of telescoping a vast amount of material into one small volume and could very profitably be used as a text or guide for a short course in the history of religions. All of the contributors write from personal observation as well as from an acquaintance with written sources—something that one feels is lacking in most texts of this character. There is no chapter on the Christian religion. The editor explains this in the foreword by saying the book was intended for people presumed to be familiar with the Christian tradition. To this reviewer the omission is proper, if for no other reason (and there are other reasons) than that of making the book less bulky.

The book suffers from the usual defects of collaborations. The chapters are not of equal length or worth. For example, the one on Islam (to this reviewer, the best one) covers almost 50 pages, whereas the ones on Hinduism and Buddhism cover less than 20 pages each. Chapter I entitled "Animism" appears hastily done. One misses in this

chapter adequate discussion of the psychological and social sources of primitive religion. The works of Malinowski and Durkheim are not even mentioned. Loaded adjectives like "savage" and "heathenish" (for primitive or native) unnecessarily jar the reader. Broad generalizations, such as this one: "An animism passes into deism . . . there is no tendency to rise upward to monotheism" (p. 19); or this one: "the primitive savage (*sic!*) has always been found to possess the instinctive knowledge not only that the soul is immortal, but that there is a Creator, a Supreme Being who is the maker of all things and holder of the key of life" (p. 22)—such generalizations lead one to wonder whether the author is more interested in dogmatics than description. Other chapters are quite free from such dogmatic assertions. The chapter on Judaism is enlightening on the doctrines and practices of present-day Judaism, but short-changes the reader on the rich historical development of that faith.

The epilogue is an interesting attempt to relate the Christian faith to non-Christian religions. While it would encourage Christians to assume a critical acceptance of many values and insights of the non-Christian faiths, it would warn against assuming that attitude towards their own faith. "In regard to the Christian faith, the Christian will neither want nor dare to meddle" because it is "God-revealed and therefore of universal validity." Alas, it is not quite so simple! But the main contention of the chapter is right: the unique significance of Christianity centers in the revelation of God in Christ.

These criticisms need not be fatal. On the whole, the book is a scholarly work and deserves a place on the shelf of any student interested in the history of the world's religions.

STANLEY L. OLSEN

Love, Power, and Justice. By Paul Tillich. New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1954. 125 pages. $2.50.

This ontological analysis of the root meanings of the three concepts of love, power, and justice is intensely interesting and instructive. The introduction indicates the jungle of problems and confusion that prevails when these concepts are used metaphorically. The task of ontology is an endless one, because the encounter with reality is inexhaustible.

These lectures delivered at Nottingham, England, and at Union Seminary in Richmond, Virginia, are timely because of contemporary interest in psychotherapeutic literature, the misleading emphasis upon the emotional element in love, and the ill-defined use of the words power and justice.

Dr. Tillich's interpretation will be very helpful to those who are trying to understand the concepts of *eros, epithymia, philia,* and *agape* and their relations to each other without considering how they are related to being as such.

The author commends Luther for his insight into the unity of power and love. Love as the ground of life is indicated, e.g., in the statement, "There is an element of libido even in the most spiritualized friendship and in the most ascetic mysticism . . . in *agape* ultimate reality manifests itself and transforms life and love."

"Power is the possibility of self-affirmation in spite of internal and external negation. It is the possibility of overcoming nonbeing." Herein lies the mission and ministry of faith, which affirms the presence of the infinite in the finite.

Justice is presented as the form in which the power of being actualizes itself. Love is the principle of justice. The four principles which mediate between the form of being in its universal and unchanging character and a concrete situation are: adequacy, equality, personality and freedom.

The last three chapters deal with the unity of justice, love and power in personal relations, in group relations and in ultimate relations. The ethics, sociology and theology of these chapters is clear, concise and challenging. The inadequacy of the theory of values and pragmatism in ethics is clearly shown. The theory of moral imperative is declared to be really ontological; the law given by God is an essential of man's true nature. Justification and forgiveness are handled superbly. Forgiveness is the fulfillment of creative justice. Another quotation

will indicate the author's thinking: "The Cross of Christ is the symbol of the divine love, participating in the destruction into which it throws him who acts against love."

The lectures show the strength and weakness of ancient and medieval philosophy and its treatment of these three concepts. They set forth the relevance of the proper understanding of these ontological concepts to the understanding of theology. Needless to say the logic of these lectures is crystal clear, the sociology is sane, the theology is biblically based. There is a breadth of knowledge, a depth of insight and a vision of truth that is refreshing and stimulating.

HARVEY D. HOOVER

The Dilemma of Church and State. By G. Elson Ruff. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1954. 103 pages. $1.50.

Most studies dealing with the problem of the relationship between church and state tend to be theoretical and abstract. Dr. G. Elson Ruff, the distinguished editor of *The Lutheran,* has written a very understandable yet penetrating survey and analysis of this vexing problem. Looking at history, he asks, "What has been the relationship between church and state through the centuries?" He answers that church and state have always lived together: "A church cannot exist without a state because voluntary acceptance of group standards is never so complete and unanimous that there are not some who must be compelled to conform. A state cannot exist without a church because coercive power cannot sustain itself when there is no faith to sanction authority" (p. 1).

The specifically Christian solution to the "dilemma" begins with the church living within the state. This arrangement was eventually replaced by what Dr. Ruff calls the "totalitarian church," which claimed to be "God's instrument for supervision of the whole earthly creation" (p. 17), and which is the heritage of Roman Catholicism to this day. In the East, however, the church was swallowed by the totalitarian state, with the result that it spoke only "for the rulers of the world and not for man as God's creature." Thus it ceased to be the living church (p. 35). The Russian development after 1917 is only the logical result of the "surrender to Caesar" that had characterized the life of the eastern church for centuries. The Lutheran interpretation of the problem in Germany Dr. Ruff calls a "temporary arrangement continued for four hundred years" (p. 53). Because of its close relationship to the states of Germany, the church became irrelevant to the social situation. Only in the fiery trial of the Nazi holocaust did Christians learn again, "the church must not be captive to the state, or it becomes irrelevant to the people's need. It is to be the front line for all who suffer injustice. It must be the conscience of the state" (p. 60).

After surveying Calvinistic theocracy and the efforts of the American sects to come to terms with the state, the author devotes almost half the book to a study of the contemporary American situation. He notes that the present worship of the "kingdom of No-God" has apparently disqualified Christianity as the organized expression of the faith undergirding America. It appears that Christianity's place is to be taken by democracy as the American faith. Dr. Ruff quotes John Dewey as saying that "governmental agencies must teach the democratic ideal as religion" (p. 86).

While Roman Catholicism is aware of the attack from the worshipers of "No-God," most Protestants, as their approval of Paul Blanshard indicates, do not see this threat very clearly. They do not realize that they are "an embattled regiment along one side of a triangle." On the second side of this triangle is the Roman Catholic church and on the third side are the secularists, "the armies of the kingdom of No-God."

Because of the triangular battle-lines the struggle tends to become confused, and people who are holding firm in one direction may be overrun from the other side. In this confusion of the relationship between church and state Dr. Ruff recommends 1) self-examination, 2) prayer, 3) public witness. Such self-examination will reveal that the weakness of Protestantism in American life is the result of a negative and petty morality. Protestants have forgotten that "all morality is social." They have been naive in their perfectionism and pietism. And they have

tended to become so immersed in the world as to lose all distinctive character. The result is that they have nothing the world does not have. This conformity to the world Dr. Ruff finds shockingly illustrated by the acceptance of racial segregation in the church itself.

The church, in order to be the conscience of the state, must never cease to witness to the state. But this means that we ought to take up the practical concerns of political life within our congregations and their organizations and study them in the light of Christian revelation. Dr. Ruff insists that it is not enough that board secretaries in charge of social views have informed opinions. Responsible Christian attitudes which exist only in the "ecclesiastical stratosphere" are in fact irresponsible. All Christians, without exception, must train themselves to bear witness to the realm of God within the realm of Caesar.

Two criticisms seem in order. This book, as most others, makes no distinction between the opposition of segments of the German church to Nazism and the opposition of the church in Norway, Denmark, Holland, etc., to the German invasion. Yet there is a crucial difference between these two situations. For the German churchmen who opposed Nazism swam against the common stream of nationalism while the Norwegian and Dutch church leaders were carried by this stream. This does not in any way lessen the heroism of this latter group. But the distinction is important when discussing the dilemma of church and state. For in contemporary America the church is tempted by a popularity which it has as the alleged bulwark of "Americanism." The German situation should teach us that the Gospel can be betrayed for the sake of patriotism. The lesson from Norway or present-day East Germany is far less clear.

Secondly, Dr. Ruff speaks of power as a "necessary evil, an evil necessity" (p. 35). This completely negative attitude toward power is hardly defensible on the basis of the New Testament where power is primarily the possession of God, both as *dynamis* and *exousia*. When man uses this power apart from God it corrupts and destroys but this is the result of man's revolt against his creator. Any denunciation of power as such does not take seriously the fact that God is the source of all power.

This is an important book. Dr. Ruff has made a promising beginning toward the education of Christian people for responsible citizenship, which he advocates so eloquently. It would be well if not only pastors but church councils, brotherhoods, missionary societies and young people's groups would study this book and its implications systematically. For what Dr. Ruff says is frighteningly true: "There will be a faith which Americans will share in common when the upheaval resulting from the introduction of a plurality of faiths has subsided. Whether it is to be faith in God or No-God is yet to be determined. The outcome depends largely on the vitality of the witness of the Christian people regarding the relevance of their faith to the problems of the common life" (p. 103).

GEORGE W. FORELL

Christianity, Diplomacy and War. By Herbert Butterfield. New York and Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1953. 125 pages. $1.75.

The basic problem of this small book is the problem of power. Prof. Butterfield's thesis is the same as Lord Acton's, *viz.*, that power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely, and that power has a tendency to expand indefinitely, transcending all barriers until a superior power stops it. Butterfield, who is professor of modern history at Cambridge, believes that this unique nature of power must lead us to look at the modern conflict between East and West in a cooler light. Insisting that Christian diplomacy should be based upon original sin and the universality of guilt, he argues that it is fruitless for Christians and others to embark on a moralistic discussion of the rightness or wrongness of either side in this conflict. For one thing, wars "for righteousness" in the past have proved to be futile, producing only misery and leading to further political difficulties. Moreover, self-righteousness is the enemy of the Gospel of Christ, and Butterfield seems to be worried lest America fall into this pit

of self-righteousness. He points to the religious wars of the sixteenth century as evidence against ideological warfare and diplomacy today. When two parties regard each other as the perversion of the "holiest in life" as Protestants and Catholics did then, the result was only horror. Eventually both Protestant and Catholic saw that coexistence was not merely possible but a positive good, and that "the interests of the international order which had been so profoundly disrupted became the objective which was to over-ride mere egotism." Butterfield asks us to read communism and anti-communism for Protestant and Catholic, and draw our own inferences.

In the interests of "international order"—a term which Butterfield appears to identify with a power balance theory—modern diplomacy must eschew "ideological diplomacy" and realize that the real seat of our post-war difficulties is not ideological but the slab of power which is Russia. Perhaps communist ideology enables Russia to act with more excuses and even efficiency than was possible under its tsarist government, but the real problem is still Russian power, and "power is short of no excuses when it can act with impunity." Butterfield does not deny that there are momentous charges which Christianity can bring against communism, which may even steel our resolve against it, but he maintains that the present situation calls for neither ideological diplomacy nor an ideological "war for righteousness" against communism. The annihilation of communism is unlikely even if Russia were defeated in a war. Since the West appears in the role of defender of the *status quo* or as the white exploiters of Asia, the West would be foolish to appeal to ideology. If there must be war, and Butterfield is not a pacifist, the Christian must insist that it be limited to a war of defense and to restricted objectives (*not* unconditional surrender, but to the time when the enemy sues for peace, for Butterfield believes unconditional surrender creates only greater difficulties, *e.g.*, by reducing Germany to nothing, the West made Russia all the more powerful). Russia must be "contained," yes, but that is as far as we should go. An international order must have room for both communism and democracy.

Butterfield's thesis has received some battering in the press, notably in a page editorial in *Life* (November 2, 1953), which at least proves that this book cannot be ignored. *Life* took exception to the "old balance-of-power act" and its "high-minded and wrong-headed support" by Butterfield. *Life* countered that Americans are not likely to fall for a "war for righteousness" against communism, but that the Soviet future cannot be inferred from previous history either. Butterfield's worst error, *Life* continued, was to treat Communist Russia as though it had already passed the test for membership in an "international order" which he rightly wants to restore. Already the Soviet empire is swollen beyond safety for its neighbors and is so choked with slaves that it will not let some Christians sleep. *Life* doubted that Soviet Russia can pass the test. In *The Christian Century* (January 6, 1954) Paul Hutchinson also took exception to the "amoral balance-of-power politics" of Bismarck's Europe, which seems to be Butterfield's point. Hutchinson agreed that we are all sinners, ignorant, and subject to pride and power, but the corollary is *not* that we should give up all moral action or judgment. Hutchinson felt that Butterfield's thesis was in effect to ask Christians to wash their hands of the problems of war and turn war and everything connected with it back to the Bismarcks.

Perhaps the issue is not as simple as that, but one cannot help feeling that Butterfield's solution is not satisfying. Lutherans who are trying to re-evaluate their own viewpoint on problems of church, state, and war will find this book, nevertheless, very helpful. Certainly no one can deny the cogency of Butterfield's historical analysis of the shortsightedness of "wars for righteousness" and "total war." But must not the church have something more to say about the intensification of power and the lust for power, especially as it appears in totalitarian regimes that swallow up all forms of life, including the church? Must not power be based on law? Of course, this applies to the lust for power in any nation, but totalitarianisms like communism are the most obvious breach of this principle. Butterfield is attacking the problem on the level of diplomacy, however,

and one cannot dismiss his solution without weighing the many factors that enter the problem on this level. Has the church anything to say here? Butterfield's study is an important one and worth reading by every Christian concerned with this problem. It is brief, to the point, and provocative—perhaps, we may hope, to the point where some theologians will get busy and further develop some ideas suggested in this book.

WILLIAM H. K. NARUM

A Foundation of Ontology. A Critical Analysis of Nicolai Hartmann. By Otto Samuel. Translated by Frank Gaynor. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. 155 pages. $3.75.

Along with Alfred North Whitehead and Jacques Maritain, Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950) is one of the pioneers of twentieth century metaphysics. Although he stems from the Marburg school of Neo-Kantianism, and has learned much from phenomenology, he harks back to Aristotle in particular. His *Ethics* has been in English translation for many years, but in 1953 came the first translations of works dealing specifically with ontology: one, a small work entitled *New Ways of Ontology,* and the other the book we are considering here. The latter is both an abridged translation of *Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie* (1933) and a critical commentary by Otto Samuel.

The plan of Samuel's book is as follows: the odd-numbered chapters present Samuel's summary condensations of Hartmann's treatise; the even-numbered chapters contain Samuel's critical analysis of Hartmann's views. There can be no doubt of Samuel's sincerity of intent—he hopes by this kind of presentation to introduce the American reader to Hartmann's world of ideas. At the same time he wishes to submit his own debate with Hartmann to the reader, so that one gets both Hartmann and Samuel. This manner of procedure is highly dubious to the mind of this reviewer. Samuel himself expresses the hope that Hartmann's writings will be translated into English some day, and one wonders if it wouldn't have been preferable to have had a complete translation of this work rather than a highly condensed summary of what is difficult matter in any case. Also, would not Samuel's own criticism have been better presented in a book dealing with Hartmann's thought in general, which at the same time might have been a systematic study of Hartmann's entire philosophy? Such a book might better introduce the American reader to Hartmann than this one. Furthermore, if Samuel hopes to attract the American public to Hartmann, as he says in the introduction, one doubts that this work will be able to do it. Frankly, it is stiff going, and it is doubtful whether anyone but professional philosophers and advanced students of philosophy will get much out of it. One is not disputing Samuel's ability to condense with accuracy, or to criticize with cogency, but rather whether what he has intended to accomplish can be achieved in a work of this sort. At least we have before us in English something of and about Hartmann, and for that we can be grateful to Samuel. Hartmann was one of the few voices crying in the wilderness of twentieth century positivism, subjectivism, pragmatism, and materialism for a return to the fundamental concerns of ontology. Ontology is the study of being *as* being, as distinguished from physics, sociology, history, and other like studies which deal with a limited aspect of being. Hartmann was not only concerned with the problem of being as such, but especially with the problem of the being of man. His original contributions to ontology are again brought to mind by this volume.

WILLIAM H. K. NARUM

The Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. Edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp. New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1952. 883 pages. $7.50.

This newest volume in THE LIBRARY OF LIVING PHILOSOPHERS claims a unique place in that very distinguished series just as its "Subject," Radhakrishnan, does in the modern world. The former is an especially fine example of the excellence of Editor Schilpp's ingenious method, and the latter is an outstanding instance of the best in thought and action in the East today. Radhakrishnan is a philosopher of the first order, and such a master of English prose as perhaps only a

brilliant Indian trained partly in England could be. He is also a political and cultural ambassador between the East and West. The Indian State assigned to him—imagine, Americans, to a philosopher!—the challenging task of representing India at the Kremlin. Believing in love and service, and condemning force as a method, here indeed was an assignment.

The responsibility of mediating between conflicting points of view rests easily upon his shoulders, for he has had to face that task throughout his long life (he was born in 1888). He is a Hindu in spite of the fact that he studied at Madras Christian College and later came under the influence of competent Christian leaders. He graciously discusses the specific reasons why he remains a Vedantist, and Christian theologians and ministers can profit by a study of his reasons. He has had to mediate not only between the Hindu East and the Christian West, but also between the various philosophies of life of the East. Of the 23 expository and critical essays in this volume, one of the three most severely critical is by a fellow-Indian, A. R. Wadia of the University of Baroda.

Rarely in this series of studies has a subject written a more informing and apparently completely candid intellectual autobiography. Modestly calling it "Fragments of a Confession," in these 82 pages he has not only laid bare his own mind and heart, but in precisely the winning way of love which he advocates he captures his reader with the sense of a wise prophet who genuinely "weeps over Jerusalem." "The world," he writes, "which has found itself a single body is feeling for its soul." Has anyone put more succinctly this characteristic of our age? Again, ponder such lines as these: "The prominent feature of our time is not so much the wars and the dictatorships which have disfigured it, but the impact of different cultures on one another, their interaction, and the emergence of a new civilization based on the truths of spirit and the unity of mankind. The tragedies and catastrophes which occupy so much of the foreground of our consciousness are symbolic of the breakdown of the separatist tendencies and the movement towards the integration of national societies in the world whole. In the confusions of the contemporary scene, this fallible, long-suffering and apparently helpless generation should not overlook the great movement towards integration in which it is participating."

Radhakrishnan's total philosophy may be described in terms of four major themes. The first and most important is metaphysics. So saying, I wish to point out that three things are involved: (a) Radhakrishnan is opposed to logical positivists on the one hand and certain types of religious thinkers on the other hand, both of whom reject metaphysics (or at least look down their collective noses at it) as being meaningless or merely emotionally expressive. He, on the contrary, holds it to be of central importance in anyone's attitude toward the nature and purpose of life. His own position is a rather clear-cut "intuitional absolute idealism," to use George P. Conger's phrase. As such it is a fresh rendering of "the perennial philosophy." Indeed, Conger shrewdly describes it as "less ponderous than Royce, less meticulous than Bradley, less involved than Hegel" (p. 86). He may easily be said to rank with Fichte and Schelling. Truth, goodness, and beauty are for him not subjective fancies nor abstract categories of thought—they are objective facts (p. 202). They are not only ultimate values which are part of the purpose of the world; they are supreme realities, more real than you and I, than this paper, than relations in the world. This ultimate reality is the source from which all else came and comes, and the goal of all right aspiration. Metaphysics, therefore, is the basis for ethics, axiology, religion, the social sciences. It was a disappointment to me that nothing was said of the arts as being informed similarly by this metaphysical viewpoint.

The way in which ultimate reality is known is by intuition, but intuition is of two kinds, perceptual knowledge and integral insight. Notice that intuition, accordingly, includes both the direct and immediate knowledge of ordinary cognitive processes and also the direct consciousness of truth. It is different from the perceptual—as when you perceive these written words—and from the conceptual—as when you ask a person, "What's your conception of democracy?" It is man's active use of his intellect and

imagination. Intuitive knowledge, he maintains, is not limited to its highest form of knowledge of God; it is present in our knowledge of each other, in aesthetic experience, and in scientific thinking. It is verified "by its capacity to bring coherence and harmony into systems framed by the intellect" (p. 794). He agrees with the late E. S. Brightman (though Radhakrishnan is not a personalist) that "complete intuition is simply a name for complete reason" (p. 795).

Readers of this QUARTERLY may be expected to be especially interested in Radhakrishnan's treatment of religion. He writes, in his reply, "Without religious vision human life is but a flash of occasional enjoyments lighting up a mass of pain and misery, a bagatelle of transient experience, as Whitehead says. Without some transcendent aim civilization either wallows in pleasure or lapses into barren repetition" (p. 804). Religion, he believes, "involves the consciousness of a Supreme Personal Reality and our intimate relation to that Reality." Although it is difficult to grasp and impossible to define that Supreme Reality, or God, we can know a good deal about what God is not (e.g. he is not emergent, a mechanical engineer, a remote ground or structure of the universe, etc.), but it is harder to describe the fact that he is a holy and immanent spirit working "in us, through us, and beyond us." Thomism is incorrect, therefore, not only because it claims too much for reason so far as knowledge of God goes, but also because it claims to know exactly where and how there has been a divine revelation (p. 241). Authoritarianism, rampant in religion as well as in politics, is the chief evil in the world today, according to Radhakrishnan.

What of Jesus and of Christianity? "For me," he writes, "the person of Jesus is a historical fact. Christ is not a datum of history, but a judgment of history. Jesus' insight is expressive of a timeless spiritual fact; but what theologians say of it are afterthoughts, interpretations of the fact. . . . Jesus ignores ritual and is indifferent to legalistic piety. . . . He is . . . to us the ideal of human perfection by embodying it visibly in himself" (p. 807). Here is the key to his own commitment, for it manifests a profound appreciation but at the same time the conviction that "Christian faith . . . was pleased to confer upon him (Jesus) a divinity and a divine inerrancy to which he made no claim." He quotes: "Why callest thou me good? There is none good but one, that is God." Christianity, as he therefore sees it, has a unique and priceless meaning and spirit to give to the world—certainly the pure religion of Jesus has—but it must do so in the winning spirit in which some teachers and missionaries have shared it, *i.e.*, constructively and not as if to say that anything else is stupid and depraved. On these, as on other matters, he is cross-examined especially by F. C. S. Northop and Joachim Wach; his reply contains all that one could expect, short of pressing for a particular kind of personal commitment.

The third and fourth major themes must, for lack of space, be discussed in unison. The former, the history of philosophy, raises issues regarding the basic *Geist* of Eastern and Western thought, their allegedly different attitudes toward deity, man, toleration, and similar topics, not to mention the matter of a difference of general approach: "restless search and exploration" in the West, and "stability, serenity, and certitude" in the East. Northop is Radhakrishnan's severest critic in these matters, and deservedly gets most of the attention in the able reply.

It is Radhakrishnan's views on social and political philosophy, however, which will impress most readers with their penetration and soundness. Mr. Kabir, of the Ministry of Education of the government of India, gives a superlative description of the subject's political philosophy in spite of the fact, as he correctly states, that this has not ever been systematically developed by Radhakrishnan. Here one finds a vigorous belief in democracy, freedom, and the principles of love and service. These are based, as are his ethical views, soundly on his metaphysical convictions about the nature of the universe and of man. The goal of history and of the cosmic process is one; it is dominated by spirit (as Greek, Indian, and Christian thought affirm). Democracy, therefore, becomes a religious issue, for the value and the significance of the individual are at its roots. So with freedom: ". . . no political arrangement in which individuality is sup-

pressed can be justified." Hence Radhakrishnan opposed *any* suppression and *all* forms of totalitarianism—clerical, political, economic. Pondering Radhakrishnan's writing on these themes, one begins to feel like giving a cheer that India has produced a philosopher, statesman, and educator who can with moving feeling yet clear, judicious reason eloquently ring out the essentials of democracy and the beliefs written into the Preamble of the United Nations Charter. His motivation presumably is twofold: (a) the tolerance and adherence to truth which are described by another interpreter as characteristics of his Hindu philosophy of life, and (b) his acceptance of the gospel of love and service of Jesus. Nor is he any less clear on "means" as well as "ends." Let the petty and noisy political and religious bigots of today read his words about the *only* method appropriate to a democracy: persuasion of the free minds of citizens in the light of the facts, respect for all minorities, even by those which attain a majority, and the consent of the governed.

Here, then, is a fine and stirring book, a credit to Radhakrishnan, to the India he represents, to the essayists, and to the editor who devised this techique of mutual edification. The world will be the wiser and the more constructive and peaceful because of its influence.

CHARLES W. KEGLEY

Modern Uncertainty and Christian Faith. By G. C. Berkouwer. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1953. 86 pages. $1.50.

G. C. Berkouwer is a calvinistic fundamentalist and carries the title with great dignity. He is conversant with the leading theologians of our day, and is not afraid to point out their weaknesses. He is also aware of the trends of the times, and advises against over-simplification in trying to deal with them. This book has plenty of food for thought for both the conservative and the liberal thinker. While the book deals with big issues, the author's style is simple enough for the average layman to read. The reviewer felt that Professor Berkouwer selected the right problems for his lectures, but that in some cases he only sparred with his material rather than coming to grips with it. We can fully agree with his solemn warning that because a man uses the same words which we use it does not mean that we speak the same theological language. The reviewer feels that while the more liberal scholar might be led to reject the author's position, it is well worth his time to read the book. It confronts us with matters which call for some action. Just as any true Christian apologetic work ought to challenge our evangelistic and missionary spirit, so this book calls us to take an inventory of our day, and to give a bold Christian answer.

G. F. SCHOTT

Introduction to Theology. By John Christian Wenger. Scottdale, Pennsylvania: Herald Press, 1954. 418 pages. $4.

John Christian Wenger is Professor of Systematic Theology at Goshen College Biblical Seminary, Goshen, Indiana, and is of such caliber in his scholarship and ability that the Publishing Committee of the Mennonite Publication Board asked him to write a "Mennonite theology." In his preface he states that he wants this book to be "saturated with the doctrines of the Anabaptist, and yet that it should be more biblical than historical in character." He also states that while he wants his work to be scholarly enough to appeal to the theologian, he also wants it to be simple enough to be readable by the layman with "a childlike faith in Christ."

Anyone reading this book will readily admit that the Committee knew the right man to select. Professor Wenger has received training outside of his own theological atmosphere and so comes to his task with a broad background. He is unafraid to deal with the problems which confront the present day theologian, and yet he reflects the conservativeness of the Mennonites. The author reaches his goals, for he has given us a truly Anabaptist position, garnished with Scripture passages, not just citations but passages printed in the body of the text, written in a very readable style and in simple theological language. Whenever he uses a technical term, he explains it so that the layman will understand its meaning.

The Lutheran reader will be very much interested in the author's knowledge of Luther and his works, even if Professor Wenger does not use Luther at places where we might wish him to. One gets the impression that the author uses Luther only when it is convenient in spite of his appeal to an open minded approach.

As one reads this book, he will be impressed with the many points of agreement between the Lutheran and Mennonite positions, but he will be equally impressed by the vastness of the points of difference. These differences stand out most in the sections dealing with what we Lutherans call the "Means of Grace." While our author uses this term, and includes prayer as a means of grace, he never means what we mean by the term. The Anabaptist position is also marked plainly for us in the sections dealing with secular authority and the Christian's duty to serve as judges, etc., revenge, oaths. The reader, if he has never read the works of Menno Simons, will in these sections get a good insight into the writings of this great Mennonite leader. This reviewer was well impressed with the general evangelical tone of this book, but could not help wishing that this evangelical-biblical approach would be applied to such topics as the Sacraments, oaths, etc.

The book is refreshing, not just because of its readable style, but because it presents to us the position of the Mennonites in a forthright way. It should make the Lutheran reader re-think his own position. The Mennonite spirit is reflected in the very way the author deals with those who differ with his position, and this too is refreshing in a day when men who differ seem to become bitter in their statements.

G. F. Schott

Svensk kyrka och teologi i dag. By Arvid Runestam. Stockholm: Diakonistyrelsens Bokförlag, 1953. 43 pages. Kr. 2.

The author of this booklet is a well-known Swedish churchman. Having previously served as professor of theology at Uppsala University he has now for a number of years, and with great distinction, filled the position of bishop in the Church of Sweden. Runestam is therefore well qualified to deal with the subject at hand, for he knows very intimately both the church and the theology of his native land.

The present era, so Runestam maintains, is one in which three distinct and different movements are discernible. These are: anti-liberalism, anti-pietism and "highchurchism." These have, in the main, come as a reaction against certain aspects of a former liberalism, but they may also be considered as a result of the over-all psychological world situation of today. The author affirms that the present generation of theologians have not rightly understood or appreciated such "liberals" as Nathan Soderblom, Einar Billing and J. A. Eklund, and that they have not followed the direction given by these men. In this connection he makes the observation that present day theologians, and especially those of the Lundensian School, have passed by a number of important problems and, at times even at the risk of being oblivious to truth, have presented the Christian doctrine with a simplicity that in and by itself may become misleading. Christian doctrine has become *theo*logy, that is, it deals altogether with what God does and with his activity and has little or nothing to say on the subject of how man reacts, or should react, with reference to the redemption offered. This is shunned on the basis that it belongs to the field of psychology rather than to theology.

The author finds three reasons for the existing renewal of an emphasis of liturgy that marks the movement of "high-churchism." These are: 1) Life today lacks a sure foundation, there is no faith, no hope, no future. 2) Life has no moral stability, and man simply follows the stream which leads to moral decadence. 3) There is a general lack of interest, and the spirit of adventure is missing.

To compensate for all this, men now seek an anchorage in the forms of religion and in the sense of mystery that is connected with the liturgy of the church. In these things, then, men seek a stability that has not been offered or found elsewhere. Return has become the slogan of the day, and for a few this has meant a return to Rome, but for others, again, it stands for a return to a

verbally-inspired Bible, to orthodoxy, and to a re-emphasis of the authority of the church.

The good bishop who has written this little volume is not afraid to criticize his church where he finds it wanting or to disagree with some of the proponents of a rather widely accepted form of theology if he thinks that they have rendered a disservice to truth as he finds it. He pleads for a more personal experience of religion, and this is a plea that might be in place in the situation obtaining in the so-called "Folk Church" of Sweden.

We have read this book with great interest and recommend it to those who seek further insights into what is happening within the Church of Sweden.

C. G. CARLFELT

The Protestant Credo. Edited by Vergilius Ferm. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. 241 pages. $5.

"The Protestant Credo" comprises ten chapters written by as many different authors, the last one by the editor himself, Dr. Vergilius Ferm. Other authors are Gaius Glenn Atkins, Conrad Henry Moehlman, Francis John McConnell, Morton Scott Enslin, John T. McNeill, John C. Bennett, Francis William Buckler, Henry Nelson Wieman, and Floyd H. Ross.

In the preface the editor says, "What we have sought to do in this volume is to state the Protestant faith and its essentials," and the authors address themselves mainly to Protestant laymen—intelligent, enquiring laymen who would not think of being anything but Protestant, yet are not quite able to explain why they are that and not something else.

In their aim to address laymen most of the writers have been fairly successful. With only a few exceptions the chapters are written in interesting style and in language which will be understood by almost any intelligent lay reader.

As a book of instruction in the essentials of the Protestant faith "The Protestant Credo" is about as successful as any anthology of ten opinions could well be expected to be. It would not be hard to imagine that the reader might come away bewildered instead of instructed, since the chapters range from a Protestantism in the sense of almost radical individualism and unimaginative humanism, on the one hand, to a profound understanding of the genius of Reformation theology on the other.

However, the person who will read the book through and preferably in not more than two or three sittings will probably get a good understanding of basic evangelical Protestant thought. The majority of the writers stand on the ground of true Protestant theology, and among these are a few of more than ordinary insight. Worthy of special mention is Dr. John T. McNeill's chapter, "Resources and Realities." "Protestantism 'protests,'" he says, "and has always protested in terms of affirmation not less than negation." This fact illustrates itself in the Lutheran Church's attitude toward and participation in such areas as church polity, the Scriptures, private property, culture in general. One very gratifying recurrent note in the book, almost from beginning to end, is that by the very genius of Protestantism the Church of the Reformation must never allow itself to settle down in the easy feeling of having arrived. The intellectual and religious activity which produced the Protestant Church in the sixteenth century must be a continuing thing, lest the Protestant church become a caricature of the religion and theology of the Reformation.

T. T. JENSEN

Martin Luther, Reformer of the Church. By Alfred Th. Jørgensen. Translated by Ronald M. Jensen. With an Introduction by J. A. Aasgaard. Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1953. 225 pages. $3.

The late Dr. Jørgensen's book, *Martin Luther, Kirkens Reformator,* which was originally published in Denmark in 1946, has now become available in a very readable English translation made by Pastor R. M. Jensen of the Evangelical Lutheran Church.

Dr. Jørgensen was one of the truly great churchmen of Denmark. He served on the Executive Committee of the Lutheran World Federation from its inception until 1952. "He is remembered," writes Dr. Aasgaard, "by many people in various European countries

for his service in welfare fields." Above all he was a Luther scholar. The present volume is the legacy of his half century of Luther research to the lay people of the church.

This book is not merely another popular biography of Luther. It contains a wealth of material—though highly selective—which is not available elsewhere in English. The detailed description of the state of the Church *circa* 1500, the impact of the Reformation upon the Scandinavian countries, the well-documented reports on Luther by both friend and foe are especially valuable to the Luther scholar. Dr. Jørgensen quotes extensively from Catholic sources, both contemporary and modern (Paul Helgesen, the *Skiby Chronicle,* Paul J. Reiter, Joseph Lortz *et al.*). This gives to the book a dispassionate, but convincing objectivity. Most of the Scandinavian source material used in this book is new to the American reader. Moreover, there is a rearrangement of German material, interestingly told, *e.g.,* the amusing meeting of Luther with Vergerio in Wittenberg in 1535. The book also contains brief digests of many of Luther's works (in small print), following the tradition of the German standard work by Koestlin. The final chapter, "Four Hundred Years Later," offers an excellent analysis of the lasting values of Luther's work, a soul-searching review of the shortcomings of the church, and a positive evaluation of the respective positions of the Roman and the Lutheran churches in modern society. By necessity, the contents of the book are selective, often sketchy, bringing out certain highlights of the career of Luther. But the volume is a very helpful supplement to the many fine larger biographies of Luther which have appeared through the years, especially in regards to its emphasis on the impact of the Reformation upon Scandinavia.

The translation is very well done, but it suffers somewhat from the following peculiarities: The translator's statement that "there are few books on Luther which truly present the great Reformer in such a fashion as to be readable and understandable to the average man" (!); his inclination to argue with the distinguished author in footnotes (Jørgensen: "The touch of superstition never left Luther." Jensen: "Luther was not bound in superstition after his conversion," etc.); certain idiosyncrasies (Tetzel, who did not know a word of Danish, says: *"Naar Pengene i Kassen klinger . . ."*; Alexander VI has two Italian children (Lucrezia, Cesare) and a Spanish child (Juan), etc.); spelling of geographical names not in conformity with approved usage (Luverne for Louvain, Flensborg for Flensburg, etc.); misprints (Alexander IV for VI; Evangelical Hymn Book of 1523 for 1524; spelling both John *Hus* and *Huss,* etc.).

As background material, especially from the Scandinavian point of view, this present volume is to be highly recommended. For family reading it offers an excellent introduction to the life and work of Luther.

WALTER G. TILLMANNS

Die Theologie des Gottesdienstes bei Luther. By Vilmos Vajta. Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokförlag, 1952. 375 pages.

The men of the Lundensian school and their students seem to be intent on covering one field of theology after the other, especially in regard to the teachings of Luther. In the volume under review, Vilmos Vajta, the present director of the Theological Department of the Lutheran World Federation, presents an exhaustive treatment of Luther's theology of worship. The following brief summary will indicate the general tenor of Vajta's book.

The distinction between subjective and objective elements in worship fails to do justice to Luther's thought. For to him, God and faith belong together and cannot be separated. Worship is not merely man's response to the action of God, but revelation and worship are in essence one and the same thing: fellowship between God and man on the earthly level. Nor has the contrast between magical and spiritual religion anything to do with Luther's liturgical struggle. To him, man made ceremonies are a threat—not to a so-called purely spiritual religion, but to the Lord's Supper as instituted by Christ. Luther is not in the least anti-cultic, but he is against a cult which misdirects rather than engenders faith, and therefore promotes idolatry rather than the true Christian faith.

The basic error in the Roman Mass is the concept of the Lord's Supper as a sacrifice. Thus worship becomes a work of man, an *opus operatum* which has religious value, even without faith on the part of the recipient. To Luther, not the command "this do," but the promise "for you" is the core of the Words of Institution. The Lord's Supper is God's gift to men and the Words of Institution are *Verba Testamenti* in the literal sense: Christ's last will and testament, bequeathing to us what he earned for us. The words "this do in remembrance of me" are to be interpreted from I Cor. 11:26. Our part consists in "showing the Lord's death." This proclamation is the priestly sacrifice of the Christian; for Christian sacrifice consists not in liturgical acts, but in that fellowship with the Crucified in which man dies to himself and rises to a new life of praise and thanksgiving to God. Most of these emphases will be familiar to students of recent theological works on Luther. But Vajta offers a convenient, dependable, and intelligible account of Luther's teachings on worship and a critique of earlier German works on the same subject. It is regrettable that the author failed to consider explicitly the modern Anglican objections to Luther's liturgical ideas, but some of his statements contain an implicit answer to these views. One could also wish that Luther's practical reforms would have been given fuller consideration as the expression of his general theological convictions. But even in its present form, this book should help to keep the liturgical movement in the Lutheran Church firmly orientated by the leading thoughts of Luther.

ULRICH S. LEUPOLD

Europäische Briefe im Reformationszeitalter. Edited by Walther Hubatsch. Kitzingen/Main: Holzner Verlag, 1949. 176 pages. DM 9.80.

This book is one in a post-war series emanating from the "Göttinger Arbeitskreis," a group of East German refugee scholars, organized in 1946 to publish materials intended to keep alive the refugee's interest in his homeland and to alert West Germans (especially the younger generation) to the necessity of maintaining vital contact with East Germany's political and cultural past.

The book under review is a selection of 200 letters addressed to Markgraf Albrecht of Brandenburg-Ansbach, Duke of Prussia who lived from 1490 to 1568. Hohenzollern Albrecht was hereditary ruler of Ansbach at the time theTeutonic Knights of East Prussia elected him Grand Master of the order (1510), in the hope that a prince might give the moribund Knights a "shot in the arm."

As an imperial prince Albrecht attended the Reichstag at Nürnberg (1522-23), during which time he was converted to Reformation truth by the preaching of Osiander. On the return trip to Königsberg he stopped off to visit Luther, who sought to persuade him "to throw aside the foolish and absurd rules of the Order, to marry, and to convert the religious state into a secular state."

Two years later, in 1525, Albrecht, acting on the advice of Luther, secularized the Order, proclaimed himself hereditary duke of Prussia, and formally introduced the Reformation. The letters contained herein date from this turning point and extend to the last years of Albrecht's life. Written by Europe's great and near-great ranging geographically from Sweden to Spain and England to Hungary, they reveal Albrecht as a Renaissance prince disturbed by the problems in the great transitional period between the Middle Ages and the modern era. In fact, the chief problems of the age found expression in the person and activity of the Prussian duke himself: the relationship between spiritual and secular authority, the tension between the old and the new doctrine, the strengthening of ties between East and West.

The selection of letters now made available to those interested in the age of the Reformation form only a very small part of the more than 40,000 which, at one time at least, were deposited in the ducal archives in Königsberg. The purpose of the editor is not to give a history of the Reformation, but rather to let the Europe of the age of the Reformation mirror itself through this variety of epistolary literature whose only unity lies in the fact that it is directed to the same individual.

The letters are divided into three categories: 1) those written by emperors and kings; 2) those written by German princes;

and 3) those written by reformers, scholars, artists, and "Bürger." Brief introductions have been prepared by the editor to set the letters in biographical and historical context. They are exceptionally valuable.

The reader will find letters from Emperor Charles V, Henry VIII, Queen Mary Tudor, Queen Elizabeth, Gustav Vasa I of Sweden, Christian III of Denmark, and Katherine de'Medici. Landgraf Philip of Hesse writes on the Lutheran-Zwinglian disputes over the Lord's Supper suggesting that Albrecht and Prussia walk a middle road between the disputants. Communications from Luther and Melanchthon are supplemented by messages from Bugenhagen, Osiander, Spalatin, and Calvin. Especially interesting is a long letter from Cardinal Stanislaus Hosius who, while attending the Council of Trent, urges his friend Albrecht unsuccessfully to repudiate the evangelical faith. Copernicus, the astronomer, the Cranachs (father and son), Ludwig Senfl, the musician, the Fuggers of Augsburg, and Hans Lufft, Luther's printer at Wittenberg, are other writers whose letters speak to us as well as to Duke Albrecht.

From beginning to end this is an interesting and valuable collection of source materials, which reflect, as often only letters can do, the Zeitgeist of the 16th century. In addition, they give enriching sidelights on the main personalities of this turbulent age.

E. Clifford Nelson

Breve og Aktstykker Vedrørende Søren Kierkegaard. 2 vols. Published on behalf of the Søren Kierkegaard Society by Niels Thulstrup. Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard, 1953 and 1954. 344 and 148 pages. Kr. 68.

These two volumes of Kierkegaardiana, the first containing 344 pages of letters and documents, the second containing Mr. Thulstrup's notes and comments, are a singular instance of Danish scholarship at its best. Engendered by the Kierkegaard Society, this work is a tribute not only to Kierkegaard but also to the sagacity and thoroughness of Mr. Thulstrup, who with the help of many of his contemporaries (notably Carl Wetzler), made such excellent use of the rich library sources and historical scholarship of Denmark to produce a well-nigh definitive edition. Drawing from all kinds of sources, published and unpublished. Mr. Thulstrup has here put together most if not all of the remaining primary source materials which Kierkegaard's collected works (in fourteen volumes) and papers (in twenty more) with minor exceptions did not already include. Therefore, these two volumes properly belong to all students and libraries which seek the minimal essential materials respecting Kierkegaard.

Kierkegaard's letters reveal an author who despite his sophistication and cosmopolitan urbanity was always within an orbit of Danish correspondents. Aside from a few visits to Berlin, he was content to stay within Copenhagen. Because of his voluntary circumscription the letters to and from him focus rather clearly upon the events and people within a small city and land. When one reads Mr. Thulstrup's illuminating commentary (as Danes call the extended footnotes), one realizes that the complicity of Denmark, Danes, the church, and Kierkegaard began early and extends certainly to the scholarship of the present hour. The orbit is not large nor was it so for Kierkegaard. But long and intensive cultivation within one university, one city, one church, one continuous historical tradition, molded a Kierkegaard and produces to this very hour a kind of homogeneous scholarship which can identify every pastor, every petty official, every emphasis and party, the content of past university lectures—in short, everything that matters for historical scholarship, but almost nothing that matters for understanding Kierkegaard's creative theological and philosophical reflection. Therefore, these letters and the scholarship on them reveal the Danishness of the man but do not carry one a whit further into the understanding of the argument of his most singular literature.

Kierkegaard poured his brief life into the creation of a literature which would re-introduce men to Christianity in a culture where everyone was, as Kierkegaard ironically averred, a Christian already. This task required his use of pseudonyms, it played a role in his break with his beloved Regine, it eventuated his slashing attack upon the

Danish Lutheran Church. Nothing in Kierkegaard's letters suggests any secret loves or hates, any causes or motives for any of the above, which are not already developed *in extenso* in his formal literature. Some might argue, therefore, that Kierkegaard was not a great letter writer—and I surely would agree, but not for the reason that his letters do not explain or reveal what his works seem to hide. Rather, might it be said that Kierkegaard was so great an author that he translated himself *in toto* into his authorship and hence the letters are of two kinds: those to Regine and certain others of his friends are of a piece with his literature, seeming, even the love letters, to anticipate or amplify what his books explore; others are perfunctory and casual, born of necessity. This latter characteristic becomes especially obvious when one reads the papers and journals where Kierkegaard communicates with himself and posterity in the idiom he chooses—here he is frequqently prolix about matters which get only casual attention in letters.

Nonetheless Kierkegaard's letters are interesting to read. His interests in his relatives, especially the nieces and nephews, is surprisingly constant and intense. He worries along with them about the grades in school, about their health, their birthdays, about getting gifts and giving them. He jokes and spoofs along with sufficient abandonment in these letters to credit the regard which he was shown in turn by some of them later. He exhibits touching humaneness and the kindest of social amenities. These letters spite, therefore, those superficial readers of his literature who construe him to have been a kind of bogey-man Viking. Surely he was intensely reflective upon his own problems but it is no psychologically sick and demanding man who writes the tender and sympathetic letter to his brother's wife explaining, in response to a request, the relation between being faithful and bodily suffering (No. 167). And those to Henrik Lund, which culminate in the long account the young medical student gives of the birds he has seen in Odense, are most exemplary. Obviously no one would have dared either to send such long and dreadful poetry as did Kierkegaard's physician friend unless the recipient were also a man of charm and humor. The friendship between a professor of law, Kolderup-Rosenvinge, and Kierkegaard produced many letters and these indicate that the latter, although conservative and cautious, was fully abreast of the social and political developments of the time.

Furthermore, these letters indicate the dimensions of Kierkegaard's fame in Denmark. One young man asks him to read his manuscript as a step towards its publication; several persons urge him to take sides in the controversies of the day; then there are those who believe that he ought to preach regularly and express to Sunday audiences what his books had already made clear. But Kierkegaard knew how to say no. The famous Swedish collector of celebrities, Frederika Bremer, was deftly turned aside. It becomes very clear that Kierkegaard's decision to be an author was a profound ethico-religious decision—he made it his calling and nothing could detract him from it. What he always declines is the immediate extrinsic significance so many lesser men revel in, for the sake of the intrinsic religious and reflective worth which makes him an author to be remembered.

Kierkegaard's correspondence begins in 1829 when he is sixteen years of age. It spans the next twenty-six years. As a totality it tells the same story that his other writings do of a young man, eminently talented, who was engrossed from first to last with understanding and becoming a Christian. He is baptized, confirmed, schooled, and churched. But with discerning anxiety he begins to press his talents to the question of whether any or all of these can actually constitute his relation to God. Rightly or wrongly, he finally concludes that all of these presuppose qualitative conditions within the individual which neither church nor state, sacraments nor learning, can command. The letters tell this story too. To Rasmus Nielsen, a professor of philosophy and erstwhile protege, Kierkegaard writes about Martensen's *Dogmatics* and says (the translation is my own):

> A dogmatic system is, Christianly considered, a luxury article; . . . proper only if in truth all men were Christians. . . . A dogmatic system should not be erected on

the basis of understanding the faith but on the basis of understanding that one cannot understand the faith. The truth is that in respect to Christianity the priest and the professor say the same thing, only that the professor says it in the second power . . . within a stricter discipline.

Instead of making faith easier, Kierkegaard chose to state it within the strictest intellectual disciplines he knew and without any falsifying translation or loss of values. This letter is an epigram upon his entire life and authorship.

Three hundred and twelve letters, twenty-one documents (certificates of baptism, vaccination, school and university, death, and his final testament), numerous "dedications" included by the author in gift copies of his books—these are the contents of Volume I. They tell the story of a man who protested against the church and its tamed faith but did not, like so many others of his time, become a sectarian. Instead, he sought the church and believed that its reform must be in the direction of honesty about the difficulties of being a Christian. Denmark has quite clearly always had room for genius, even Kierkegaard's, but honesty and the severity it brings, ah, that is something else. The contemporary surge of interest in his writings in Denmark promises to keep him safe and Danish by describing him always in commodious historical and literary categories. That it was these which he disparaged as a means of understanding either the Christian faith or any body of valid truths—and the latter may include his own writings—seems to be forgotten. It is a melancholy thought that even such a labor of love as these two volumes are for their editor shall undoubtedly become extended parenthetical asides for more historical scholars. But this does not detract any of the glory rightly belonging to Niels Thulstrup for his almost thankless and painstaking work. His notes are brief yet illuminating. Every subsequent reader of Kierkegaard literature must surely know something of these two volumes. It is to be hoped that a considerable selection will also be published for English-reading audiences.

PAUL L. HOLMER

Preaching From Isaiah. By John P. Milton. Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1953. 187 pages. $2.50.

Many books in a pastor's library are bought, read once—lightly or studiously—then consigned to the bookshelf, seldom to be used again. This volume, however, likely will not experience such a fate. Here Dr. John P. Milton, professor of Old Testament at Luther Theological Seminary, St. Paul, has given his fellow preachers, teachers and Bible students a book which may well stand within easy reach on the desk and be a constant companion through a year of preaching and on many another occasion thereafter.

The book is not a commentary, nor a collection of sermon outlines, nor a Bible study guide in Isaiah; yet in usage it can provide stimulating help in any of these areas. Its chief purpose is accomplished in the second of its four sections. These four are: a brief sketch of the historical milieu of the Book of Isaiah; a selected topic, text and theme from Isaiah for each Sunday and festival of the Church Year; brief suggestions for topical preaching from Isaiah on twenty-five vital theological themes such as Sin, Redemption, Salvation, the Holiness of God, Peace, Love, the Messiah, the New Heaven and New Earth; and a listing of fifty-two great texts from Isaiah. A concluding index of texts adds to the practical convenience of the volume.

To provide all of this in a volume of 187 pages with any degree of thoroughness is a notable accomplishment; we believe Dr. Milton has achieved this to a high degree. This is due in large measure to the pattern followed in the chief section of the book, dealing with the pericope texts for each Sunday and festival. For each of these a text is selected to fit the season and theme of the day in line with the historic church year. For each text a topic for the day and a theme are given. (Many of the topical headings are, as the writer acknowledges, selected from the Augustana Hymnal lectionary.) Then, in a few compact paragraphs, each text is treated under the following three headings: Relation of the text to the topic; Basic religious teachings of the text; New Testament echoes of the text. It becomes quite apparent from

this outline that a sermon growing out of these aids to study will be firmly biblical and expository in character. Preacher and worshiper alike will be led into the deep spiritual treasures of this the crown of Old Testament prophecy, and they will discover with renewed inspiration its spiritual harmony with the New Testament revelation. Incidentally, your reviewer has found rich spiritual rewards in using the meditations, particularly for the Sundays in Lent, as a basis for private devotional study.

Those of us who have preached from the Eisenach or other Old Testament pericope series through a church year are aware of the blessing which can come from greater use of the Old Testament in our pulpit ministry. Here is a book which will give real encouragement and assistance toward exploiting this blessing. Dr. Milton expresses this hope in his foreword: "It is my hope and belief that the lessons selected from Isaiah will help in preaching on the New Testament even when they are not used as sermon texts in their own right. It is my prayer that when they are used for preaching they will be seen always to unite with the message of the New Testament as one Word of God." The reviewer is quite confident that the user of Dr. Milton's book will experience in gratifying measure a fulfillment of the author's hope and prayer.

C. C. MADSEN

The Student's New Testament. The Westcott and Hort New Testament in Greek parallel with The American Translation by Edgar J. Goodspeed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954. 1055 pages. $6.

Here is an excellent tool for the serious Bible student. The Geek and the English text are printed on opposite pages. Because the Greek text requires more space than the English, there is room for brief notes at the bottom of the pages carrying the English version. The four pages of introduction deal largely with the Westcott and Hort text.

HARVEY D. HOOVER

The God in You. By Kermit Eby. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954. 162 pages. $2.50.

This book is a sociological autobiography written by a man who has lived his Christian faith. The book integrates all of life from youth to maturity, showing how the seed ideas of youth blossom into the attitudes and actions of later years. The character and attitudes of the mind of the adult are traced back to the instruction, discipline and experiences of boyhood. Influence of the home in creating and developing attitudes is emphasized. Children cannot be forced or coaxed into correct attitudes, but "they catch the spirit of right thinking and right doing by example."

Of teaching the author says, "All successful teaching is dependent on the relationship between the teacher and the taught." "Each student is important and each merits special emphasis and attention. He is more important than books. He is more important than records. He is more important than footnotes."

Some of our unchristian practices are indicated: our believing in the separateness of mind and heart in business; our shouting hurrah for American, but believing that all politics are beyond honor; our stealing money from those who earn it and giving it to others in the name of charity; our bold declarations of hatred of war, and our wild preparations for it. We seem to think that we must be "successful" at any cost. We work hard to produce destructive instruments of war and fussily sympathize with a friend who has lost his son in Korea.

The author declares that we must learn the truth, and act upon it. There is a price to pay and a job for each of us to do. We must learn to cooperate with minorities, strangers, and those who are different. We must want to integrate humanity divided by race, color, religion, education, mind-washing, and other forces without and within.

The book ends with the statement, "The final prize is the irrevocable knowledge that you have attempted to live the God in you as fully and as satisfyingly as is possible."

HARVEY D. HOOVER

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